(Monarchical) Electoral Oligarchy
On 10/04/1830 Belgium proclaimed its independence from the Netherlands. From 08/25/1830 until 07/21/1831 the Belgium Revolution took place. On 02/07/1831 Belgium became the Kingdom of Belgium. On 04/19/1839 independence was recognized by the Netherlands. As parties emerged, initially beginning as representative clubs, the king’s sway over cabinet formation and policy experienced a consistent decline. Subsequent to 1848, the monarch managed to dismiss the prime minister only on two occasions (in 1971 and 1884), despite the prime minister enjoying parliamentary support (Trefs 2010: 271). While the 1893 electoral reforms in Belgium were progressive for their era and marked a departure from more elitist voting systems, the plural voting system meant that it was not a full democracy in the sense that we understand today. The principle of ‘one person, one vote’ was not yet realized, and significant segments of the population, including women and those without property or certain educational qualifications, were either excluded or had limited influence compared to wealthier and more educated males. All datasets including the one’s with a separate category for ruling monarchies like AF classify Belgium from 1900 on as a democracy or semidemocracy. Va-PoReg disagrees and classifies the regime as an electoral oligarchy, which can, however, be viewed as the historical predecessor of democracy. LIED as well as V-Dem’s PCLI code political liberties as present for this period. From 1900 to 1907, according to the Polity5 indicator the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. Since 1908, based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.