



Greece — Va-PoReg Country Report

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09/12/1829 Start Constitutional Monarchy: Greece only became independent after a war from 02/21/1821 to 09/12/1829 after more than four hundred years of belonging to the Ottoman Empire.¹ The country was at this point far more strongly and directly influenced by Byzantine Ottoman traditions than by the democratic ideas of antiquity. On 02/03/1830 the independence of Greece was recognized by the London Protocol as Kingdom of Greece. After the revolution of 09/03/1843, the Greek Constitution of 1844 with the electoral law of 03/18/1844 introduced universal male suffrage with secret ballot.² On 03/30/1863 (greg.) Prince Wilhelm was elected king of Greece and was coronated as George I³. He ruled until his murder on 03/18/1913. In the time from 07/19 to 08/28/1909 Dimitrios Rallis⁴ was deposed as prime minister as a result of a military coup. During the coup Eleftherios Venizelos arrived in Greece and became prime minister from 10/19/1910 until 03/10/1915. The regime type is coded as a ruling monarchy throughout the period even though the military coup led to the change of prime ministers.⁵ From 12/19/1920 Constantine I was king of Greece⁶ until he was forced to abdicate in a coup d'état on 09/27/1922. He was replaced by King George II of Greece.⁷ According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative executive elections were held until 1908, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1909 and multiparty executive and legislative elections were held again from 1910 onward. Furthermore, political liberties were absent according to LIED. Following V-Dem's PCLI they were somewhat present until 1919 and ambiguous from 1920 onwards. From 1900 to 1914, based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. In 1915, 1920 and 1921, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

12/16/1923 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Autocracy: The elections on this date were boycotted by the entire monarchist camp. They cannot be classified as democratic, since the monarchists could not in fact expect fair electoral conditions (Polyzoides 1924), because the revolutionary government had enacted an electoral law that significantly favored the Venizelist Liberal Party and other parties opposed to the monarchy.⁸ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The election is categorized as not competitive by LIED. V-Dem's EF&FI scores it as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores it as not clean. Moreover, political liberties were absent according to LIED. They were classified with an ambiguous presence by V-Dem's PCLI. Venizélos returned to Greece on 01/04/1924 and took over the government a week later. In the referendum on 04/13/1924, 70 per cent of those who voted were in favor of Greece being a republic and no longer a monarchy. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. These findings by V-Dem are inconsistent with the historical reality of unrestrained executive dominance. On the basis of our observations, we consider Polity's assessment more accurate, as no meaningful institutional checks limited the executive during this period.

04/13/1924 Continuation Electoral Autocracy (as republic): From this point on Greece was no longer a monarchy. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

06/25/1925 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: General Theodoros Pangalos became prime minister and president after organizing a coup.⁹ According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In this year, political liberties were categorized as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous per V-Dem's PCLI.

08/24/1926 End Military Autocracy/Start Democratizing Regime: Georgios Kondylis overthrew Pangalos' government ending the ephemeral dictatorship. General Kondylis prepared a new republican constitution and parliamentary elections, for which he did not run himself.¹⁰

11/07/1926 End Democratizing Regime/Start Electoral Oligarchy (Patriarchal): On this date parliamentary elections were held.¹¹ In 1927 a constitution was adopted which introduced a senate that together with the parliament elected the president with a 5-year tenure (Pantelis/Koutsoubinas/Gerapetritis 2010).¹² The first government to be formed in this regime period was an all-party government, but until 1928 three parties dropped out of the coalition. In 1928 a new government was formed, this time a large rightwing party block. Due to personalist decision making by Prime Minister Venizelos, the coalition fell apart and Venizelos resigned. When a rightwing anti-Venizelist camp won elections in 1933, Venizelist General Plastiras took power in a short-lived coup, but he lacked support and thus could not maintain power.¹³ The anti-Venizelos camp formed a government consisting of a coalition of the People's Party (LK), the Free Opinion Party (FOP), the National Radical Party (NRP) and the Agrarians (Ag). In March 1935 the Venizelist camp attempted to stage a coup, but failed and the minister of war, Georgios Kondylis, answered with massive purges, concomitantly increasing his own power.¹⁴ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED the elections in this period were competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores their electoral cleanliness as ambiguous. In addition to that, female suffrage was not given. LIED viewed political liberties still as absent and V-Dem's PCLI also maintained its ambiguous scores. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

10/10/1935 End Electoral Oligarchy (Patriarchal)/Start Constitutional Monarchy: In a coup d'état Georgios Kondylis restored the monarchic rule by carrying out a rigged plebiscite. King George II returned to power.¹⁵ On 04/13/1936 General Ioannis Metaxas was appointed by King George II as prime minister.¹⁶ According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

08/04/1936 End Constitutional Monarchy/Start (Monarchical) Right-Wing [Semi-Fascist] Autocracy: In a self-coup General Ioannis Metaxas dismantled the parliament and promoted a more fascist and nationalist rule. Due to lack of popular approval the rule was dependent on King George II.¹⁷ Metaxas suspended the constitution and repressed opposition" (Clogg 2013: 106-7, 115, 117-18, Casey et al. 2020: 7). On 01/21/1941 Metaxas died.¹⁸ Lacking a popular base, after Metaxas' death in January 1941 the regime hinged entirely on the King.¹⁹ Approximately one-third of historians categorize the regime as "fascist", while the remaining

two-thirds describe it as “authoritarian”, “quasi-fascist”, “radical conservative”, and other similar terms.²⁰ While the Metaxas government and its official doctrines are frequently labeled as fascist, from an academic perspective, it is generally regarded as a conventional totalitarian-conservative dictatorship, comparable to Francisco Franco’s Spain or António de Oliveira Salazar’s Portugal.²¹ However, the regime did not have the strong corporatist and expansionist elements that were central to fascist regimes like those in Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy. It also lacked the mass mobilization and paramilitary organizations typically associated with fascism. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. Additionally, both LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1937 to 1939, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1940 and 1941, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. We reject V-Dem’s score on legislative constraints, as Metaxas has indefinitely suspended parliament in his self-coup²² and there was no restoration even after his death.²³

04/27/1941 End Right-Wing [Semi-Fascist] Autocracy/Start Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy, Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy, and Bulgaria, Constitutional Monarchy]: On this day, German troops captured Athens, after having invaded Greece on 04/06/1941 to help Italy, who had declared war on Greece in 10/1940. On 06/01/1941 of all Greece was under occupation of Italy, Germany, and Bulgaria (Clogg 2013: 118-21, Casey et al. 2020: 7).²⁴ Since 1944, based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1943, from 1944 onward only executive elections were held. Both LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent. In the timeframe 1942-1944, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the following two years, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. We cast serious doubt on the quality of the V-Dem data in this context. Robust legislative constraints on the executive under Axis occupation—or even during a civil war—appear entirely implausible according to our observations.

10/12/1944 End Direct Rule Occupation Regime [by Italy, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy, Germany, Right-Wing (Fascist) Autocracy, and Bulgaria]/Start No Central Authority: On this date, German troops left Athens, following the advance of the Red Army in Romania.²⁵ Soon after that the British troops and members of the exile government landed in Athens. They tried to disarm the resistance groups, who had waged a guerrilla war against the occupation regime and controlled large parts of the countryside. However, the already politically divided and deeply antagonistic resistance groups and guerrilla armies refused to lay down their weapons and cede power. This conflict between the largest resistance group EAM (mainly-driven by the Greek communist party) and its armed forces (ELAS), and anti-communist groups supported by British troops resulted in the breakup of the first provisional government and culminated into a month-long battle over the control of Athens (“Dekremviana”).²⁶ We code this period as “No Central Authority”, because neither EAM/ELAS, nor the British troops had control over the capital and sufficient parts of Greece territory. The underlying conflict broke the “Government of National Unity”, which was agreed before the liberation and comprised of monarchist, republican and communist forces. This period has also been described as the “first phase” of the Greek civil war.²⁷ After the ELAS lost the battle over Athens on 01/11/1945, a peace deal was signed. This regime change event is coded as a voluntary exit. The trigger for the regime change was the withdrawal of the German occupation forces. The direction is unclear because the transition was from one

extreme form of autocracy, a direct rule occupation by Nazi Germany, to another, (a complete collapse of state order into civil war), representing a horizontal shift between two catastrophic states rather than a clear institutional deterioration. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. As indicated in the previous regime period, we again cast serious doubt on the quality of the V-Dem data in this context. Robust legislative and moderate judicial constraints on the executive under this phase of civil war appear entirely implausible according to our observations.

02/12/1945 End No Central Authority/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, representatives of the Greek communist party and the Greek government signed the Treaty of Varkiza.²⁸ This treaty regulated the disarmament of EAM/ELAS and promised a referendum in 1945 on constitutional matters as well as the oversight of British forces over the 1946 parliamentary elections. The treaty also announced the creation of a non-political national army. In announcing a referendum as well as planning elections, this regime is clearly of transitional character. During the regime, many left-wing resistance members were persecuted for their actions, as courts classified them as criminal and not political. Anti-communist militias killed and tortured civilians as well as attacking entire villages out of retaliation while some communist fighters hid their weapons for the disarmament.²⁹ The political and military persecution of left-wing groups is known as "White Terror".³⁰ In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. As mentioned in the regime periods above, we strongly doubt the quality of the V-Dem data in this context. Parliament was suspended since the coup of Metaxas in 1936 and we found no evidence of parliamentary activities.

03/31/1946 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start (Monarchical) (Male) Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date parliamentary elections took place. The outcome led to a triumph for the United Alignment of Nationalists, a coalition comprising the People's Party, the National Liberal Party, and the Reform Party. A main aim of the new government was the proclamation of a plebiscite for the restoration of the Greek monarchy, which took place on 09/01/1946.³¹ Right before the election a communist band attacked a police station in Litchoro, which started three years of civil war in Greece. According to MCM the "two kings that ruled during this time assembled governments and seemed to have meaningful executive power that actually affected politics in the country (Magaloni/Chu/Min 2013a: 21). Therefore, the country in the view of MCM is a ruling monarchy not a democracy. However, GWF, CGV and BMR classify the regime as democratic. PRC classifies the regime as a semidemocracy. While we agree that the kings still held political power, the gravitation center of the political regime was the elected government, the monarchs still interfered in politics. Until 1949, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present. For the rest of the assessed regime period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

11/16/1952 Continuation (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime: King Paul decided to dissolve Parliament in 10/1952 and appointed a caretaker government to set up new elections. This was an endeavor to secure a majority government to alleviate the nation's severe economic situation (NELDA). Following the elections, Alexander Papagos of the Hellenic Union Party (GRAL) became prime minister and served until his death in 1955. The office, along with the leadership of GRAL, was passed on to Konstantinos Karamanlis, who changed the party affiliation into National Radical Union (ERE). The ERE won the majority in the following

elections of 1958 and 1961, but when Karamanlis had a disagreement with the royal family in 1963, he fled the country. This marks the beginning of a period of social unrest with several governments forming and falling apart.³² In 1965 King Constantine II dismissed Prime Minister Papandreou, causing a constitutional crisis known as the “Apostasia of 1965”.³³ Until 11/16/1952 the electoral regime had the additional severe restriction that only men could vote. From then on women could also vote in national elections.³⁴ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this time as competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores their electoral cleanliness as ambiguous. Moreover, regarding the political liberties, they were still absent according to LIED. V-Dem’s PCLI scores them as not really present until 1949 and as ambiguous from 1950 onwards. Based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the years 1952 and 1953, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1954, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. From 1955 to 1966, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 1967, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

04/21/1967 End (Monarchical) Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start (Monarchical) Military Autocracy: A group of colonels, the Holy Bond of Greek Officers (IDEA), led by Colonel Papadopoulos overthrew the caretaker government a month before scheduled elections which Georgios Papandreou’s Centre Union was favoured to win. The coup plotters perceived them as leftist opponents. The right-wing junta installed Kollias as acting prime minister and junta (Feit 1973: 118-122, Brown 1974: 217, Veremis 1985: 30-32, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 62).³⁵ According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. This seems to us as a clear case of miscoding by V-Dem.³⁶

06/01/1973 Continuation Military Autocracy (as republic): On this date, the military regime proclaimed a republic and abolished the Greek monarchy. On 11/23/1973 frightened by the social unrest in the country and Papadopoulos’ liberalization campaign, General Ioannides overthrew him and his appointed prime minister. Ioannides appointed General Gizikis as junta head. Based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. According to FH’s classification for the assessed regime period since 1972, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Both LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent in this period. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. Still this seems to us as a clear case of miscoding by V-Dem. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections took place.

07/23/1974 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, the military transferred power to Constantine Karamanlis in preparation for competitive elections (Veremis 1985: 41, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 62).

11/17/1974 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Democracy: Free and fair parliamentary elections were held on this date.³⁷ Since then Greece is a parliamentary democracy with a unicameral parliament. The political landscape is characterized by competitive and freely operating parties. Governmental power frequently changed, underscoring competitiveness in the electoral processes, but coalitions also tended to break apart prematurely or prime ministers resigned due to lacks in performance legitimacy. Economy and fiscal politics have posed ongoing problems since the early 1990s. However, governmental transitions

remained constitutional.³⁸ There are persistent problems concerning migrants, discrimination against minorities, corruption and press freedom. Judiciary is generally independent. However, there are still occasional problems with corruption. Although there is gender equality by law, women still face discrimination, especially in the workplace. Universal suffrage applies to Greek citizens from the age of 17 and older.³⁹ On 06/25/2023 snap parliamentary elections were held. The elections were necessary because no coalition government was formed after the elections on 05/21/2023. The presidential election, which took place from 01/25 to 02/12/2025, was an indirect vote by the parliament to elect the head of state. Due to high supermajority thresholds, the election required multiple rounds. The government-backed candidate, Konstantinos Tasoulas of the New Democracy party, failed to secure the necessary majority in the first three rounds, requiring a fourth. Tasoulas was finally elected president in the fourth round with 160 votes after the required threshold was lowered to a simple majority of 151.⁴⁰ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since then, LIED categorizes all elections as competitive. V-Dem's EF&FI and CEI score them as free, fair and clean. Per FH, for this regime period, the country is classified as free, scoring between 2 and 4, which we also place in the free category. In addition, ever since 1975 both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI acknowledge the full presence of political liberties. From 1975 to 1985, according to the Polity5 indicator, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. Since 1986, based on this assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For 1975, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. From 1976 to 2019, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also comprehensive. For 2020-2021, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the year 2022, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 2023, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

Electoral Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Campbell/Sherrard 1968, Clogg 1986, Grothusen 1980, Kallis 2007, Kofas 1983, Koumoulides 1977, Mavrokordatos 1983, Richter 1990, Serafetinidis 1978, Woodhouse 1998, Zervakis/Auernheimer 2009, Zink 2000a)

Notes

¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_War_of_Independence

² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37

³ [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_I._\(Griechenland\)](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_I._(Griechenland))

⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimitrios_Rallis

⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_prime_ministers_of_Greece; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eleftherios_Venizelos;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_prime_ministers_of_Greece

⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constantine_I_of_Greece

⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_II_of_Greece

⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leonardopoulos%E2%80%93Gargalidis_coup_attempt

⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1925_Greek_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat; [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodoros_Pangalos_\(general\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodoros_Pangalos_(general)).

¹⁰ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html>, see narratives for version 5.0, Greece_V: 2.

¹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1926_Greek_legislative_election

¹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgios_Kondylis

- ¹³ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Greece_V: 3.
- ¹⁴ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Greece_V: 3-4.
- ¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Greece#Restoration_of_Monarchy_and_the_4th_of_August_Regime
- ¹⁶ <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ioannis-Metaxas>
- ¹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th_of_August_Regime
- ¹⁸ <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ioannis-Metaxas>
- ¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th_of_August_Regime
- ²⁰ <https://metaxas-project.com/was-the-4th-of-august-regime-really-fascist/>
- ²¹ <https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/metaxism/>
- ²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th_of_August_Regime
- ²³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th_of_August_Regime#Differences_from_other_far-right_regimes
- ²⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_occupation_of_Greece
- ²⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_occupation_of_Greece#Liberation_and_aftermath
- ²⁶ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dekemvriana>
- ²⁷ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Terror_\(Greece\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Terror_(Greece))
- ²⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Varkiza
- ²⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_Civil_War#Interlude:_1945%E2%80%931946
- ³⁰ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Terror_\(Greece\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Terror_(Greece))
- ³¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1946_Greek_legislative_election
- ³² <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Greece_R: 5-6.
- ³³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_junta
- ³⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37
- ³⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_junta; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centre_Union
- ³⁶ E.g. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Griechische_Milit%C3%A4rdiktatur#Die_Entmachtung_der_unabh%C3%A4ngigen_Justiz
- ³⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1974_Greek_legislative_election; https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Greece_2008?lang=en
- ³⁸ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Greece_R: 7-8, Greece_V: 8-9.
- ³⁹ <https://www.ypes.gr/en/information-for-the-voters/>
- ⁴⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Greek_presidential_election

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