



Peru — Va-PoReg Country Report

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08/14/1879 Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: On 07/28/1821 independence from Spain was declared and on 08/14/1879 it was recognized by Spain. From 09/08/1899 to 09/08/1903 Eduardo López de Romaña, member of the Civilista Party, was elected as constitutional president of the Peruvian Republic.¹ López de Romaña was a member of the landowning elite, reflecting the Aristocratic Republic's pattern of presidents emerging from the country's most privileged classes also known as the twenty-four friends.² This era is marked by a combination of relative political stability, swift economic advancement, and modernization, alongside significant social and political transformations. Despite these developments, electoral processes were limited, governed by stringent property ownership and literacy requirements, and frequently influenced or controlled by the ruling Civilista regime.³ Only in 1931 suffrage was extended to literate men, in 1955 women suffrage was introduced and in 1979 suffrage was extended to illiterates (Kellam 2013).⁴ Therefore, we classify the regime in this period as an electoral oligarchy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Therefore, the elections held were not competitive (LIED). During this period no cleanliness was scored (V-Dem CEI). The overall election conditions are classified as ambiguous by V-Dem's EF&FI. Additionally, political liberties were absent (LIED). However, V-Dem's PCLI already considers them as somewhat present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1900 to 1912, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 1913, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

02/04/1914 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, Guillermo Billinghurst was overthrown in a military coup headed by Colonel Oscar R. Benavides, Javier and Manuel Prado, and conservative members of the Civilista Party (Klaren 1993: 38, Casey et al. 2020: 14).⁵ In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties were somewhat present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1914, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

08/18/1915 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: Presidential and parliamentary elections were held on 05/16&17/1915. José Pardo, who headed the Civilista Party, won the presidency.⁶ On 08/18/1915 Benavides left office and Pardo took over. The military's withdrawal in 1915 was a negotiated exit, coordinated with civilian elites, particularly the Civilista Party, as part of a planned restoration of oligarchic rule. Rather than seeking to establish a lasting dictatorship, the military had intervened primarily to remove President Billinghurst and stabilize the political order in favor of traditional elite interests. The transition back to civilian control through tightly controlled elections reflected a strategic realignment within the ruling class, not a democratizing shift (Klaren 1993: 38, Casey et al. 2020: 14).⁷ On 07/04/1919, Augusto

B. Leguía was reinstated as president, an event that incited rebellion among certain oligarchic groups. Nevertheless, on the same date, 07/04/1919, his allies orchestrated a coup to ensure his ascension to power. Throughout his subsequent term, Leguía severed ties with the traditional oligarchy that had previously reigned over Peruvian politics for the last two decades. He exiled a number of leading politicians, then dissolved the parliament with the support of the gendarmerie. In the elections that followed, he committed significant electoral fraud, effectively converting the legislature into an entity that merely ratified his decisions (Klaren 1986: 588, 625, 631, 635, Klaren 1993: 39-40, Casey et al. 2020: 14-15). Although he presided over the creation of a new constitution, he disregarded constitutional norms and ruled as a dictator.⁸ Only in 1931 suffrage was extended to literate men, in 1955 women suffrage was introduced and in 1979 suffrage was extended to illiterates (Kellam 2013).⁹ In the elections between 1915 and 1930 only between 3.1 and 3.8 percentage of the population participated (Vanhanen 2019). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED, the elections were not competitive during the entire time. V-Dem's CEI indicates no electoral cleanliness. From 1915 to 1918 the overall election conditions were ambiguous. In 1919 per V-Dem's EF&FI elections were not really free and fair and not free and fair since 1920. LIED scores concerning the political liberties did not change. V-Dem's PCLI points out their somewhat presence until 1919. Since 1920, ambiguous outcomes are given. Between 1916 and 1918, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. Since 1920, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. Therefore, we classify the regime in this period as an electoral oligarchy. For the years 1915-1918, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1919, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. From 1920 to 1928, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For 1929 and 1930, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. BMR, RoW and LIED classify the period as an electoral/multiparty autocracy.

08/27/1930 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: On this date Leguía was deposed by a military coup.¹⁰ A junta formed, and Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro became President.¹¹ Following his assassination, General Oscar Benavides was appointed president by a constituent assembly in 1933. When the results of the 1936 elections proved unfavorable, Benavides nullified them. He was subsequently succeeded by Manuel Prado in 1939 (Klaren 1986: 639, Klaren 1993: 41, 44-45, Albertus 2015: 195, 197, Casey et al. 2020: 15). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held in 1930. Subsequently between 1931 and 1933, multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted. From 1934 onward, multiparty executive and legislative elections remain absent. Between 1933 and 1939, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1931 and from 1933 to 1939, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1932, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the given period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

10/22/1939 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy: On this date, general elections were held in Peru to elect the President and both houses of the Congress. In the presidential elections the result was a victory for Manuel Prado Ugarteche of the Concentración Nacional coalition, who received 77.5% of

the vote. The Concentración Nacional also won a landslide victory in the Congressional elections, winning 45 of the 48 seats in the Senate and 111 of the 140 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.¹² Given the peaceful transition of power from Benavides to Prado, we code this regime change event as a voluntary exit by the ruler. It is worth noting, however, that Prado remained loyal to Benavides's policies. Our coding also captures the subsequent transfer of power from Prado to Bustamante and the associated process of liberalization (see below for further details).¹³ Sociologist Dennis Gilbert describes the era spanning from 1930 to 1968 as marked by a „tripartite“ political system, wherein the military frequently acted on behalf of the oligarchy to quell the dissent of the „disorderly“ populace, symbolized by APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) and the PCP (Partido Comunista Peruano).¹⁴ Jose Bustamante emerged victorious in the competitive elections of 1945, leading to Prado stepping down from office (Klaren 1993: 44, Albertus 2015: 197, Casey et al. 2020: 15). He restored freedom of the press and civil rights. Furthermore, he planned for a democratization of government and hence limiting the influence of the military and the oligarchy.¹⁵ However, neither women suffrage (until 1955) nor suffrage for illiterates (until 1979) was granted.¹⁶ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. However, LIED declares the elections as competitive until 1947. From 1940 to 1947 no cleanliness was scored according to V-Dem's CEI. V-Dem's EF&FI classifies the overall conditions as not really free and fair until 1944. Since 1945, the overall conditions outcomes are ambiguous. Political liberties were absent according to LIED. For the time since 1940 V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were somewhat present. In addition, the quantitative criterion of participation of at least 15% of the population is not met. Between 1939 and 1948, the percentage of the population which participated in the elections was between 0.0 and 6.0 (Vanhanen 2019). According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. In 1948, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. For 1940-1944, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 1945, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1946 and 1947, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

10/27/1948 End Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy/Start Military Autocracy: A military coup led by General Manuel A. Odría ousted President José Bustamante and installed a military junta (Kantor 1969: 474, Soldevilla 1993: 536, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 88). It came as a surprise that Odría legalized opposition parties in 1956 and called fresh elections.¹⁷ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 1949. From 1950 onward, both executive and legislative elections were held but they were not categorized as multiparty. In 1948 and 1949, as per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. Since 1950, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. For 1948, V-Dem's JCE is classified as moderate, indicating occasional judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. In 1949, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1950 to 1955, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present.

06/17/1956 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: On this date, general elections were held to elect the President and both houses of the Congress. Manuel Prado Ugarteche of the Pradist Democratic Movement won the presidential election (Masterson 1991: 148-49, Soldevilla 1993: 525, 532,

Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 88). They were the first elections in Peru in which women could vote.¹⁸ Although female suffrage had been introduced in 1955, the suffrage was still restricted. Illiterates were only allowed to vote in 1979.¹⁹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this time the elections scored competitiveness according to LIED. Whereas V-Dem's CEI indicates not real cleanliness scores from 1957 to 1961. V-Dem's EF&FI declares the overall election conditions as ambiguous since 1956. While LIED states that no political liberties were present for this time, according to V-Dem's PCLI indicates the presence of political liberties can be viewed as ambiguous in 1956. Since 1957 they are considered as somewhat present. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For 1956, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1957 to 1961, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

07/18/1962 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: On this date, a military coup led by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Perez Godoy, ousted the outgoing civilian President Manuel Prado Ugarteche and installed a military junta (Pike 1967: 302).²⁰ In the June 1962 presidential election, no candidate had received the 1/3 of votes required to win, so the choice went to Congress. Haya de la Torre, APRA 's leader, and Odría, the former president agreed to a coalition in which Odría would be president and Haya de la Torre's deputy. The military ousted the outgoing president in order to prevent the UNO-APRA alliance from taking office, annulled the election, and established a four man junta of the leaders of the services to rule until another election could be held (Pike 1967: 299-300, Kantor 1969: 477, Masterson 1991: 174-77 , Klaren 2000: 320, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 88). On 03/03/1963 General Lindley overthrew Godoy due to policy differences. Lindley took over as chairman of the junta. In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the year 1962, V-Dem's JCE is classified as robust, indicating strong and regular judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. In 1962, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were somewhat present.

06/09/1963 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Hybrid Regime: Civilians reclaimed power through competitive elections, finalizing the transition to democracy (Masterson 1991: 183, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 88). However, illiterates, a large portion of the population, had no right to vote. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED the elections were nevertheless competitive. V-Dem's CEI classifies the cleanliness as ambiguous since 1964. V-Dem's EF&FI also scores the overall conditions as ambiguous. In addition to that political liberties were still absent (LIED). Since 1964 V-Dem's PCLI scores them as fully present. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For 1963, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 1964 to 1967, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. In this regime period Peru is according to our observations a borderline case between an electoral hybrid regime and an electoral democracy.

10/03/1968 End Electoral Hybrid Regime/Start Military Autocracy: Military coup led by army chief of staff General Velasco, who deposed the elected president Fernando Belaúnde and installed a – leftist revolutionary - military junta with Velasco as the chairman.²¹ The reason for the coup was a scandal over an oil contract that prompted the armed forces to overthrow the government (Einaudi 1974: 163, Masterson 1991: 229-30). On

08/29/1975 Velasco was overthrown by the military government for not carrying out the revolution. Furthermore, economic decline, unemployment and violence were growing Bermudez took over the junta (Balmaseda 1992). The military leadership agreed to elections for a Constituent Assembly, held on 06/18/1978. In these multiparty elections the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance emerged as the largest party in the multiparty elections.²² In 1979 suffrage was granted for the illiterate.²³ However, power was held until 05/18/1980 by the military and the executive was neither directly nor indirectly legitimized by popular elections. In accordance with LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Per FH, from 1972 to 1974, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified by FH from 1975 to 1979, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1968, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the span of 1969-1977, V-Dem's JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1978 and 1979, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not really present until 1977, are in an ambiguous state in 1978 and were somewhat present in 1979.

05/18/1980 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral Democracy: The parliament, dominated by APRA and other opposition forces, organized free presidential elections on this date. These elections are viewed in the literature as a transition to democracy (Soldevilla 1993: 518, Orsini 2000, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 88).²⁴ Fernando Belaunde Terry, representing the Christian Democratic party, secured victory as the opposition candidate (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 52). In July 1980 the new constitution was fully implemented, and the new state institutions were inaugurated (Lea/Milward/Rowe 2001: 176). The bicameral parliament comprised the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Citizens aged at least 18 years and possessing full civil and political rights were entitled to vote. Additionally, voting was compulsory for citizens until the age of 70 (IPU 1980). Throughout much of this period, political and civil liberties were generally respected. According to FH, from 1980 to 1988, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. Per FH, in 1989 and 1990, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. According to FH, in 1991, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. V-Dem's PCLI full political liberties were present until 1989. Since 1990 the outcomes have changed to somewhat present. However, according to LIED political liberties were not present. The occurrence of human rights abuses and the imposition of periodic states of emergency during counter-insurgency operations against the Maoist Shining Path guerrilla severely undermined the state of Peruvian democracy (Gastil 1986: 354). The democratic situation deteriorated significantly, particularly in the late 1980s. On 06/10/1990 relatively unknown Alberto Fujimori won the Peruvian general election. Towards the end of this period, Peru faced significant institutional challenges due to a severe economic downturn, widespread corruption associated with drug trafficking, and heightened counter-insurgency efforts against the Shining Path. Expanded martial law extended military control over more than half of the country, severely limiting political expression amidst a climate of pervasive violence and fear caused by the Shining Path and MRTA guerrilla movements (Soldevilla 1993: 518, Orsini 2000, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 88, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 52, Lea/Milward/Rowe 2001: 176).²⁵ Repressive measures by the military, security forces, and affiliated paramilitary groups exacerbated the situation. Fujimori's first year in office saw a dramatic increase in political violence, with an average of ten deaths per day, up from four deaths per day in 1989, with the trend worsening in the latter half of 1991 (Freedom House, 1992: 369). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this time elections were competitive according to LIED. V-Dem's CEI

underlines that somewhat cleanliness is achieved. According to V-Dem's EF&FI the elections are somewhat free and fair. Between 1980 and 1989, based on Polity5's evaluation, during this period, the executive's power was limited to a degree between substantial constraints and parity with other institutions, fitting Intermediate Category 3. In 1990 and 1991, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For 1980, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1981-1989, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In 1990, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. In 1991, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive.

04/05/1992 End Electoral Democracy/Start Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy: When opposition parties deadlocked President Alberto Fujimori's neo-liberal economic agenda, he launched, on this date, a self-coup with military support. He ordered the military to occupy the legislative chambers and removed all Supreme Court justices who were deemed insufficiently loyal. He suspended most of the Constitution and by the end of that day, every major institutional check on Fujimori's authority had been neutralized, allowing him to rule by decree under the stated goal of combating insurgency and corruption. Subsequently, he called for elections to a new congress which drafted a new constitution (Soldevilla 1993: 518, Conaghan 2005: 41-45, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 88-89). On 11/22/1992 elections took place for the Democratic Constituent Congress. This assembly was elected to draft a new constitution. These elections were marked by controversy. The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, the second-largest party in the Chamber of Deputies at the time, boycotted the elections. Fujimori's Cambio 90-New Majority alliance won a significant portion of the seats, securing 44 out of the 80 available seats in the Democratic Constituent Congress (Cameron 1998). On 04/09/1995 general elections were held, the first under the newly drafted constitution. Fujimori was re-elected with 64,4% of the votes and his Cambio 90-New Majority won 67 of the 120 seats in the unicameral Congress. The former UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and his Party Union for Peru came second with 21,8% and 17 seats.²⁶ Because after the self-coup new elections were held the new regime is coded as an electoral autocracy and not a personalist autocracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. However, no competitive elections were held during this regime period (LIED). From 1993 to 1999 ambiguous cleanliness is scored and in 2000 no real cleanliness is stated (V-Dem CEI). However, somehow surprisingly given the CEI score the elections are considered as somewhat free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. Per FH, in 1992, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified by FH, from 1993 to 1995 the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Per FH, in 1996, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. As classified by FH from 1997 to 1999, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Moreover, LIED's outcome concerning the political liberties did not change. According to LIED political liberties were still not present and V-Dem's PCLI scores switched to an ambiguous presence. In 1992, as per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. Since 1993, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For 1992, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 1993 to 1999, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints

on the executive were limited.

11/21/2000 End Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy/Start Democratizing Regime: Fujimori resigned in response to the publication of evidence of corruption and human rights abuses. Remaining members of Fujimori's inner circle also resigned and/or agreed to turn power over to an interim government led by the opposition until the next election. Generals allied with Fujimori were forced to retire later the same month (Taylor 2001: 18, Conaghan 2005: 228-42, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 89). According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. For the year 2000, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In 2000, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were somewhat present.

04/08/2001 End Democratizing Regime/Start Electoral Democracy: Following the fraudulent presidential elections of 2000, free and fair elections were held on this date.²⁷ Following the 2021 general elections, Congress saw the entry of ten parties. International observers regarded these elections as competitive and peaceful. The Peru Libre party, led by Castillo, emerged as the largest faction in Congress with 37 seats. The right-wing FP party, previously led by Fujimori and known for its dominance, secured 24 seats. However, no single party achieved a majority in the Congress.²⁸ Elections are held regularly, including in 2006, 2011, 2016 and 2021. International election observer missions are regularly deployed, for example the European Union Election Observation Mission. In general, the missions conclude that the important democratic benchmarks are met, but that reforms are still necessary regarding electoral law, electoral administration and party funding (Amnesty International 1996).²⁹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. However, since 2001, the elections are considered as competitive by LIED. V-Dem's CEI declares the elections with a constant cleanliness since 2002. Moreover, V-Dem' EF&FI confirms constant free and fair election conditions. Nevertheless, in December 2022, Peru's president Pedro Castillo was impeached and imprisoned after trying to dissolve Congress illegally, whereafter Dina Boluarte, the previous vice-president, was inaugurated by Congress. After the impeachment, the new government declared a state of emergency after large scale pro-castillo protests turned violent, limiting rights of assembly and employing the military.³⁰ Many protestors call for a new election.³¹ Dina Buolarte is the sixth president in five years.³² This is mainly due to the fact that the provisions for impeachment proceedings in the 1993 Constitution are very broadly worded, which means that the legislature can initiate proceedings without cause.³³ The independence of the judiciary is problematic and Peru scores constantly relatively poorly in Freedom House's Rule of Law category. Corruption is also a constant, systematic problem. The reactions to the protests in 2022 and 2020, which were accompanied by restrictions on political and civil rights and the use of police violence, led Freedom House to downgrade Peru to partly free in 2021 and 2023 reports.³⁴ As per FH's classification in 2004, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. According to FH, from 2005 to 2019, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. Per FH, in 2020, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. As per FH's classification in 2021, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. As classified by FH since 2022, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. Since 2001 both LIED and V-Dem's PCLI point out that political liberties are achieved. Overall, Peru always seems to score on the border between free and partly free. From 2001 to 2018, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. Elections are usually free and fair, and show only minor defects, but checks and balances between the different branches are distorted and civil rights are restricted in the light of protests. For 2001, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 2002-2006 and 2010-2023, V-Dem's JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. For the years 2007 to 2009, V-Dem's JCE is

interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. According to our observations Peru is an electoral democracy.

Electoral Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Cameron 1994a, Cameron/Mauceri 1997, Carrión 2006, Cotler 1978, Cotler 1986, Dietz 1992, Kenney 2004, Sonntag 2001, Levitsky/Cameron 2003)

Notes

- ¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eduardo_L%C3%B3pez_de_Roma%C3%B1a
- ² [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eduardo_L%C3%B3pez_de_Roma%C3%B1a#:~:text=A%20member%20of%20the%20landowning,calle d%20Aristocratic%20Republic](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eduardo_L%C3%B3pez_de_Roma%C3%B1a#:~:text=A%20member%20of%20the%20landowning,calle d%20Aristocratic%20Republic;); https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Peru
- ³ <https://countrystudies.us/peru/16.htm>
- ⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage_in_Peru
- ⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guillermo_Billinghurst; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guillermo_Billinghurst
- ⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_Pardo_y_Barreda
- ⁷ https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elecciones_generales_de_Per%C3%BA_de_1915
- ⁸ <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Augusto-Bernardino-Legua-y-Salcedo>
<https://www.britannica.com/biography/Augusto-Bernardino-Legua-y-Salcedo>
- ⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women%27s_suffrage_in_Peru
- ¹⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augusto_B._Legu%C3%ADa#Overthrow
- ¹¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1939_Peruvian_general_election; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luis_Miguel_S%C3%A1nchez_Cerro
- ¹² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luis_Miguel_S%C3%A1nchez_Cerro
- ¹³ <http://www.chisols.org/narratives.html> , see narratives for version 5.0, Peru_R: 3
- ¹⁴ <https://countrystudies.us/peru/19.htm>
- ¹⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_Luis_Bustamante_y_Rivero
- ¹⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage
- ¹⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manuel_A._Odr%C3%ADa
- ¹⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1956_Peruvian_general_election
- ¹⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage
- ²⁰ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1962_Peruvian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat
- ²¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1968_Peruvian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat
- ²² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1978_Peruvian_Constituent_Assembly_election
- ²³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_suffrage#cite_note-centralasiainstitute.org-37
- ²⁴ <https://www.janda.org/ICPP/ICPP2000/Countries/3-SouthAmerica/37-Peru/Peru63-00.htm>
- ²⁵ <https://www.janda.org/ICPP/ICPP2000/Countries/3-SouthAmerica/37-Peru/Peru63-00.htm>
- ²⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995_Peruvian_general_election
- ²⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_Peruvian_general_election
- ²⁸ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/peru/freedom-world/2022>
- ²⁹ <https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/relations-non-eu-countries/types-relations-and-partnerships/election-observation/mission-recommendations-repository/search>
- ³⁰ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/peru/freedom-world/2023>
- ³¹ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/24/democracy-line-peru>
- ³² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dina_Boluarte
- ³³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_Peru
- ³⁴ <https://freedomhouse.org/country/peru/freedom-world/2023>; <https://freedomhouse.org/country/peru/freedom-world/2021>

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