



Paraguay — Va-PoReg Country Report

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05/14/1811 Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: On 05/14/1811, Paraguay declared independence from Spain. Subsequently, long periods of dictatorial governments followed that were legitimized by the national Congress or a new constitution, which rendered elections insignificant (León-Roesch/Ortiz Ortiz 2005:412). In 1844, Congress passed a new constitution, which established a powerful president with a ten-year term of office. The president was granted the authority to promulgate legislation and convene congress every five years to approve it (León-Roesch/Ortiz Ortiz 2005:412). In 1870, male suffrage was introduced (Kellam 2013: 29). Although the constitution was liberal and democratic in nature, it played no role in political reality. The constitution of 1870 rapidly lost its relevance (Sacks 1990: 30-31). According to Vanhanen only 0.0 to 3.0 percentage of the population participated in the elections between 1870 and 1902 (Vanhanen 2019). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections are considered as not competitive by LIED. Moreover, the elections were not clean (V-Dem CEI). V-Dem's EF&FI underlines, no freedom and fairness for the elections were given. Additionally, political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous following V-Dem's PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. On 09/10/1880, independence was recognized by Spain. The Liberal Party (Partido Azul) and the National Republican Association (Partido Colorado), founded by General and President Bernadino Caballero, emerged in 1887. Both parties represented the interests of the oligarchical groups. The Partido Colorado was the dominant political force between 1878 and 1904 (León-Roesch/Ortiz Ortiz 2005:413-414). The political development in this period was marked by the consolidation of elite power, despite nominal democratic reforms. The emerging political parties and electoral processes were often used to legitimize the dominance of influential families, limiting broader political participation (Meyer-Aurich 2006).

01/09/1902 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, President Emilio Aceval was ousted in a coup supported by General Caballero, putting Juan Antonio Ecurra, also from the Partido Colorado, into power (Lewis 1986: 484, Casey et al. 2020: 13). In September 1904 a civil war started. According to LIED, only legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No executive elections were present. In 1902 and 1903, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. In 1904, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

12/19/1904 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, Ezcurra signed a peace treaty and relinquished power to the combined Civic and Radical Liberal rebels led by General Ferreira (Lewis 1986: 484, Casey et al. 2020: 13). Ezcurra resigned, and Juan Bautista Ganoa became temporary

president on 12/19/1904, followed by Cecilio Báez on 12/09/1905. In 1906, Ferreira orchestrated his own nomination for the presidency and was elected without facing any opposition (Lewis 1986: 484-85, Casey et al. 2020: 13). For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED, only executive elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No legislative elections were present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is categorized by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties, indicating an intermediate state between present and absent.

07/04/1908 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Military Autocracy: Army commander-in-chief Colonel Albino Jara ousted Ferreira in a coup (Lewis 1986: 485, Casey et al. 2020: 13). The Revolutionary Committee took control of the government, dissolved the National Congress (Senate and Chamber of Deputies), and declared a state of siege on 07/04/1908. On 07/05/1908, the Revolutionary Committee placed civilian leader and Radical Liberal Emiliano Gonzalez Navarro in office as provisional president.¹ In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1908, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For 1909, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the state of political liberties.

11/25/1910 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: On this date, elections uncontested by both major opposition parties were held which gave power to Radical Liberal candidate Manuel Gondra (Lewis 1986: 584, Casey et al. 2020: 13). Based on the constitution of 1870 there was de jure universal male suffrage (Bruneau 1990: 161). However, de facto voting rights were still restricted based on several criteria, including property ownership, income, literacy, and age. This effectively limited political participation to a small elite class, primarily comprising landowners, wealthy individuals, and those who were considered „educated.“ The restrictions ensured that political power remained concentrated in the hands of the upper classes, excluding the vast majority of the population, such as the rural poor, indigenous groups, and those without formal education. Therefore, only five percent of the population participated in the elections. Furthermore, the president was elected unopposed (Vanhanen 2019). The election scored an absence of competitiveness according to LIED. V-Dem's CEI indicates no electoral cleanliness. Moreover, the elections were not free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicate the same outcomes as between 1900 and 1902 concerning the presence of political liberties. As in the period 1900-1902, the implementation of the constitution thus appears to be deficient to non-existent (Sacks 1990: 30-31). Therefore, we classify the regime in this period as an electoral oligarchical autocracy. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

01/11/1911 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, after a period of considerable instability, Colonel Albino Jara led a coup which overthrew the Radical Liberal regime (Lewis 1986: 486, Casey et al. 2020: 13).² Jara became provisional president from 01/19/1911 to 07/05/1911 and chose Liberato Marcial Rojas as his successor on 07/06/1911.³ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the

executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. In 1911, LIED identifies political liberties absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is categorized by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

02/18/1912 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: In elections uncontested by either the Civic Liberals or the Colorados, power was transferred to Radical Liberal candidate Manuel Franco. Estimates suggest that electoral participation rose to around 10-15% of the eligible male population. This relatively modest increase reflects a variety of challenges, such as limited political engagement, logistical issues with voter registration and turnout, and potential resistance to broader political participation. While the expansion of suffrage was a significant legal change, the practical impact on voter turnout was constrained by existing social, economic, and political factors. Informal restrictions included socio-economic inequalities, limited access to information, geographic isolation (especially for rural and indigenous populations), and coercion or influence by political elites. However, based on the absence of formal restrictions we code the regime no longer as an electoral oligarchical autocracy. Franco died in 1919, and power was transferred to his Vice President Jose P. Montero. On 08/15/1920, Gondra was elected president in uncompetitive elections. After brief factional fighting between Gondra and Schaerer in October 1921, Gondra resigned but Schaerer abstained from seizing power and instead the two factions agreed on Eusebio Ayala as provisional president. After Schaerer and opposition Colorado Party members attempted to foment a coup, Ayala announced the postponement of elections which led to a 13-month civil war. During the war, Ayala resigned and Eligio Ayala⁴ took over as president and was elected president in 1923. Ayala introduced electoral reforms which led the Colorado Party to contest the 1927 legislative elections and the 1928 presidential elections which were won by the Radical Liberal candidate Jose P. Guggiari. After the 1932 elections, Ayala returned to the presidency (Lewis 1986: 486-95, Casey et al. 2020: 13-14). Until 1928 presidents were elected unopposed. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In the period between 1912 and 1936 only between 0.0 and 9.1 percentage of the population participated in the elections (Vanhanen 2019). During the entire time competitive elections were absent, following LIED. V-Dem's CEI scores no cleanliness. Furthermore, no freedom and fairness are achieved for the elections (V-Dem EF&FI). Furthermore, LIED considers the political liberties as absent. Whereas V-Dem's PCLI declares their presence as ambiguous. The constitution of 1870 was still in force and therefore, de jure universal male suffrage (Bruneau 1990: 161). Generally, the liberal decades was also characterized by a „deeply factionalized political oligarchy”.⁵ According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant regime period, 1912-1935, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

02/17/1936 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Ayala was ousted in a military coup, called the February Revolution (Lewis 1991: 234, 236, Casey et al. 2020: 14).⁶ Afterward, war hero Colonel Rafael Franco, who had been in exile, returned to Paraguay to take charge of the newly established military government. Decree-Law 1952 conferred unrestricted powers to a „committee of civil mobilization” (Lewis 1991: 235-36, Casey et al. 2020: 14). In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1936, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. In 1936, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

08/13/1937 End Military Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Colonel Ramon Paredes overthrew Franco in a military coup in favor of the Liberal Party. Felix Paiva, a civilian, became president (Lewis 1991: 239-42, Casey et al. 2020: 14). In accordance with LIED, only legislative elections were held in 1937, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No executive elections were present. In 1938 multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1937 and 1938, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For that short period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent and V-Dem's PCLI is categorized by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties, indicating an intermediate state between present and absent.

04/30/1939 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: After the Liberal Party had realized that they needed a more popular president with national prestige if they wanted to stay in power, they chose General José Félix Estigarribia as their candidate.⁷ On 04/30/1939 General José Félix Estigarribia was elected indirectly and without opposition, because the Colorado Party, the other relevant party at that time, had boycotted the presidential election.⁸ Highly respected for his efforts in the Chaco War as Commander in Chief of the Paraguayan Army, the candidate of the Liberal Party initiated a new period of authoritarianism supported by the military and shifting factions of civilians.⁹ In August 1939, Estigarribia officially took office after the New Liberal faction and army had eliminated any left-over opposition. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The election was not competitive (LIED). In addition, no cleanliness was scored (V-Dem CEI) and the overall election conditions were not free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). Moreover, political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem's PCLI. In 1939, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. In 1940, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1939, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

02/19/1940 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Personalist (Military) Autocracy: On this date Estigarribia carried out a self-coup and dissolved the parliament (Lewis 1993: 175-78, Wild/Llloyd 2018, Lewis 1991: 242, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 87). The newly drafted constitution was approved on 08/04/1940. It granted the president extensive powers. The rule of Estigarribia came to a sudden end on 09/07/1940 when he and his wife died in a plane crash. The Liberal Party opted for General Higinio Morínigo as interim president in the hope of having chosen a more submissive candidate.¹⁰ However, he took full control of the government on 11/30/1940 and gradually suppressed opponents, banned all parties and restricted individual liberties. Therefore, he was the only candidate in the presidential election on 02/14/1943.¹¹ He became a „non-party dictator without a large body of supporters”.¹² According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held in 1940. Thereafter, only legislative elections were held until 1942, but they were not categorized as multiparty. From 1943 onward, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. LIED classifies no electoral competitiveness. Moreover, the election was not free, fair and clean (V-Dem EF&FI, CEI). Nevertheless, due to his astute handling of relevant parts of the military, he stayed in power until 1948.¹³ Regarding the political liberties they were absent (LIED) and not really present following V-Dem's PCLI. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. According to our classification the regime is not an electoral autocracy since during this period, no freely functioning parliament existed and Morínigo ruled without legislative oversight. From 1940 to 1948, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

06/03/1948 End Personalist (Military) Autocracy/Start Electoral Autocracy: A military coup supported by the Colorado party ousted President Morínigo. In the long-promised 1948 elections Natalicio González was

elected unopposed. Based on our observations, both executive and legislative elections were held during this period, but they were not categorized as multiparty, which contradicts the observations of LIED. During the entire time elections were not competitive, following LIED. Moreover, no cleanliness was achieved (V-Dem CEI). The overall conditions were considered as not free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. Furthermore, LIED's score regarding the political liberties remains absent. V-Dem's PCLI scores changed to not real presence of political liberties. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. Suspecting that Morínigo would not relinquish power to González, a group of Colorado military officers, including Stroessner, removed Morínigo from office. He was replaced by civilian one-party Colorado government (León-Roesch 1993: 514, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 87).¹⁴ The appointed Juan Frutos, a supreme court justice became acting president, before the presidency was handed over to González.

01/30/1949 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: Gonzalez was only a few months in office when Raimundo Rolón, the Minister of Defense, staged a coup and became the acting president.¹⁵ The brief Rolón period classifies as Military Autocracy rather than Non-Electoral Transitional Regime because Brigadier General Raimundo Rolón Villasanti was an active-duty military officer who staged the coup while serving as Defense Minister and assumed the presidency through military command authority. Rolón's military credentials are well-established: he served as chief of operations under General Estigarribia during the Chaco War (1932-1935), rose through military ranks from artillery second lieutenant (1923) to brigadier general (1947), and held his Defense Minister position as a serving general rather than civilian appointee. When a sitting brigadier general executing Defense Minister duties stages a coup, this represents the military institution exercising authority through its command hierarchy—the defining characteristic of military autocracy.

02/26/1949 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, Rolón was deposed by a joint civilian and military movement. Felipe Lopez was appointed as provisional president in the aftermath.¹⁶ In 1949, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present.

04/17/1949 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Autocracy: Felipe Lopez was elected president unopposed on this date and inaugurated on 05/14/1949. However, on 09/12/1949, the Colorado Party ousted him due to his failure to unify the party and restore civil order. The process within the Colorado Party that led to the ousting was controlled primarily by the party's military faction and influential political elites. The party appointed Federico Chavez to complete Lopez's term. He was sworn in as president on 08/15/1950 and re-elected without opposition on 02/15/1953.¹⁷ Based on our observations, both executive and legislative elections were held during this period, but they were not categorized as multiparty, which contradicts the observations of LIED. According to LIED, elections during this regime period were not competitive. V-Dem's CEI indicates no cleanliness. The overall election conditions are classified as not free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. In addition to that, political liberties were still absent per LIED and V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were not really present. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For 1949-1954, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

05/04[-07]/1954 End Electoral Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A brief military conflict led by General Stroessner ousted the civilian president Chavez. The motive was that Chavez began to militarize a national police force at the expense of the military. An interim president reigned temporarily until the Colorado Party and the coup makers decided that Stroessner should be president. He became president two months later as the result of a single-candidate election (Roett/Sacks 1991: 53-54, León-Roesch 1993: 507, 514,

Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 87-88).¹⁸ The following autocracy of Alfredo Stroessner is colloquially known as El Stronismo.¹⁹ In 1961, female suffrage was introduced.²⁰ Since there were in the presidential elections only one candidate from the military and no other choice the regime is classified as a military autocracy even if parliamentary elections took place. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held until 1958, but they were not categorized as multiparty. In 1959, only executive elections were held and in the period between 1960 and 1962, both executive and legislative elections were held again, but they were not classified as multiparty. From 1963 onward, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held conducted. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. From 1955 to 1988, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. As classified by FH from 1972 to 1975, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH, in 1976 and 1977, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Per FH's evaluation from 1978 to 1985, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH's classification from 1986 to 1988, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. Stroessner's regime represents a borderline case between military and personalist autocracy. In day-to-day governance, the regime exhibited personalist features: Stroessner ruled alone without visible junta structures, no collective military leadership was apparent in decision-making, and his 35-year tenure suggested deep personalization of power. The Colorado Party functioned as a captured instrument of his rule. These surface characteristics resemble personalist patterns. However, three decisive factors support classification as military autocracy. First, the 1989 military coup led by General Rodríguez revealed that the armed forces retained latent institutional capacity to remove the ruler through organized action rather than regime collapse. Second, legitimation remained functional rather than charismatic: Stroessner justified rule through claims to national security, order, and anticommunism, not through personality cult or ideological deification. Third, elite loyalty operated through military discipline and institutional hierarchies rather than through personalized patronage networks or ritualized devotion. The absence of personality cult distinguishes Stroessner from paradigmatic personalist autocrats. While the regime's daily operations appeared highly personalized, the institutional foundation remained military. According to Va-PoReg's principle that the institution capable of organized removal determines regime type, Paraguay qualifies as military autocracy despite borderline features.

02/03/1989 End Military Autocracy/Start Non-Electoral Transitional Regime: On this date, Andrés Rodríguez and other military officials overthrew Stroessner, supported by the Roman Catholic Church and the United States of America. The Congress and Council of State designated Rodríguez as provisional president.²¹ Rodríguez had previously served as Stroessner's closest confidant for 35 years. Their relationship became so intimate that Rodríguez's daughter married Stroessner's elder son.²² Approximately 500 soldiers on both sides are estimated to have lost their lives as a result of Stroessner's capture.²³ In accordance with LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1989 to 1991, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. For the given period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present since 1990.

12/01/1991 End Non-Electoral Transitional Regime/Start Electoral Democracy: On this date, the election for a National Constitutional Assembly took place, which were won by the Colorado Party.²⁴ In 1992, the National Constitutional Assembly adopted a new constitution that established the basis for a competitive presidential election in 1993 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 51). Elections, generally considered free and fair, are coded as

the endpoint of a series of democratizing reforms carried out between 1989 and 1993 by the Rodríguez administration. The 1989 election of Rodríguez is not considered transitional because he was a Stroessner regime insider and relative by marriage who had originally achieved office via coup in what Abente Brun (Abente-Brun 1999: 93) calls „an internal adjustment made by the ruling coalition”. The formal and informal rules under which he won the election were very similar to those under which Stroessner had won elections. Starting in the early 1990s, the Rodríguez government implemented several democratizing reforms. These included ending the compulsory party affiliation of officers, prohibiting the military and police from engaging in partisan activity, revising electoral rules that were disadvantageous to opposition parties to proportional representation, and drafting a new constitution (León-Roesch 1993: 505, Lambert 2000: 383-85, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 87-88). The elections of 1993 were not entirely peaceful. Despite confirmed cases of fraud, independent analysts concluded that the fraudulent activity had no effect on the outcome, and that Wasmos's eight-point margin of victory was large enough to offset any illicit activity. Carte's team of international observers noted that opposition candidates tallied almost 60 percent of the vote between them.²⁵ In the presidential election on 5/9/1993, the Colorado Party secured pluralities in both houses of Congress, with evident military backing and extensive utilization of state resources to fund its campaign (Lansford, 2021: 1300). The conservative Colorado Party has dominated the presidency for the majority of the past 75 years. The only recent exception, left-wing former president Fernando Lugo, faced a legal but highly controversial „express impeachment“ in 2012. In the 2018 election, Mario Abdo Benítez from the Colorado Party secured the presidency with slightly over 46 percent of the vote. Efraín Alegre, representing the opposition Alianza Ganar coalition, garnered 43 percent. While international observers generally deemed the election fair, there were claims of irregularities such as fraud, vote-buying, and a media blackout impacting other candidates.²⁶ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since the country's transformation, the elections held are considered as competitive (LIED). V-Dem's CEI states the cleanliness as ambiguous from 1992 to 2002. Since 2003 somewhat cleanliness outcomes are scored. Since 1991 the overall elections conditions are somewhat free and fair (V-Dem EF&FI). Paraguay's constitution grants its indigenous inhabitants the right to engage in the economic, social, and political spheres of the nation. Nevertheless, in practice, the indigenous population faces marginalization and neglect. According to a June 2008 census, 48 percent of indigenous individuals were unemployed, and 88 percent lacked access to medical care. The judiciary, influenced by the ruling party and the military, suffers from pervasive corruption, leading to inefficiencies within the courts. Political interference in the judiciary is a significant issue, with judges frequently facing pressure from politicians and investigations being obstructed. Constitutional freedoms of expression and the press are inconsistently upheld, with ownership of Paraguay's primary media outlets concentrated in three influential corporations whose interests often shape media content. Regarding the political liberties they remain absent according to LIED. V-Dem's PCLI classifies them as somewhat present from 1991 to 1992, in 2013 and in 2016. For the remaining years full political liberties are achieved. Despite these challenges, Paraguay boasts a robust culture of largely autonomous non-governmental organizations dedicated to human rights and governance (Freedom House, 2010: 515-518).²⁷ Between 1992 and 1997, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For 1992-1998, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. From 1999 to 2005, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. 2006 and 2007, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 2008-2011, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. 2012 and 2015, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. 2013 and 2014, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For

2016 and 2017, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 2018 onward, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Since 1999, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority.

Electoral Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Abente-Brun 1995, Fournier/Burges 2000, Lambert 1997, Martini/Lezcano 1997, Roett 1989, Sosna 2001, Valenzuela 1997, Zagorski 2003, Sonntag 2001)

Persia see Iran

Notes

- ¹ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/paraguay-1904-present/>
- ² https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albino_Jara
- ³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albino_Jara
- ⁴ The two Ayalas are not related to each other.
- ⁵ <https://countrystudies.us/paraguay/14.htm>
- ⁶ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/February_Revolution_\(Paraguay\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/February_Revolution_(Paraguay))
- ⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Paraguay
- ⁸ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/paraguay-1904-present/>
- ⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_F%C3%A9lix_Estigarribia
- ¹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Paraguay
- ¹¹ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/paraguay-1904-present/>
- ¹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Paraguay
- ¹³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Paraguay
- ¹⁴ <http://tinyurl.com/4x5f65a>
- ¹⁵ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/paraguay-1904-present/>
- ¹⁶ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/paraguay-1904-present/>
- ¹⁷ <https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/western-hemisphere-region/paraguay-1904-present/>
- ¹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1954_Paraguayan_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat
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- ¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictatorship_of_Alfredo_Stroessner https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictatorship_of_Alfredo_Stroessner
- ²⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37
- ²¹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andr%C3%A9s_Rodr%C3%ADguez_\(politician\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andr%C3%A9s_Rodr%C3%ADguez_(politician))
- ²² [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andr%C3%A9s_Rodr%C3%ADguez_\(politician\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andr%C3%A9s_Rodr%C3%ADguez_(politician))
- ²³ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andr%C3%A9s_Rodr%C3%ADguez_\(politician\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andr%C3%A9s_Rodr%C3%ADguez_(politician))
- ²⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Paraguayan_Constitutional_Assembly_election
- ²⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Paraguayan_general_election
- ²⁶ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/paraguay/freedom-world/2022>
- ²⁷ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/paraguay/freedom-world/2023#CL>

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