



Nigeria — Va-PoReg Country Report

Kailitz, Steffen, et al., 2026: Varieties of Political Regimes (Va-PoReg). Country Report Nigeria, Dresden: Hannah Arendt Institute for Totalitarianism Studies.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JYEL7U>

02/26/1885 Start Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom]: The United Kingdom's dominance over Nigerian territory had been recognized by other European powers at the Berlin Conference that ended on 02/26/1885. From 1886 until 1899 the territory was ruled mainly by the Royal Niger Company. In 1900, both the Southern and the Northern Nigeria Protectorate passed on to the Crown. The protectorates were governed by the colonial office at Whitehall.¹ LIED provides data from 1914 onward and does not record any multiparty executive or legislative elections that took place during the specified period. LIED and V-Dem do not treat Nigeria before 1914. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI. For 1900-1913, V-Dem do not list Nigeria in their database. From 1914 to 1953, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

10/01/1954 End Direct Rule Colonial Regime [of United Kingdom, Liberal Democracy]/Start (Monarchical) Electoral Autocracy [semi-sovereign, external affairs under United Kingdom, Liberal Democracy]: On this date, Nigeria became the self-governing Federation of Nigeria. Nevertheless, full independence had not yet been granted. General elections were held between October and December 1954.² The elections were held using different systems in the different provinces. Direct elections were held in Lagos and the Eastern and Western regions, whilst electoral colleges were used in Southern Cameroons and Northern Region.³ In these elections male suffrage was introduced (LIED) and in 1958 female suffrage was introduced.⁴ On 12/12/1959 parliamentary elections were held that resulted in the victory for the Northern People's Congress, which won 134 of the 312 seats.⁵ Based on our observations, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which contradicts the observations of LIED. However, LIED classifies the elections as not competitive until 1960. Moreover, no cleanliness is achieved according to V-Dem's CEI. The 1959 elections were not really free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). For this period political liberties were absent (LIED). Whereas V-Dem's PCLI points out ambiguous political liberties are present. In this period, the British monarch remained the symbolic head of state, represented by a colonial governor, while local elections were being held to establish domestic governance. For 1954 to 1958, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1959, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

10/01/1960 Continuation (Monarchical) Electoral Autocracy [as independent country]: On 10/01/1960, Nigeria reached independence within the Commonwealth under its first prime minister, Abubaker Tafawa Balewa (Lansford 2021: 1227). The British monarch continued to be the symbolic head of state. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

10/01/1963 Continuation Electoral Autocracy [as republic]: On this date, Nigeria adopted a new constitution in 1963 which abolished the monarchy and the office of governor-general, with Nigeria becoming a

parliamentary republic within the Commonwealth with Nnamdi Azikiwe of the Ibo tribe as President of Nigeria (Lansford 2021: 1227). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since the independence, electoral competitiveness is given (LIED). In addition, the elections are stated as not really clean (V-Dem CEI). The overall election conditions were not really free and fair as well (V-Dem EF&FI). According to LIED no political liberties were present. V-Dem's PCLI scores somewhat political liberties. However, since 1960, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. From 1963 to 1966, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

01/15[&16]/1966 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: The government could not control the ongoing ethnic violence in the country and thus the military initiated a coup designed to eradicate the civilian elements.⁶ Eventually, General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi took the reins of a new military government with the goal of restoring order (Luckham 1971: 43-49, 55-66, 76-79).⁷ There were around 22 casualties. The acting president, Nwafor Orizu, announced a „voluntary” transfer of power to the armed forces. Shortly after, General Ironsi established a Military Council which suspended the constitution. The coup was seen as an Igbo conspiracy to gain power and fueled the Nigerian Civil War which broke out soon after.⁸ According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power.

07/29/1966 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup led by Hausa-Fulani junior officers and NCOs ousted the government of Ibo Major General Ironsi. The military regime that commenced in July 1966 was distinct from the previous military administration due to differences in ethnic composition and the seniority of the officers participating in the two governments (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 83). This coup is regarded as the „counter-coup” to the military coup on 01/15/1966.⁹ Several pogroms against Igbo people and southern Nigerians took place starting in May 1966 and culminating after 09/29/1966. An estimated 8.000 to 30.000 Igbos and eastern Nigerians were killed and an additional one million Igbos fled the Northern Region. In response, northern Nigerians were massacred in Port Harcourt in the East. The killings contributed to the secession of Biafra and the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War.¹⁰ On 07/06/1967 the Nigerian Civil War, also known as the Biafran War, began, when Nigerian troops advanced into Biafra.¹¹ It was a war fought between and the Republic of Biafra, a secessionist state which had declared its independence from Nigeria in 1967. Biafra was led by Igbo nationalists who no longer felt represented by the federal government which they felt was being dominated by Muslim Hausa-Fulanis. On 01/07/1970, the Nigerian Army launched their last operation named Tail-Wind.¹² On 01/14/1970 the surrender paper of Biafra was signed in Lagos. The secession was renounced and General Gowon, who had led Nigeria during the civil war, returned to power.¹³ The Nigerian Civil War is documented as one of the deadliest conflicts in modern history, with accusations against Gowon for crimes against humanity and genocide.¹⁴ In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1967 to 1974, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. As classified by FH from 1972 onward, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free.

07/29/1975 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a number of scandals including a massive cement contract mistake combined with Gowon's declaration to stay in power led to a bloodless coup while Gowon was attending the 12th summit of the Organization for African Unity in Kampala. Brigadier Murtala Mohammed was appointed leader of the military government by the coup plotters.¹⁵ In accordance

with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1975 to 1978, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Per FH, in 1975, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. In 1976 and 1977, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. In 1978 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. For this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as pointing out that political liberties are ambiguous until 1977 and are somewhat present afterwards.

08/11/1979 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, competitive presidential elections were overseen by the outgoing military regime as a means of choosing a civilian leadership (Panter-Brick 1979: 317-35, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 83).¹⁶ The elections were won by Shehu Shagari from the National Party of Nigeria.¹⁷ PRC classifies the regime as a semidemocracy, RoW as an electoral autocracy, BR, BMR, GWF, HTW, LIED, MCM and REIGN as a democracy. The main reason for our classification as an electoral hybrid regime is the low quality of the elections which is mainly due to the oversight of the military over the elections. This also has to be seen against the background that this regime was preceded and succeeded by a military autocracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. However, LIED scores the elections as competitive. Whereas V-Dem's CEI indicates no clean elections. The overall election conditions are considered as ambiguous by V-Dem's EF&FI. Per FH's scoring for this regime period, the country is classified as free with a score of 5, which falls into our interpretation of the rather free category. Moreover, LIED's score still underlines the absence of political liberties. Following V-Dem's PCLI somewhat political liberties are present for this time. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. During this regime period, from 1979 to 1983 V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Given all our observations Nigeria is a borderline case between an electoral democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

12/31/1983 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, religious and political violence coupled with economic decline prompted a military coup by Major-General Muhammadu Buhari against the government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari. Buhari rationalized the military's seizure of power by castigating the civilian government as hopelessly corrupt and promptly suspended the constitution.¹⁸ Buhari established himself as the chairman of the Supreme Military Council (Lovejoy 1992, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 83, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 84).¹⁹ In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is categorized by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties, indicating an intermediate state between present and absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1984 and 1985, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free.

08/27/1985 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Major-General Ibrahim Babangida, overthrew the government of Major General Muhammadu Buhari.²⁰ Babangida formed a new junta, called the Armed Forces Ruling Council. On 06/12/1993, the first presidential elections since the 1983 military coup were held. The unofficial result indicated a victory for Moshood Kashimawo Olawale Abiola of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), who defeated Bashir Tofa of the National Republican Convention (NRC). However, the winner of the election was never declared as the elections were annulled by Babangida.²¹ Hence,

no regime change is coded for 06/12/1993. In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1986 to 1991, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1992, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Per FH, from 1985 to 1987, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. In 1988, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. In 1989 the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. In 1990 to 1992, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

08/26/1993 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: The annulment of the election led to political violence and severe strikes. On this date, the military government under Babangida was forced to resign and appoint an unelected civilian government after annulling the results of what should have been a transitional election (Lewis 1999: 144). For 1993, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

11/17/1993 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, in a situation of political and economic stalemate General Sani Abacha, defense minister, overthrew Interim President Chief Ernest Shonekan and canceled the budding civilian government.²² Due to the shifts in the identity of those holding key leadership positions and influencing policy decisions, the era following August 1993 is perceived as distinct from the Buhari/Babangida regime. (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 83-84). Abacha dissolved the legislature, as well as the state and local governments, and replaced the elected civilian state governors with military and police officers. He also banned all political activities and established two governing institutions - the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) and Federal Executive Council.²³ In the span of a month, Abacha dismissed and compelled the retirement of a significant number of high-ranking officers. He narrowed the circle of influence and high office to his close military allies and individuals from his home region. Additionally, he excluded civilians who had collaborated with the previous regime from positions of influence.²⁴ GWF misclassifies the period from 02/27/1997 on as democratic based on the statement that there has been „competitive presidential elections overseen by the military as part of a transition to democracy” (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 84) on this date. However, the presidential elections only occurred on 02/20/1999. Hence, the period until this elections is coded as a military autocracy. In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1994 to 1998, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Per FH, until 1997, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. In 1998, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free.

02/20/1999 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: On this date, parliamentary elections were held, following the annulling of the 1998 elections.²⁵ The Carter Center and NDI observers reported serious irregularities nationwide: Instances of electoral process abuses, such as ballot stuffing, result inflation, and voter intimidation, were pervasive enough to raise concerns about the outcome of the elections in specific electoral districts (The Carter Center 1999). On 02/27/1999 presidential elections were held. The result was a victory for Olusegun Obasanjo of the People's Democratic Party.²⁶ Presidential elections were held regularly

in 2003, 2007 and 2011. According to international observers like the EU EOM the presidential elections of 2003 were marred by irregularities and fraud, such as ballot stuffing and forgery of results. In addition, the media coverage was biased (van den Berg 2003). Furthermore, most observers deemed the Nigerian elections of 2007 to significantly deviate from the benchmarks of credible, free, and fair elections, marking them as the poorest in Nigeria's post-independence electoral timeline. Up to this point, elections primarily favored the interests of the influential elite, with minimal, if any, tangible contribution to enhancing representative democracy. Reports from both domestic and international observers corroborate that all aspects of the elections were fundamentally flawed (Department for International Development 2010). The general elections of 2011 were characterized by both domestic and international observers as transparent, free, and fair, which is particularly noteworthy considering the fraudulent elections of 2007. However, despite being well-managed, the aftermath saw post-election violence in northern Nigeria, resulting in 800 casualties over three days and displacing 65,000 individuals, making it the most violent election in Nigeria's history (Okolo/Onunkwo 2011, Bekoe 2011). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Besides, between 1999 and 2002 the elections score competitiveness. Until 2010 no competitive elections were held. Since 2011, electoral competitiveness is stated again, following LIED. However, V-Dem's CEI views the elections as not really clean from 1999 to 2003 and for the following seven years as not clean at all. Since 2011, the election were classified as not really clean again. V-Dem's EF&FI considers the overall elections conditions as ambiguous until 2002. Between 2003 and 2010, not real freedom and fairness is achieved. Since 2011, the elections are classified as somewhat free and fair. Per FH, in 1999, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. In 2000 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. In 2001 and 2002 the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. From 2003 to 2007 the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. In 2008 and 2009 a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. From 2010 to 2013 the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. In 2014 the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Whereas LIED points out the absence of political liberties, V-Dem's PCLI indicates full political liberties. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For 1999-2009, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2010 and 2011, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 2012, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2013 to 2015, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. Regarding the fundamental problems with electoral integrity the period is classified as an electoral autocracy in our dataset.

03/28[&29]/2015 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: General elections were held in Nigeria on these dates. The AUEOM concluded that the elections were conducted in a „peaceful atmosphere“ and met the „continental and regional principles of democratic elections“. ECOWAS EOM said that it met the „criteria of being free and transparent“ despite „pockets of incidents and logistical challenges.“ The Commonwealth EOM described the conduct as „generally peaceful and transparent”.²⁷ Constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech, expression, and the press were limited by laws on sedition, defamation, and false news. While the right to peaceful assembly was protected, authorities frequently banned public events seen as national security threats, and the military faced criticism for abuses of rights, including extrajudicial killings and torture. Both Boko Haram and a civilian vigilante group were reported to forcibly recruit child

soldiers.²⁸ According to FH, in 2015, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. From 2016 to 2018 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. According to LIED Nigeria did not guarantee political rights for this time. On the other hand, V-Dem's PCLI still states the full presence of political liberties except in 2021 political liberties are classified by us as somewhat present. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In addition, between 2015 and 2018 the country's elections were competitive according to LIED. Furthermore, elections are not competitive since 2019 per LIED. V-Dem's CEI indicates ambiguous cleanliness outcomes until 2018, and not real electoral cleanliness ever since 2019. V-Dem's EF&FI underlines somewhat free and fair election conditions since 2015. Based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. On 02/23/2019 general elections were held to elect the president, vice president and both chambers of the parliament. Observers documented irregularities, including violence, voter and official intimidation, and vote-buying. There were also instances where party officials instructed voters on how to cast their ballots at polling stations. Additionally, INEC refused to certify the winning candidates in two races due to reports that local returning officers were operating under duress.²⁹ Generally the 1999 constitution provides for a bicameral legislative branch (National Assembly), consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Members are elected for four-year terms. Executive power is vested in a president, generally elected for four-year terms.³⁰ However, due to the deep challenges to Nigeria's democratic integrity it is coded an electoral autocracy: widespread corruption, high levels of violence by both state- and non-state actors, and discrimination that impede the civil liberties of groups such as LGBT+ and women,³¹ and media is restricted by so-called defamation laws that allow the government to punish critical journalism likely cause self-censorship. Moreover, high violence during election cycles has led to disillusionment and falling voter-turnout rates.³² The 2023 Nigerian presidential election took place on 02/25/2023, to choose the president and Vice President of Nigeria. Bola Tinubu, the former Governor of Lagos State and nominee of the All Progressives Congress, emerged as the winner with 36.61% of the vote, totaling about 8,794,726 votes. The election initially had a high projected turnout but was marked by reports of irregularities such as vote buying, voter intimidation, attacks on polling units, and delays in electoral procedures. Additionally, there were accusations of fraud, and the Independent National Electoral Commission failed to upload polling unit results to the INEC result viewing portal as promised on election day, further eroding trust in the electoral process.³³ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. For 2016 to 2018, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. From 2019 onward, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. According to FH, for the regime period under consideration, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free.

Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Bendel 1999a, Bienen 1978, Diamond 1988, Kura 2005, Metz 1991, Zagel 2010)

Notes

¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colonial_Nigeria

² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1954_Nigerian_general_election

³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1954_Nigerian_general_election

⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage

- ⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1959_Nigerian_general_election
- ⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_Nigerian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat
- ⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johnson_Aguiyi-Ironsi
- ⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_Nigerian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat
- ⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Civil_War#Background
- ¹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1966_anti-Igbo_pogrom
- ¹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Civil_War#War
- ¹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Civil_War
- ¹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_Civil_War#
- ¹⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yakubu_Gowon
- ¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1975_Nigerian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat
- ¹⁶ <http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng.html>
- ¹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shehu_Shagari
- ¹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammadu_Buhari
- ¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muhammadu_Buhari
- ²⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1985_Nigerian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat
- ²¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Nigerian_presidential_election
- ²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Nigerian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat
- ²³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Nigerian_presidential_election
- ²⁴ <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-09-26-mn-39134-story.html>
- ²⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_Nigerian_parliamentary_election
- ²⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_Nigerian_presidential_election
- ²⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Nigerian_general_election
- ²⁸ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-world/2020>
- ²⁹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-world/2022>
- ³⁰ <https://www.britannica.com/place/Nigeria/Government-and-society>
- ³¹ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria/freedom-world/2023>
- ³² <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/06/democracy-nigeria>
- ³³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Nigerian_presidential_election

References

- Bekoe, Dorina (2011): Nigeria's 2011 Elections: Best Run, but Most Violent. United States Institute of Peace.
- Bendel, Petra (1999a): Nigeria, in: Nohlen, Dieter, Krennerich, Michael & Thibaut, Bernhard (Hrsg.), Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 697–726.
- Bienen, Henry (1978): Military Rule and Political Process: Nigerian Examples, in: Comparative Politics 10, 205-225.
- Department for International Development (2010): Elections in Nigeria in 2007. London: ukaid.
- Diamond, Larry (1988): Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First Republic. London: Syracuse University.
- Geddes, Barbara/Wright, Joseph/Frantz, Erica (2014): Autocratic Regimes Code Book. Version 1.2. Los Angeles, University Park, Bridgewater: UCLA, Pennsylvania State University, Bridgewater State University.
- Haggard, Stephan/Kaufman, Robert/Teo, Terence (2016): Distributive Conflict and Regime Change: A Qualitative Dataset (Codebook). San Diego/Rutgers: University of California/State University of New Jersey.
- Kura, Sulaiman Y. B. (2005): Globalisation and Democracy: A Dialectical Framework for Understanding Democratisation in Nigeria, in: Globalization 5.
- Lansford, Tom (2021): Political Handbook of the World 2020-2021. Thousand Oaks: CQ Press.
- Lewis, Peter M. (1999): Nigeria: An End to the Permanent Transition?, in: Journal of Democracy 10, 141-156.
- Lovejoy, Paul E. (1992): Historical Setting, in: Metz, Helen Chapin (Hrsg.), Nigeria: A Country Study. Washington: Library of Congress, 1-84.
- Luckham, Robin (1971): The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960-67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Metz, Helen Chapin (Hrsg.) (1991): Nigeria: A Country Study. Washington: Library of Congress.
- Okolo, Ben S./Onunkwo, R. Okey (2011): The 2011 Nigerian Elections: An Empirical Review, in: Journal of African Elections 10, 54-72.

The Carter Center (1999): Observing the 1998-99 Nigeria Elections: Final Report. Atlanta/Washington: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

Zagel, Marija (2010): Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Processes and Obstacles Case Studies: Ghana, Nigeria, DR Congo. Belgrade: University of Belgrade.