



## Central African Republic — Va-PoReg Country Report

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07/13/1894 Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France]: From this date on, France seized and colonized Ubangi-Shari (Haut-Oubangui).<sup>1</sup> On 07/01/1904, the territories of Haut-Chari and Haut-Oubangui were united to form Oubangui-Chari.<sup>2</sup> On 02/11/1906 the territory merged into Oubangui-Chari-Tchad. In 1920 French Equatorial Africa was established and Ubangi-Shari was administered from Brazzaville. Multiparty legislative elections were absent during this period (LIED). Both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent, but both treat the Central African Republic only since 1920 in their dataset. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. The Constitution of the French Republic of 10/27/1946 granted French citizenship to inhabitants and established local assemblies consisting of French colonists and several African inhabitants.<sup>3</sup> However, this did not constitute a shift to indirect rule, as the assembly was elected through a discriminatory double college system that favored European settlers and denied the vast majority of the indigenous population the right to vote. Universal suffrage was absent, and the assembly's powers were limited to advisory functions without genuine legislative authority. According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. Political liberties were absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem's PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also moderate.

03/31/1957 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the first territorial elections under universal suffrage were held, marking the implementation of the Loi Cadre Defferre of 1956. This reform abolished the double college system and granted the territory a significant degree of internal self-government, fulfilling the criteria for indirect rule. The elections resulted in a landslide victory for the Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa (Mouvement de l'Évolution Sociale de l'Afrique Noir – MESAN), led and founded by Barthélemy Boganda, which won all 50 seats in the Territorial Assembly. Consequently, Boganda was appointed Vice-President of the Government Council, becoming the de facto head of the territory's first indigenous government. While France retained control over foreign affairs and defense, the new government under Boganda and his nephew David Dacko, who became the republic's first president in 1960, exercised genuine authority over domestic administration (Lansford 2021: 286). 12/01/1958 End Indirect Rule Colonial Regime [of France, Liberal Democracy]/Start Electoral Autocracy [semi-souverain, external affairs under France, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, the Central African Republic was proclaimed an autonomous republic following a referendum on 09/28/1958.<sup>4</sup> The first steps of the new government were to draft a constitution. It borrowed many parts from the French constitution and was democratic in nature. The constitution was approved by the assembly on 02/16/1959. Parliamentary elections were scheduled for 04/05/1959, but the newly created electoral law basically hindered independents and opposition parties to participate. Therefore, MESAN was unopposed.<sup>5</sup> After its leader's (Boganda) death in 1959, the party split and Dacko became leader of MESAN (Mehler 1999b: 205). According to LIED political liberties were absent for this period. V-Dem's PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present in this period. For 1959,

V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

08/13/1960 End Electoral Autocracy [semi-sovereign, external affairs under France, Liberal Democracy]/Start One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy [as independent country]: After two years of autonomy the Central African Republic became independent under the rule of the faction of MESAN led by Dacko. President Dacko established a political monopoly, suppressed the other faction of MESAN, jailed its leaders and banned all other parties in 1962 (Lansford 2021: 286, Collier 1982:109, Decalo 1989: 205, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 52-53). Hence, the country was a one-party autocracy. In the presidential elections on 01/05/1964 Dacko was the sole candidate for MESAN and received officially 99.97% of the vote. Regarding to GWF, the rule of Dacko is classified as personalist. While it is according to the coding of this dataset a one-party autocracy it belongs to the subset of one-party (personalist) autocracies. Corruption, poor economic performance and rebellion plagued the country. LIED categorizes the election as not competitive since 1946. According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. Between 1946 and 1963, V-Dem's EF&FI scores the countries elections as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores them as not really clean. LIED categorizes them as not competitive. LIED considers political liberties as absent. V-Dem's PCLI varies between not really present and absent for this time. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1961 to 1963, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 1964 and 1965, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

12/31/1965[-01/01/1966] End One-Party (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: On this date, a military coup (Saint-Sylvestre coup d'état) staged by Colonel Jean-Bédél Bokassa, Chief of Staff and Commander of the Army, ousted Dacko, a cousin of Bokassa (Decalo 1989:207, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 52-53). After the coup on 12/31/1965 Bokassa declared himself president, prime minister, and head of the sole political party, MESAN (Decalo 1989: 207-211, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 53). He established a new governing body known as the Revolutionary Council, nullified the existing constitution, and disbanded the parliament.<sup>6</sup> On 03/04/1972 Bokassa declared himself president for life.<sup>7</sup> On 12/04/1977 Bokassa coronated himself emperor and the country was renamed in Central African Empire. There is a consensus among historians and political scientists that Bokassa's rule was kleptocratic. He is estimated to have stolen billions of dollars from the Central African Republic during his reign. He used this money to fund his lavish lifestyle, including his coronation as emperor and his construction of a lavish palace. He also used the money to buy expensive gifts for himself and his family (Tittley 1997). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Besides, both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

09/20/1979 End Personalist Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date Bokassa was overthrown by a coup by armed forces of exiles led by Dacko and backed by the French military invasion known as „Operation Barracuda” (Decalo 1989: 234-235). After the coup, Dacko was reinstalled as president (Decalo 1989: 234-238, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 53). On 03/15/1981, Dacko was reelected president of the Republic in a

multiparty presidential election. By 09/21/1981, „Operation Barracuda” was over, and Dacko signed a provisional constitutional act (Colpus Dataset Case Narrative, 2021:233). The 1981 presidential election witnessed irregularities, sparking demands for annulment from opposition parties. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes it as not competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI lists it as not really free or fair and their CEI as not clean. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. LIED classifies political liberties as absent in this period. According to V-Dem’s PCLI political liberties were absent in 1979 and ambiguous in 1980 and 1981. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. The oppositions outcry resulted in civil unrest and the subsequent delay of legislative elections. The suspension of political parties and widespread dissatisfaction then served as the pretext for a bloodless coup d’état (Mehler 1999b: 206). Therefore, we classify this period as electoral autocracy.

09/01/1981 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: General Kolingba ousted President Dacko in a bloodless coup and a Military Committee for National Recover (French: Comité Militaire pour le Redressement National, CMRN) was established and led by Kolingba (Decalo 1989: 240-241, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 53). Subsequently, the CMRN suspended the Constitution and restricted political party engagement.<sup>8</sup> According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. While LIED still codes political liberties as not present, V-Dem’s PCLI scores them as ambiguous in 1981 and as not really present until 1986.

11/21/1986 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: On this date, a constitutional referendum was held in the Central African Republic, turning the country into a one-party state with the Central African Democratic Rally as the only legal party. Moreover, term limits of the presidency were removed, making Kolingba the automatically elected president. The referendum was approved by 92.22% of voters with a 87.6% turnout.<sup>9</sup> Subsequently, in 1987 and 1988, partially unrestricted parliamentary elections took place; however, Kolingba prevented his two prominent political rivals, Abel Goumba and Ange-Félix Patassé, from participating.<sup>10</sup> Under Kolingba’s leadership, the government remained under his direct authority, and he retained complete control over both the executive and legislative branches of the nation’s governance.<sup>11</sup> LIED categorizes the elections as not competitive. During this period, electoral freedom and fairness is scored as not really present by V-Dem’s EF&FI. Their CEI scores the elections as not clean. According to FH’s classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Moreover, political liberties were still absent (LIED). Following V-Dem’s PCLI they were not really present until 1990 and ambiguous until 1992. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

10/25/1992 End One-Party Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the Central African Republic conducted general elections to select a President and National Assembly, marking the first instance of multi-party democracy since its restoration in 1991. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. V-Dem’s

EF&FI scores the elections as somewhat free and fair while their CEI still scores them as not clean. Notably, the incumbent President, André Kolingba, finished last in the elections. However, the Supreme Court nullified the election outcomes due to extensive irregularities. Consequently, new elections were held the following year.<sup>12</sup> The international community pressed for competitive elections and change as well (Mehler 1999b: 206). According to FH's classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. V-Dem's PCLI states that the presence of political liberties in this period was ambiguous. In 1993, as per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Because of the severe irregularities during these elections which led to the annulment, we classify this period as electoral autocracy.

09/19/1993 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, the second round of multiparty presidential elections were held, Kolingba was defeated and subsequently resigned from his position. The first round of the elections took place on 08/22/1992 (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 53).<sup>13</sup> Patassé took office on 10/22/1993. This marked the first peaceful power transfer since independence.<sup>14</sup> He was reelected in 1999.<sup>15</sup> There were ongoing defects which led to political instability and severely constrained democracy in the Central African Republic. Although the elections were free and fair, because of the support of the UN, the electoral process was controlled by the government.<sup>16</sup> The political and civil liberties were violated. These included: violation of the right of physical integrity, restrictions of freedom of press and freedom of assembly. Furthermore, the judicial independence was restricted.<sup>17</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorized all elections during this time as competitive. Between 1993 and 2003, V-Dem's EF&FI first rose to scoring the countries elections as somewhat free and fair but later dopped back down to ambiguous. Their CEI rose briefly to scoring the elections as not really clean but also dropped back down to not clean. As classified by FH for the regime period until 1995, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. For 1996 and 1997 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. Between 1998 and 2000 a score of 6 to 7 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. As classified by FH for the rest of the regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. According to LIED political liberties were absent in this period. V-Dem's PCLI classifies as ambiguous in 1993 and as somewhat present from 1994 onward. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

03/15/2003 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military (Personalist) Autocracy: General François Bozizé and a militia from Chad invaded the country and seized the capital (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 53). Patasse was out of the country at the time and no efforts were made to restore him to power. Bozizé rose to become a high-ranking army officer in the 1970s, under the rule of Bokassa.<sup>18</sup> Following Bozizé's assumption of power, he implemented a curfew and suspended the constitution.<sup>19</sup> On 03/16/2003, just a day after seizing control, he declared himself president of the Central African Republic. This move prompted France to deploy troops to safeguard foreign citizens, marking their first intervention in four years. Post-coup, Bozizé established a new faction within the Central African Armed Forces, known as the Republican Guard, comprised of individuals who supported his coup. This unit perpetrated numerous atrocities against civilians in the capital.<sup>20</sup> Following Bozizé's seizure of power, the Central African Republic Bush War erupted with the uprising led by Michel Djotodia's Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR). This conflict swiftly intensified, culminating in significant hostilities throughout 2004. In December 2004, a constitution endorsing a semi-presidential system and imposing a two-term limit was ratified through a referendum. Concurrently, on 12/30/2004, Bozizé

emerged as one of five contenders cleared to participate in the presidential election set for early 2005. Subsequently, on 01/04/2005, Bozizé declared that three initially sidelined candidates would also be permitted to enter the race, although former president Patassé was not among either faction. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Furthermore, political liberties are considered as absent by LIED. Whereas, V-Dem's PCLI codes them as somewhat present. Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

03/13/2005 End Military (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, general elections took place, which were won by Bozizé.<sup>21</sup> The National Assembly authorized Bozizé to rule by decree for three months, from 01/01 to 03/31/2006.<sup>22</sup> In 2008, Bozizé opened a so-called „Inclusive Political Dialogue” with his rebel foes.<sup>23</sup> In the first round of the presidential election on 01/23/2011, President Bozizé was re-elected with 64% of the votes cast. In addition, 26 of the 35 deputies elected in the first round of legislative elections belonged to his party, the „Kwa Na Kwa” (Work Just Work - KNK), including President Bozizé himself and several family members. The opposition quickly denounced irregularities and demanded the cancellation of the election. The European Union, in a document released in March 2011, observed numerous irregularities and determined that the election held on 01/23/2011, raised doubts regarding its fairness and equity, which are fundamental to democratic elections. The period leading up to the election was characterized by intimidation, arrests, and constraints on the freedom of movement of those opposing the regime.<sup>24</sup> Until January 2013, his son held position of defense minister.<sup>25</sup> After dismissing his son, Bozizé took over the defense ministry himself.<sup>26</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED no competitive elections were held for the entire time. During this period, V-Dem's EF&FI scores the freedom and fairness of elections as ambiguous while their CEI scores them as not clean. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. According to V-Dem's PCLI political liberties were somewhat present in this period. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

03/24/2013 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, the Muslim rebel coalition Séléka marched into Bangui and overthrew president Bozizé. Séléka launched a transition phase with Michel Djotodia as president but failed to stop the fighting in the country.<sup>27</sup> On 01/20/2014, the National Transitional Council chose Bangui mayor Catherine Samba Panza as interim president, following Djotodia's resignation on 01/10/2014. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. LIED declares political liberties as absent for this time. V-Dem's PCLI varies between an ambiguous level in 2013 and a somewhat present level until 2016. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

03/30/2016 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, the former prime minister Faustin-Archange Touadéra was elected president. He was re-elected on 03/14/2020, but the opposition contested the election due to alleged fraud and irregularities. However, the Constitutional Court rejected the appeals and confirmed his presidency, despite significant electoral flaws. Fighting between armed militant groups and the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) continued throughout 2022, and the state

authority outside the capital remains weak.<sup>28</sup> Touadéra sought to extend his presidency to a third term to which end he announced a constitutional reform in 2022. In this time, the court was marred by interference by a Russian diplomat, calling on the court chief to help Touadéra. Judicial independence is further hampered by corruption and various other factors including unpaid salaries. Touadéra secured a third term in a referendum with 61% turnout. However, the opposition widely claims that the voting procedure was marred by irregularities and accused the electoral institutions of not acting independently.<sup>29</sup> Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Besides, LIED continues to classify the elections as not competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI rates the countries elections as not really free or fair and their CEI scores them as not free. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. According to LIED political liberties were absent for this period. V-Dem's PCLI scores political liberties as somewhat present from 2016 to 2022 and as ambiguous in 2023. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the year 2017, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the following year, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. During 2019 and 2020, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2021 and 2022, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the year 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central\\_African\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_African_Republic)

<sup>2</sup> <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haut-Oubangui>

<sup>3</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central\\_African\\_Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_African_Republic)

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.encyclopedia.com/places/africa/central-african-republic-political-geography/central-african-republic>

<sup>5</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barth%C3%A9lemy\\_Boganda#Internal\\_autonomy\\_and\\_MESAN\\_government](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barth%C3%A9lemy_Boganda#Internal_autonomy_and_MESAN_government)

<sup>6</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-B%C3%A9del\\_Bokassa](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-B%C3%A9del_Bokassa)

<sup>7</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-B%C3%A9del\\_Bokassa](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-B%C3%A9del_Bokassa)

<sup>8</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981\\_Central\\_African\\_Republic\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Central_African_Republic_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>9</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1986\\_Central\\_African\\_constitutional\\_referendum](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1986_Central_African_constitutional_referendum)

<sup>10</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central\\_African\\_Republic#Central\\_African\\_Republic\\_under\\_Kolingba](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_African_Republic#Central_African_Republic_under_Kolingba)

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-African-Republic/Authoritarian-rule-under-Kolingba>

<sup>12</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992\\_Central\\_African\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Central_African_general_election)

<sup>13</sup> <https://africanelections.tripod.com/cf.html>

<sup>14</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993\\_Central\\_African\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Central_African_general_election)

<sup>15</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999\\_Central\\_African\\_presidential\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_Central_African_presidential_election)

<sup>16</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ange-F%C3%A9lix\\_Patass%C3%A9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ange-F%C3%A9lix_Patass%C3%A9); <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/af/731.htm>

<sup>17</sup> <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/af/731.htm>

<sup>18</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fran%C3%A7ois\\_Boziz%C3%A9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fran%C3%A7ois_Boziz%C3%A9)

<sup>19</sup> <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2003/03/17/rebel-leader-seizes-power-suspends-constitution>

<sup>20</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003\\_Central\\_African\\_Republic\\_coup\\_d%27%C3%A9tat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2003_Central_African_Republic_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat)

<sup>21</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005\\_Central\\_African\\_general\\_election](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Central_African_general_election); [http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2059\\_05.htm](http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2059_05.htm)

- <sup>22</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fran%C3%A7ois\\_Boziz%C3%A9](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fran%C3%A7ois_Boziz%C3%A9)
- <sup>23</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-car-rebels-bozize-idUKBRE9010J120130102>
- <sup>24</sup> <https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/central-african-republic/CENTRAL-AFRICAN-REPUBLIC-2010-2011>
- <sup>25</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-car-rebels-bozize-idUKBRE9010J120130102/>
- <sup>26</sup> <https://www.voanews.com/a/car-president-sacks-defense-minister/1576975.html>
- <sup>27</sup> <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/dix-ans-apres-le-coup-detat-la-republique>
- <sup>28</sup> <https://freedomhouse.org/country/central-african-republic/freedom-world/2022>
- <sup>29</sup> <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230807-central-african-republic-approves-new-constitution-possible-third-term-for-touadera>
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