



China — Va-PoReg Country Report

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04/01/1636 Start Autocratic Monarchy: China became sovereign in 1600 BC. In April 1636, Hong Taiji, leader of the Manchu, proclaimed the establishment of the Qing dynasty, marking the beginning of their rule.¹ In 1909 for the first time some kind of Chinese parliamentary elections took place, however, not in the modern sense. They were indirect election to an imperial Advisory Council, a preparatory body of the parliament created under the constitutional reform bought by the late Qing dynasty. Even if participation was extremely restricted, it is seen by some sources as the first popular election in Chinese history.² The monarchy was dynastic and absolute until 11/03/1911. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For this period, LIED states political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI as what we interpret as not really present.

11/03/1911 End Autocratic Monarchy/Start Constitutional Monarchy: On this date, the Qing dynasty issued the 'Doctrine of Nineteen Articles', which limited the emperor's absolute power and established a system of ministerial responsibility inspired by the British system from the imperial era. The doctrine expanded the power of the congress.³ On 02/12/1912, empress Longyu signed an abdication decree on behalf of the Xuantong Emperor. This alteration marked the transition to a constitutional monarchy.⁴ LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

01/01/1912 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start Military Autocracy: Only about three months later, on this date, Sun Yat-sen announced the establishment of the Republic of China in Nanking, and he was inaugurated as the Provisional President of the Republic. During February 1912, the Qing dynasty was toppled, and authority was transferred to Yuan Shih-kai, who served as both the president of the council of ministers and an official. The newly established regime granted Yuan Shih-kai substantial powers as president. Yuan was the leader of the Beiyang Army and used its power to gain more control. Therefore, this regime was known as the Beiyang government.⁵ While the constitution nominally placed the government and the state under civilian control, the Beiyang generals effectively wielded authority over them. Therefore, we code this regime as a military autocracy.⁶ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. LIED still codes political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI switched to an ambiguous level. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

01/01/1913 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: From December 1912 to January 1913, elections were conducted for the national assembly, resulting in a significant victory for the Kuomintang (KMT), also known as the „Chinese Nationalist Party”.⁷ The national assembly was the first elected legislature in the Republic of China. As voters chose electors, it was an indirect poll. It was a bicameral assembly; the senate was elected by provincial assemblies and representatives were directly elected.⁸ The president was tasked with selecting the 64 members who would represent Tibet, Outer Mongolia, and Overseas Chinese. Notably, this process involved the participation of over 300 civic groups, making it the most competitive nationwide elections in Chinese history.⁹ Eligible to cast a vote were only adult males over 21 years of age who owned property, paid taxes, were educated and could prove a two-year residency in a particular county. About 4-6% of the population were able to register for elections.¹⁰ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as not competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores them as not really clean and fair while their CEI scores them as not lean. Although the subnational elections in 1912 exhibited some degree of competitiveness, suffrage was extremely restricted, and the prevalence of vote buying was significant. Only about one per cent of the population could vote. Furthermore, the regime resorted to repressive measures against political opponents. (Young 1983: 208-13, 222-24, 226, 231, 237-38, Sheridan 1983, Casey et al. 2020: 3-4). Less than one percent of the population voted in the indirect poll.

07/12/1913 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Personalist Autocracy: On this date, Jianxi, as the first of many southern provinces, declared independence. These events occurred within the frame of the „Second Revolution”. This was a revolt of the Southern Provinces as well as the Kuomintang against Yuan Shikai who had started to ignore the National Assembly’s decisions soon after the elections. Additionally, Yuan Shikai assassinated Song Jiaoren, the leader of the Kuomintang, and arranged the assassination of several other Kuomintang politicians. When the Kuomintang started voicing their outrage over the power abuse of Yuan Shikai, he decided to use military action against them.¹¹ Yuan Shikai outlawed the Kuomintang and expelled them from the National Assembly.¹² On 01/10/1914, Yuan Shikai disbanded the National Assembly after it had lost its quorum due to the expulsion of the Kuomintang.¹³ The second revolution had failed. Yuan Shikai’s Beiyang Army had beaten the revolt. The revolution cemented Yuan’s power. To give his government seeming legitimacy, he promulgated the constitutional compact which gave him unlimited control over the Chinese army, finances, foreign policy and the rights of China’s citizens.¹⁴ Furthermore, it made him *de facto* president for life.¹⁵ On 12/12/1915 Yuan Shi-kai declared himself the emperor.¹⁶ One day earlier, the National Assembly had unanimously voted for his ascending to the throne.¹⁷ By declaring himself emperor, he tried to restore the Qing dynasty that had ended 1912.¹⁸ This event does not mark an actual transformation towards a monarchy but rather a conferral of titles and extension of absolute power typical for personalist autocracies. Generally, the Republican period in Chinese history, spanning from 1912 to 1949, marked an interim phase between the Qing dynasty and the emergence of the Communist People’s Republic of China (Elleman/Paine 2019).¹⁹ On 12/25/1915 the so-called National Protection War or the Anti-Monarchy War began. In the Yunnan Province, independence had been declared and military operations were launched against the new emperor’s army. The Guizhou and Guangxi provinces followed with a declaration of independence.²⁰ : On 03/22/1916, Yuan formally abdicated as emperor and restored the republic. However, he remained president, which was met with much resistance.²¹ On 06/06/1916, Yuan passed away. The National Protection War ended on 07/14/1916.²² According to LIED, only executive elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No legislative elections were present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Additionally, political liberties were absent (LIED) and indicate an ambiguous presence according to V-Dem’s PCLI.

07/14/1916 End Personalist Autocracy/Start No Central Authority: Following Yuan's ousting and subsequent demise, the central government swiftly lost its grip on the provinces, resulting in the absence of an effective central authority (Young 1983: 253-54, Sheridan 1983: 284, 287-91, 296-303, 307-9, Nathan 1983: 256, 266, Casey et al. 2020: 4). The so-called Warlord Era began.²³ The control of the country was subsequently divided between military cliques and regional factions, resulting in a period of warlordism. The key actors in the highly fragmented political landscape were mainly the Zhili clique, led by Cao Kun after 1919, and the Fengtian clique, both former members of the Beiyang army. Cao Kun was promised the vice-presidency by Duan Qirui during the 1918 national assembly elections, but the office remained vacant. As a result, Cao Kun experienced a sense of betrayal by Duan and engaged in battle, emerging victorious in 1920.²⁴ The first Zhili-Fengtian war broke out in 1922 and resulted in Zhili dominance.²⁵ During this period, the KMT tried to build a rival national government in Canton, led by Sun. He succeeded in taking the city with the help of the Soviets and agreed to build a coalition with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), building a revolutionary base. Sun's goal was to unify China through a military campaign.²⁶ In 1918, new assembly elections were initiated. Seventeen provinces provided responses, while five southern provinces opted for a boycott. Delegates for Tibet, Xinjiang, and Qinghai were appointed by Beijing. The voting process witnessed the open buying and selling of votes, with prices constantly fluctuating, and widespread instances of fraud and abuse.²⁷ This assembly, however, only came together until August 1920. In 1922, after the Zhili-Ahnui War and the victory of the Zhili clique led by Cao Kun, Li Yuanhong was appointed to the presidency in Beijing by the military leadership.²⁸ Yuanhong then summoned back the 1913 assembly, excluding the 1919 'extraordinary' additions, citing the same pretext that its three-year term had not been completed.²⁹ An alternative approach to code this period would be to code different political regimes on specific territories for China in this period. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Regarding political liberties they maintained to code them as absent (LIED) and as ambiguous (V-Dem PCLI). According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1917, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1918 to 1920, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 1921, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. The following two years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

10/05/1923 End No Central Authority/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Cao Kun, a former general of the Beiyang Army and the leader of the Zhili clique, was elected president by the National Assembly. Subsequently, the constitution, which was hastily drafted by the assembly, was promulgated by Cao Kun in 1923.³⁰ Just as Li Yuanhong's takeover of the presidency was orchestrated, so was Yuanhong's eviction from office. The military successes of the Zhili clique led Cao Kun to aspire to become president, which led to the ouster of Li Yuanhong, but also brought disunity to the Zhili clique and led to the reunion of the enemies of the Zhili clique.³¹³² In September of 1924, the Second Zhili-Fengtian War started, between the Fengtian and the Zhili clique. It ended with the Beijing Coup.³³ Cao Kun's term in office thus occurred in the turmoil of the War Lord Era. Hence, the Republic of China was still contested by different military cliques and a military-dominated culture characterized the political regime.³⁴ Therefore, the regime can only be classified as a military autocracy, since there were no popular multi-party/multi-candidate elections for president, the parliament, which had emerged from the 1913 elections and had been repeatedly reinstated, had questionable legitimacy, plus Cao Kun had a military background and had just won the preceding Zhili-Anui War as the leader of the Zhili-Clique. The regime classification as a military autocracy is further supported by the fact

that AF also classifies it as a military autocracy. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. LIED classifies the state of political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI as what we interpret as ambiguous. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

10/23/1924 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, the Beijing Coup occurred.³⁵ The coup took place at a pivotal juncture in the Second Zhili–Fengtian War, enabling the pro-Japanese Fengtian clique to overcome the previously dominant Zhili clique.³⁶ Feng Yuxiang put Huang Fu into the president's position.³⁷ On 11/24/1924 Duan Qirui was named the new Chief Executive of the nation by Zhang Zuolin, the leader of the Fengtian clique, who shared power with the leader of the coup Feng Yuxiang.³⁸ His government was reluctantly accepted by the Zhili and perceived as a neutral choice as Duan had no army of his own. In addition, the renaming of the President's title from 'President' to 'Chief Executive' further weakened the office politically. Duan contacted Sun Yat-sen, with the goal of renegotiating a national reunification. Sun died in 1925, which cut off the negotiations. Thereafter, Duan's government was extremely dependent on Feng Yuxiang and Zhang Zuolin. Duan was forced out of office in April 1926.³⁹ The reason was the Anti-Fengtian War – the last major civil war within the Republic of China.⁴⁰ The regime has to be classified as military autocracy because it exhibits essentially the same features as the previous regime, just under another clique. The only difference is that Duan Qirui itself did not have a military background but was dependent on the Fengtian clique and can therefore be seen as a figurehead president chosen by the military elite. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the relevant period, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Besides, political liberties continued to be coded as absent (LIED) and as ambiguous (V-Dem PCLI).

04/20/1926 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: After the Anti-Fengtian War, Duan Qirui was succeeded by multiple presidents who came from different political cliques and parties, but none of them held office for long.⁴¹ The period was marked by the Northern Expedition, „a military campaign launched by the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) of the Kuomintang (KMT) against the Beiyang government and other regional warlords in 1926. The purpose of the campaign was to reunify China, which had become fragmented.”⁴² The political situation was therefore very unstable. And it was only toward the end of the Northern Expedition that a national government could be installed.⁴³ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. In this timeframe, V-Dem's JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. LIED declares political liberties as not present. V-Dem's PCLI indicated an ambiguous status of political liberties until 1928, when the PCLI decreased into a range which indicates that political liberties were not really present.

10/10/1928 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start (Non-Electoral) One-Party Autocracy: On 10/10/1928, Chiang launched himself as the leader of the Nanjing Government. Between 1928 to 1949 during the Republican Era the Nationalist Party aka Kuomintang (KMT) was the sole party in a non-electoral regime.⁴⁴ The early achievements of the Nationalist Party were largely attributed to the assistance and counsel provided by the USSR, as well as their close cooperation with the Chinese communists from 1924 to 1927. Following the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925, leadership of the party gradually shifted to Chiang Kai Shek, who successfully brought the majority of China under its authority by curtailing or eliminating the regional

warlords' autonomy between 1926 and 1928.⁴⁵ He led the „Northern Expedition” and fought against the Beiyang government. They succeeded in 1928, when the KMT had most of China under its control.⁴⁶ Subsequently, the so-called Nanjing decade began and lasted until 1937. Moreover, after his victory, Chiang expelled any Communists from the KMT.⁴⁷ This period was characterized by conflicts, between 08/01/1927 and 12/07/1949 the Chinese Civil war raged, with some interruptions.⁴⁸ The struggle ensued between the government led by the Kuomintang in the Republic of China and the forces of the Chinese Communist Party, culminating in the establishment of Communist control over mainland China.⁴⁹ Moreover, between 07/07/1937 and 09/02/1945 the Second Sino-Japanese War took place, starting with the invasion of Japan.⁵⁰ In 1947 male suffrage was introduced.⁵¹ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Between 1928 and 1936, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. From 1946 to 1948, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. From 1929 to 1947, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1948 and 1949, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the entire time LIED still states an absence of political liberties, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates them as not really present.

01/21/1949 End (Non-Electoral) One-Party Autocracy/Start Communist Ideocracy: On this day, Chiang Kai Shek gave power as a peacemaking concession to the communist rebels. Power was handed over to his vice president Li Tsung Jen. One day later Beijing fell to the Communist ending de facto the power of the old regime. On 10/01/1949 the People's Republic of China (PRC) was declared by Mao Se Tung (Shinn/Worden 1988, Leung 2002: xxix). The Communist Revolutionaries led by Mao Se Tung had defeated the last strongholds of the Republic forces and had established a transitional government placing Mao at its head. Since then, the Chinese Communist Party is ruling China as a one-party autocracy. In 1953, universal suffrage was officially granted under the 1947 Constitution of the Republic of China when the First National Assembly (disbanded 2005) elections were held in 1947. But women were not explicitly enfranchised until 1953 thanks to the first Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China. The general populace can only vote for local elections.⁵² Local people's congresses are directly elected, operating under the control of the CCP. People's congresses at higher levels, including the National People's Congress (NPC), the national legislature, are elected indirectly by the people's congress at the immediately lower level.⁵³ From 1978 to 1982, China transformed its economy with reforms such as industrial liberalization, and the establishment of Special Economic Zones. These changes aimed to attract private and foreign investment and experiment with market-driven policies. These reforms laid the foundation for China's rapid economic growth. Between 1982 and 1989, China implemented more economic reforms to modernize its economy. These included decollectivization in agriculture, industrial liberalization, and the introduction of market-based price determination. From 1989 to 1991, China experienced a shift in its economic policies (Bramall 2008: 330). In spring 1989, a series of protests erupted in the country. These reached their climax on the night of June 3-4 at Tiananmen Square in Beijing. By spring 1989, an increasing desire for political and economic reform was evident among society, especially among university students, prompted by a decade of significant economic growth and openness, exposing many Chinese to foreign ideas and lifestyles. What began as a mourning gathering for the death of reformist Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang turned into demands for political change, freedom of speech, and an end to corruption. Thousands occupied Tiananmen Square, leading the government to declare martial law and send in the military. On the night of 06/03/1989 to 06/04/1989, troops used tanks and live ammunition to disperse protesters, resulting in numerous casualties.⁵⁴ As a result, there was a pause in the Gilley policy of opening-up as the government prioritized stability. Additionally, there were cuts in government spending, and the transition to market socialism was halted temporarily (Bramall 2008: 330). On 07/01/1997 Hong Kong was transferred from the United Kingdom to the People's Republic of

China. It was designate as a special administrative region (SAR) of China for a duration of 50 years, allowing it to maintain distinct economic and governmental structures during these years.⁵⁵ On 12/20/1999, Macau was transferred to the People's Republic of China from the Portuguese Republic in a similar fashion, also maintaining its own economic and administrative system.⁵⁶ Between 2002 and 2005, the first planned leadership transfer occurred, with Hu Jintao slowly transitioning into the authority previously held by Jiang Zemin.⁵⁷ Between 2012 and 2013 power then transitioned to Xi Jinping.⁵⁸ On 03/11/2018 the 13th National People's Congress passed a constitutional amendment which removed the term limits of the presidential and vice presidential office.⁵⁹ In recent years, the regime under the leadership of CCP general secretary Xi Jinping has significantly tightened control over every facet of life and governance. This control extends over the state bureaucracy, media, and civil society. Xi Jinping's consolidation of power represents a level of centralization not witnessed in China for many years. After years of crackdowns on political dissent, independent NGOs, and human rights advocates, civil society has been greatly weakened.⁶⁰ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were present during the specified period. From 1949 to 1965, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. Between 1966 and 1968, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1969 to 1975, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. Since 1976, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1950 to 1953, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. From 1954 to 2004, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Since 2004, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Moreover, since 1949 both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate that political liberties were constantly absent, except from 1986 to 1988 where V-Dem's PCLI is in a range which we interpret as not really present.

Communist Ideocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Bader 2011, Baum 1994, Gilley/Holbig 2010, Guo 2000, Hoffmann 1978, Landry 2008, Lin 2006, Saxonberg 2013)

Notes

¹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_China#Qing_dynasty_\(1636%E2%80%931912\);](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_China#Qing_dynasty_(1636%E2%80%931912);)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Qing_dynasty

² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1909_Chinese_parliamentary_election

³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nineteen_Articles

⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monarchy_of_China

⁵ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_\(1912%E2%80%931949\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_(1912%E2%80%931949))

⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beiyang_government

⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuan_Shikai; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1912_Chinese_National_Assembly_election

⁸ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_\(Beiyang_government\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_(Beiyang_government))

⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1918_Chinese_National_Assembly_election

¹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1912_Chinese_National_Assembly_election

¹¹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Revolution_\(Republic_of_China\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Revolution_(Republic_of_China))

¹² [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_\(Beiyang_government\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_(Beiyang_government))

¹³ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_\(Beiyang_government\);](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_(Beiyang_government);) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuan_Shikai

- ¹⁴ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Revolution_\(Republic_of_China\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Revolution_(Republic_of_China))
- ¹⁵ <https://countrystudies.us/china/20.htm>
- ¹⁶ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empire_of_China_\(1915%E2%80%931916\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empire_of_China_(1915%E2%80%931916))
- ¹⁷ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empire_of_China_\(1915%E2%80%931916\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empire_of_China_(1915%E2%80%931916))
- ¹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qing_dynasty
- ¹⁹ <https://countrystudies.us/china/20.htm>; <https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-China/The-early-republican-period>
- ²⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Protection_War
- ²¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yuan_Shikai
- ²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Protection_War
- ²³ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_\(1912%E2%80%931949\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_(1912%E2%80%931949))
- ²⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cao_Kun
- ²⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warlord_Era
- ²⁶ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_\(1912%E2%80%931949\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_(1912%E2%80%931949))
- ²⁷ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_\(Beiyang_government\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_(Beiyang_government))
- ²⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhili_clique https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li_Yuanhong
- ²⁹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_\(Beiyang_government\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Assembly_(Beiyang_government))
- ³⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1923_Chinese_presidential_election; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cao_Kun
- ³¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li_Yuanhong
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- ³³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Zhili%E2%80%93Fengtian_War
- ³⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warlord_Era
- ³⁵ <https://omniatlas.com/maps/asia-pacific/19241023/>
- ³⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1924_in_China
- ³⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feng_Yuxiang#Rise; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huang_Fu
- ³⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhang_Zuolin
- ³⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duan_Qirui
- ⁴⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Fengtian_War
- ⁴¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_presidents_of_China
- ⁴² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Expedition
- ⁴³ <https://www.britannica.com/place/China/The-Northern-Expedition>
- ⁴⁴ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuomintang>
- ⁴⁵ <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Nationalist-Party-Chinese-political-party>
- ⁴⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Expedition
- ⁴⁷ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_\(1912%E2%80%931949\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_China_(1912%E2%80%931949))
- ⁴⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanjing_decade
- ⁴⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Civil_War
- ⁵⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Sino-Japanese_War
- ⁵¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage
- ⁵² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37
- ⁵³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_China
- ⁵⁴ <https://www.britannica.com/event/Tiananmen-Square-incident>
- ⁵⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Handover_of_Hong_Kong
- ⁵⁶ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macau>
- ⁵⁷ https://www.hoover/sites/default/files/research/docs/clm13_lm.pdf
- ⁵⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hu_Jintao#Transition_to_Xi
- ⁵⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_China
- ⁶⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-world/2024>

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