Va-PoReg Country Report Argentina 1900–2025

On this date general elections were held under the new rules. Voters elected the President, legislators, and local officials. They were the first secret-ballot presidential elections in the nation’s history, they were mandatory and had a turnout of 62.8%. The turnout for the Chamber of Deputies election was 65.9%.⁴ The period spanning from 1916 to 1930 in Argentina is known as the Radical Phase (Spanish: Etapa Radical), as it began with the election of the Radical Civic Union candidate Hipólito Yrigoyen, ending the conservative Generation of ‘80’s domination on politics.⁵ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections are present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes the elections as competitive. V-Dem’s CEI and EF&FI scores stay at the level of somewhat clean, free and fair elections. According to V-Dem’s PCLI political liberties were present. LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. The critical regime change occurred in 1916, transitioning to an Electoral Oligarchy. The decisive victory of the opposition Radical Civic Union (UCR) in the 1916 elections proved that intra-elite competition was now genuine and functional, fulfilling the core criterion that distinguishes it from autocracy. However, the regime maintained its oligarchic character through the massive, legal exclusion of immigrants, who constituted a majority of the adult male population in key urban areas, and all women, restricting the electorate to a narrow native-born male minority. This combination of robust constitutional competition within a legally restricted elite is the paradigmatic pattern of an Electoral Oligarchy. A subsequent transition to a Electoral Democracy would only be justifiable after 1947 with the introduction of female suffrage, which moved the system closer to universal inclusion.

A military coup led by General José Félix Uriburu overthrew the elected government of President Hipólito Yrigoyen (Radical Civic Union). The coup was supported by the Nacionalistas, a far-right nationalist movement (Lewis 2003: 83f).⁶ In this period Uriburu acted as „President of the Provisional Government”. He planned to structure the regime along corporatist and fascist lines.⁷ However, more traditional forces behind the coup were opposed to this direction. As per Polity5’s classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. Regarding the political liberties they were classified as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as being in an ambiguous state according to V-Dem’s PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The regime episode is not a military autocracy because, according to our codebook, military autocracy requires a stable legitimation pattern grounded in the corporate authority of the armed forces. Uriburu’s regime does not meet this criterion. Its legitimation was provisional, coup-based, and openly contested, oscillating between a fascist–corporatist project and more traditional conservative expectations. The armed forces did not present a unified institutional claim to rule, nor did the regime justify itself through the enduring authority of a military institution. This absence of a consolidated, military-institutional right to rule places the episode clearly in the category of a non-electoral transitional regime, despite its military control.

On this date elections were held. Justo, supported by a coalition comprising the conservative National Democratic Party, the Independent Socialist Party, and the anti-personalist faction of the Radical Party (later known as the Coalition of Parties for Democracy), ran for president. With the Yrigoyen faction excluded from the elections and its supporters opting for a strategy of „revolutionary abstention,” Justo secured a straightforward victory.⁸ The regime employed a combination of direct and indirect military control, along with fraudulent elections that effectively prevented opposition candidates from participating, guaranteeing victory for the regime’s candidates in election (Rock 1993: 173-74, 177-81, 208, Lentz 1999: 21, Mainwaring/Pérez-Liñán 2013: 131, Finchelstein 2014: 26). Justo’s rule was characterized by prioritizing commercial interests, promoting fraud in elections, and implementing significant public works projects. However, the urban and industrialized social landscape of Argentina posed challenges for the ruling Concordance, an alliance dominated by the conservative National Autonomist Party. The Radical Civic Union (Ilsley), led by Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear, emerged as a significant force after its boycott of the 1931 elections. Negotiations between Justo and Alvear resulted in the lifting of the UCR’s boycott, and the party achieved victories in various elections, including the election of Amadeo Sabattini as Governor of Córdoba Province.⁹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as not competitive. The EF&FI and CEI both drop down one level during this era, rating election freedom and fairness as ambiguous and cleanliness as not really present. LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. From 1931 to 1932 V-Dem’s PCLI indicates that political liberties did not really exist. From 1933 to 1942 political liberties PCLI can be interpreted as an ambiguous state of political liberties (V-Dem PCLI). On 09/05/1937 elections were held. Alvear became the UCR’s presidential candidate in 1937, with Enrique Mosca as his running mate. However, Alvear faced opposition from certain progressive factions and failed to secure the endorsement of influential groups like FORJA. Additionally, the resignation of Lisandro de la Torre from the Senate and the prevalence of corruption and impunity further shaped the political climate. Justo, influenced by British commercial interests, nominated Roberto Ortiz as his party’s candidate, with Ramón Castillo as his running mate. The elections were marred by intimidation, ballot stuffing, and voter roll tampering, leading to a clear victory for Ortiz. The system of „patriotic fraud” prevalent during the „Infamous Decade” was evident in the 1937 elections, which Governor Manuel Fresco described as one of the most fraudulent in history.⁹ LIED as well as V-Dem’s EF&FI did not change their scores. At the beginning of this regime period from 1932 until 1936, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. From 1937 to 1942 based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. For the year 1932, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the following year, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For the period 1934-1942, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the year 1943, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are again both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

On this date, a military coup by ultra-nationalist officers from Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU)¹⁰ led by General Pedro Pablo Ramírez occurred, resulting in the removal of the conservative civilian government and the establishment of a military junta (Rock 1993: 174-75, 221, Levitsky 2003: 38, Finchelstein 2014: 30, Casey et al. 2020: 2, Potash 1996:573, : 40-41Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 40).¹¹ The coup was directed against the corruption and perceived ineffectiveness of the civilian government. The military junta that followed prioritized nationalistic and corporatist policies, which set the stage for the eventual rise of Colonel Juan Perón to power within the government. V-Dem’s PCLI scores concerning the political liberties decreased back to not really present, while LIED’s outcome stayed absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the years 1944 and 1945, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are robust. At the same time, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

The Argentine general elections of 1946 were considered to be free and fair. Voters chose both the president and the parliament (Lewis 1990: 98-99).¹² The elections of 1946 were the last in Argentine in which only men were enfranchised. In this election Juan Domingo Perón (Labour Party) became president. The Sáenz Peña Law was amended to include female citizens in 1947 but became effective in 1952.¹³ While the 1946 elections were conducted with voters choosing both the president and their legislators, the broader political context included elements of authoritarianism, such as suppression of opposition and control over political life, which leads us to characterize the regime as an electoral hybrid regime. Peron „was bidding for undisputed power, based on the support of the underprivileged laborers and on his popularity and authority in the army”.¹⁴ However, during his presidency the autocratic elements became more clearly visible. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as competitive. The V-Dem CEI and EF&FI increased again to levels of somewhat cleanliness, freedom and fairness during this period. Political liberties were classified as ambiguous until 1950 according to V-Dem’s PCLI. LIED codes political liberties as absent for this period. Since 1948, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1946, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the year 1947, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. During the rest of the regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

On this date, the Peronist government, suspended constitutional guarantees and allowed detention without trial. In the months leading up to the November 1951 election, the government intensified its harassment and manipulation tactics against the opposition. By late September, they escalated these efforts by arresting key opposition leaders and soon after excluded opposition deputies from the legislature, solidifying the regime’s shift toward autocracy (Ilsley 1952: 229, 240, Potash 1996: 133, Brooker 1995: 175, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 40). MCM coded the regime as military because Peron had a prominent military background and inserted military officers into other positions of power as candidates (Magaloni/Chu/Min 2013: 15). According to the coding rules of this dataset the regime does not fulfil the coding rules of a military regime. We also disagree with the classification of CGV of this regime period as democratic. Political liberties were classified as not really existent according to V-Dem’s PCLI for this period. LIED classifies political liberties as absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

On this date, a military coup led by General Eduardo Lonardi ousted the Peronist government (Potash 1996: 575, Brooker 1995: 181, Lewis 2001: 110-111). Peron fled the country and Lonardi established himself as the head of a military junta.¹⁵ Furthermore, political liberties were still coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present following V-Dem’s PCLI. For the years 1956 and 1957, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the following year, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

In the Argentine general election voters chose both the president and their legislators. The election was competitive „but the largest party, the PJ, was banned” (O'Donnell 1973: 166-192, Potash 1996:228, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 41), hence, the regime is coded as an electoral autocracy. The military actively wielded veto power over economic policy decisions, ministerial appointments, and prohibited the Peronist Party from participating in elections (O'Donnell 1973: 166-192, Finer 1975: 153, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 41). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED again classifies the elections as competitive. The CEI and EF&FI did not change during this time. V-Dem’s PCLI classifies political liberties as somewhat existent for this period. LIED codes political liberties as absent. Based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

On this date Army Chief of Staff General Rual Poggi surrounded the presidential palace and arrested President Frondizi. The military dissolved congress and set up a government with José María Guido as the interim president.¹⁶ During Guido’s presidency, the military held significant sway, and although he was a civilian, his role was largely to provide a constitutional façade for what was effectively military rule. Since, the military in this period named a president to their liking and kept the parliament dissolved the regime is classified as a military autocracy. However, because there was a civilian president it is classified as an indirect rule military regime. LIED still codes political liberties as absent. According to V-Dem’s PCLI the state of political liberties can be interpreted as somewhat present. Based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also robust. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

On this date multiparty executive elections were held. However, the military continued to exert significant political influence, most notably in the enforced ban of the Peronist Party and its leader, Juan Domingo Perón. Arturo Umberto Illia was elected president.¹⁷ On 03/14/1965 multiparty legislative elections were held, with the same official constraints. Despite military pressure on Illia to ban the Popular Union Party as well, which styled itself pro-peronian, but he refused,¹⁸ demonstrating the militaries declined influence. Despite the continued military constraints V-Dem’s PCLI indicates political freedoms as somewhat present. Following LIED, they are classified as absent. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. After 1962, LIED classifies multiparty executive and legislative elections as present in this period. For the years 1964 and 1965, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1966, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

On this date, a military coup mainly organized by General Julio Alsogaray and military led by Lieutenant-General Pistarini ousted President Arturo Illia. Indirect military rule was replaced with direct military rule and General Juan Carlos Ongania took over the presidency (Gallo 1969: 497-498, 501, Potash 1996: 160-161, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 41). This period marked the beginning of what Guillermo O’Donnell (1973) famously conceptualized as a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, a model particularly characteristic of the Southern Cone in the 1960s and 1970s. In contrast to earlier forms of populist or personalist authoritarianism, the bureaucratic-authoritarian model was defined by the systematic exclusion of popular participation, technocratic governance, and the central role of the armed forces in shaping economic and political decision-making. O’Donnell emphasized that such regimes emerged in response to the crises of import-substitution industrialization and mass mobilization, aiming to depoliticize society through repression and economic orthodoxy. In Argentina, this was reflected in the military’s dissolution of democratic institutions, suspension of party politics, and the installation of an authoritarian developmental state under Onganía. The exclusionary nature of the regime and its rejection of even limited pluralism underscore its classification as a military autocracy in this period. For that period the classification of political liberties by V-Dem’s PCLI ranged between none, not really and ambiguous while LIED’s outcomes still scored their absence. Based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In the timeframe 1967-1972, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the year 1973, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

On this date, free and fair presidential elections took place. The Peronist party was allowed to run and won (Arceneaux 2001b: 68, Lewis 2001: 149-51, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 41). Perón’s surrogate candidate, the left-wing Peronist Hector Cámpora, won the presidential elections and assumed office on 05/25/1973. Following a month of his presidency, Perón returned from Spain. However, Cámpora’s tenure was marred by political and social unrest, leading to his resignation alongside Vice President Vicente Solano Lima in July 1973. On 06/20/1973, the Ezeiza Massacre took place, which marked the starting point for the violent conflict within the Peronist movement. Subsequently, new elections were called, this time with Perón as the nominee of the Justicialist Party. Perón emerged victorious in the 10/12/1973 election, with his wife Isabel Perón elected as vice president.¹⁹ The period was marred by a raging violent conflict between the left and right wing of the Peronist party, with right wing death squads - supported by the minister of social welfare José López Rega and some sectors of the federal police and military²⁰ - and leftist guerilla groups committing a myriad of atrocities.²¹ From 1974 to 1983, as part of Operation Condor and the so called Dirty War, parts of the military and security forces, along with death squads such as the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA, or Triple A), systematically targeted political dissidents and individuals suspected of affiliations with socialism, left-wing Peronism, or the Montoneros movement. Between 22,000 to 30,000 people were killed or disappeared during this period, with many impossible to formally document due to state terrorism.²² Despite the occurrence of two free and fair elections held under universal suffrage during this period, the state-sponsored repression targeting left-wing Peronists, coupled with a cycle of violence, renders it untenable to characterize Argentina between 1973 and 1976 as a democracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this period, LIED classifies the elections as competitive and the V-Dem EF&FI reached its highest score to date, scoring elections as free and fair. The CEI scored at the level of somewhat clean elections. V-Dem’s PCLI classifications concerning political liberties from 1973 to 1976 range from somewhat to none. According to LIED political liberties were absent for this period. In accordance with FH, the country was designated as free in 1973, with a score between 2 and 4. This categorization aligns with our interpretation of the country’s status. From 1974 onward, the country’s score ranged between 6 and 7, indicating a classification of partly free and is categorized as rather free in our interpretation. Based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For most of the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the year 1976, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating as indicating that that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. According to our classification this is a borderline case between an electoral democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

On this date, a military coup led by General Jorge Rafael Videla ousted democratically elected President Isabel Peron and established a military junta headed by Videla (Balmaseda 1992, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 41).²³ The country was ruled by a three-man junta comprising the heads of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The military regime aimed to restore order and stability, which they believed were undermined by economic difficulties, social unrest, and political violence. The regime was notorious for its widespread human rights abuses, including forced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial killings. Thousands of political opponents, activists, and suspected dissidents were abducted and „disappeared“ in what is known as the „Dirty War“ (Guerra Sucia). Political parties were banned, and political activities were heavily suppressed. The junta dissolved the National Congress and suspended the constitution, effectively erasing any remaining democratic institutions (Munck 1985). The regime implemented neoliberal economic policies, including privatization, deregulation, and opening the economy to foreign investment. These policies were overseen by Economy Minister José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz. The military regime imposed strict censorship on the press and other media, controlling the flow of information and suppressing any criticism of the government. Educational institutions were purged of suspected leftist influences, and the regime promoted a nationalist and conservative curriculum. By the early 1980s, the regime’s popularity waned due to economic problems and growing domestic and international pressure. In 1981 and 1982, the military junta underwent several changes in the presidency, indicating instability within the government’s structure. By 1983, the military gradually returned Argentina to democratic rule.²⁴ Per FH, the country is classified as not free with a score between 11 and 14 and falls under the not free category in our interpretation. The disastrous Falklands War (Guerra de las Malvinas) in 1982 further weakened the junta. Moreover, while political liberties stayed absent (LIED), V-Dem’s PCLI scores dropped back to a range that we interpret as the absence of political liberties. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For 1977 to 1982, V-Dem’s JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1983, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. Based on our observations, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns the observations of LIED.

On this date, free and fair elections were held (Rock 1995:189, Arceneaux 2001a: 114-140, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 41). Since then, Argentina can be characterized as a democracy with competitive elections, a free media, and vibrant civil society sectors. Nevertheless, significant challenges persist, including economic instability, governmental and judicial corruption, and drug-related violence.²⁵ From the end of military rule until 2015,the political landscape was dominated by two parties, the Peronist Partido Justicialista (PJ) and the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR).²⁶ Between 1998 and 2002, the country experienced a severe financial depression marked by hyperinflation and high unemployment rates. Widespread riots led to the resignation of President Fernando de la Rúa of the UCR in 2001. Since then, the UCR has been significantly weakened and has participated in national politics only through alliance arrangements.²⁷ In 2003, Néstor Carlos Kirchner of the PJ was elected president, followed by his wife Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, also a PJ member, who served two consecutive terms. During her presidency, allegations concerning corruption were raised against both Kirchners and when Fernández de Kirchner lost elections in 2015, several charges were formally brought against her. She was accused and found guilty of corruption charges in 2022. That same year, an assassination attempt against her failed only by accident.²⁸ While civil liberties are generally guaranteed, the institutions meant to safeguard them are plagued by corruption. Additionally, while a free press and freedom of expression is enshrined in law, journalists are frequently harassed when reporting sensitive issues such as drug-related criminality²⁹, which could lead to self-censorship. Argentina is a presidential representative republic, featuring a bicameral legislative branch. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections as competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI and CEI both score elections as free, fair and clean. In accordance with FH, the country receives a score between 6 and 7 in 1983, indicating a status as partly free. Our framework categorizes the country as rather free. From 1984 to 1991, the country is classified as free, with a score between 2 and 4. From 1992 to 1997, the country is still classified as free with a score of 5, falling under the rather free category in our interpretation. In 1998, the country once again achieved a score between 6 and 7. In 1999, the country is classified as free with a score of 5 and in 2000 it was classified as free with a score between 2 and 4. From 2001 to 2002, it scored between 6 and 7 as partly free. From 2003 onward, it was classified as free with a score between 2 and 4. V-Dem’s PCLI classifies political liberties as present from 1984 onward and LIED as present from 1986 onward. The president of Argentina is both the head of state as well as head of government. Elections are held regularly and within a multi-party framework.³⁰ Presidential and parliamentary elections in October 2023 were deemed fair and free by independent observers and turnout was over 70%. The right-wing candidate Javier Milei won the presidency with 36% of the vote while the Union for the Homeland (UxP) coalition holds the majority of parliamentary seats (102 in the Chamber of Deputies, 33 in the Senate). Mass protests that erupted as a response to reforms which caused inflation to spike considerably, and restricted protests slightly were conducted peacefully.³¹ Milei, however, is pursuing a strategy of power centralization and trying to dismantle the system of democratic oversight. In a reform package, he proposed the declaration of an ”economic emergency” that would grant him the power to govern by decree for one year, effectively sidestepping the legislative and judiciary.³² He previously used supposed emergency decrees to legislate without the approval of parliament, while commentators called him out for inventing an urgency that does not exist.³³ Argentinian democracy seems under pressure once more and it remains to be seen how it develops under Javier Milei. During this regime period, according to Polity5’s categorization, various periods regarding executive constraints can be identified. From 1984-1988, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. From 1989 to 2014, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks. Since 2015, based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. During the years 1984-1989, V-Dem’s JCE LCE are classified by us as indicating that judicial and legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the years 1990 to 1998, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the years 1999 to 2015, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For the three years 2016-2018, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 2019-2022, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For 2023, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive.

Liberal Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Allub 1973, Alvarez 2003, Brown 2010, Carreras 2002, Cavarozzi 1986, Cavarozzi 2001, Domínguez 2002, Finer 1975, Gallo 1969, Ilsley 1952, Levitsky 2008, Lewis 1990, Lewis 2001, López-Alves 2000, Peruzzotti 2001, Potash 1996, Rock 1995, Smith 1974, Smith 1978, Thibaut 1996, Thiery 2002, Waldmann 1995)