Va-PoReg Country Report Cambodia 1900–2025

On 08/11/1863 the French established a protectorate in Cambodia (Thomson 1945). A treaty was signed between the Cambodian King Norodom and the French under which the Cambodian monarchy was allowed to remain, but power was largely vested in a resident general. France also retained Cambodia’s foreign and trade relations as well as military protection.¹ At the same time, Siam (modern Thailand) renounced its sovereignty over Cambodia and officially recognized the French protectorate in Cambodia.¹ On 10/17/1887 Cambodia became a colony as part of the newly created French Indochinese Federation under a governor-general (Tully 2005).² The Resident General assumed all powers by the King to collect taxes, issue decrees, and even appoint royal officials and choose crown princes. Therefore, from that time on, all powers were vested in the governor general and colonial bureaucracy.¹ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period. Both LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI classify political liberties as absent. For the relevant period, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. By agreement with Japan, the French Vichy government allowed Japanese troops to transit through French Indochina starting in 1940. In August 1941, Japanese troops occupied the French protectorate of Cambodia and established a garrison. However, the Japanese authorities allowed the French colonial officials to remain at their administrative posts, maintaining effective French control over the administration.

On this date, Japanese staged a coup de force against the French, removing them from power and ending French colonial rule (Tully 2005).³ On 03/13 King Norodom Sihanouk proclaimed an independent Kingdom of Kampuchea, a short-lived puppet state of Imperial Japan, and served as prime minister.⁴

The Japanese occupation ended with the official surrender of Japan in August 1945 and a new government was established with Son Ngoc Thanh acting as prime minister.⁴

On this date the French re-established colonial rule in Cambodia shortly after Japanese surrender in 1945 and Thanh was put under house arrest.⁴ In 1946, France allowed the Cambodians to form political parties and to hold elections for a Consultative Assembly that would advise the monarch on drafting the country’s constitution. Pre-independence Consultative Assembly elections were held in September 1946 in which the Democrats won 50 of 67 seats. In the December 1947 elections for the parliament, the Democrats won a large majority again.¹ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Additionally, LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI indicate the absence of political liberties. For 1946, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1947, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

On this date Cambodia was declared a French associated state by the Franco-Khmer treaty. It granted Cambodia control over most internal matters and of most administrative functions while France retained a significant control over the judicial system, finances and customs and moreover, Cambodia was obliged to co-ordinate foreign policy matters with the High Council of the French Union (Tully 2005).¹ We code this regime change event as a negotiated transition. Legislative elections were held on 12/21/1947. Suffrage was limited to a literate minority of the male population with property rights. In Nohlens Elections Handbook, a precise percentage of registered voters for 1947 was not cataloged, however, in the years previous and after registered voters fluctuate between 15 and 20% of the total population. (Nohlen/Grotz/Hartmann 2001:63). Despite this, considering the strong restrictions on male and absence of female suffrage, this period is classified as an autocratic monarchy. The period is considered as a borderline case between a colony and a protectorate. According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. For the year 1948, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the year 1949, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1950, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1951, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1952, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1953, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

After a long struggle by Sihanouk, on 08/17/1953 France granted Cambodia full sovereignty and on 11/09/1953 the last French troops left Cambodian soil after 90 years of colonial rule (Tully 2005). According to the constitution Cambodia was supposed to be a constitutional monarchy. However, King Sihanouk suspended the constitution, dissolved the assembly, assumed the post of PM, and declared martial law before independence (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 51). Sihanouk came from the traditional royal family but had been chosen by the French over other potential royal claimant (Seekins 1987, Lansford 2012g:216). Control of residual matters affecting sovereignty, such as finances and foreign affairs were transferred completely to the Cambodian state in 1954.¹ In 1955, universal suffrage was introduced.⁵ Since 1955, based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the year 1954, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1955 to 1969, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1970, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held in 1954 and 1955. No executive elections were present. From 1955-1961 multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. From 1962 until 1972 LIED classifies both executive and legislative elections as present, but they were not categorized as multiparty. Besides, political liberties maintained their absent score for the entire time following LIED. V-Dem’s PCLI scores them as absent until 1949, as not really present from 1950 to 1959 and as ambiguous until 1970.

A new civil-military ruling coalition was established following a coup orchestrated by Prime Minister General Lon Nol and Prince Sirik Matak (Seekins 1990, Lansford 2012f: 215, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 51). The monarchy was abolished in October 1970 (Seekins 1990, Lansford 2012f: 216). On 03/11/1972, Nol took advantage of a crisis to remove Heng from the presidency and assumed it himself, further consolidating his executive power in the nation. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. LIED still codes political liberties as absent and V-Dem’s PCLI outcomes dropped back to what we interpret as not really present for this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

09/03[-09/17]/1972 End Military Autocracy/Start One-Party Autocracy: On this date the Khmer Republic conducted general elections, marking the first electoral process following the 1970 coup. The National Assembly elections were held on 09/03 featuring contestation between the Social Republican Party and Pracheachon (though the latter only fielded 10 candidates). The Republican Party and the Democratic Party boycotted the elections due to their objections to the new electoral law. The Social Republican Party emerged victorious, securing all 126 seats in the National Assembly with 99.1% of valid votes. Subsequently, the Senate elections took place on 09/17, resulting in the Social Republican Party winning all 32 seats.⁶ LIED categories it as not competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI & CEI indicate that the elections were not really free and fair as well as not clean. Based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the year 1974, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For the following year, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. On 04/01/1975 Nol resigned and fled Cambodia as the Khmer rebels laid siege to Phom Penh. His regime persisted with a series of short-lived military leaders but at this point the rebels had already taken control of the capital. According to LIED, only executive elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. Based on our observations, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which contradicts the observations of LIED. According to FH’s classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Moreover, regarding the political liberties they are classified as absent by LIED and as not really present by V-Dem’s PCLI.

The government surrendered on this date to the insurgency of the Khmer Rouge (Communist Party of Kampuchea, CPK). The Cambodian state was officially renamed Democratic Kampuchea. Norodom Sihanouk remained a figurehead head of government until 04/02/1976.⁷ Between 1975 and 1978, around two million Cambodians died by execution, forced labor and famine under the rule of a very radical Communist regime (Chandler/Kiernan/Boua 1988). The government formally capitulated to the Khmer Rouge insurgency, leading to the establishment of a new governing body (Seekins 1990, Lansford 2012f:216, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 51-52). In January 1976 a new constitution of Democratic Kampuchea was promulgated by the CPK. The Kampuchean People´s Representative Assembly (KPRA) was supposed to be elected in direct general elections. The KPRA was to appoint a State Praesidium for a period of five years. The direct elections for the KPRA never took place. Rather, the Central Committee of the CPK appointed members of the KPRA and the State Praesidium. Pol Pot became prime minister of Democratic Kampuchean. Both the administrative and legal bodies were destroyed or at least restructured. Society, as defined by the constitution, consisted of workers, peasants, and all other working people of Kampuchea. Ideological aim of the Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot was to form the country into a nation of peasants.⁸ From 12/25/1978, the armed forces of Vietnam invaded Cambodia. This was the first and only extended war between two communist regimes. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held for most of this period, but they were not categorized as multiparty. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Both LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent in this period. Between 1976 and 1978, based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. In this timeframe, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

On this date, Phnom Penh was captured by Vietnamese troops and Cambodian exiles. A more moderate communist regime took over. This is the only takeover from one variant of a communist ideocracy to another. However, due to intervention of China, the United Kingdom, the United States and the ASEAN countries the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was not recognized by the United Nations. Samrim was installed as leader of the Communist regime. Even though the country was also occupied by Vietnamese troops (Seekins 1990) the regime period is coded as a variant of a communist ideocracy. During this period, the UN seat for Kampuchea was occupied by a coalition government led by the Khmer Rouge (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 52). On 04/29-30/1989 started to implement constitutional changes, for example the renaming of the People´s Republic of Kampuchea into State of Cambodia (SOC) and laws on economic liberalization were passed.⁹ On 10/15/1991, Civil war peace accords established by UN and regional nations interest forced the step down of Hun Sen as premier and the ascension of Sinaouk to the executive. The Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) dropped its commitment to communism and became more of a conservative-authoritarian party.¹⁰ The Paris Peace Agreements were signed on 10/23/1991. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held from 1979 to 1980. From then on, according to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. For the communist period both LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI considered political liberties as absent. For the relevant period, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

With the Paris Peace Agreements, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was formed. It took responsibility for the administration. Its aim was to restore peace and civil government, conduct free and fair elections and disarm Cambodia´s fighting factions.¹¹ We code this regime change event as a negotiated transition. During this period the so called Supreme National Council embodied Cambodian sovereignty and represented the state internally and externally for this transition period. It was headed by Sihanouk and was composed of six members of the SOC and five of the resistance factions (Brown 1992: 91-93). According to FH’s classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Besides, political liberties are coded as absent by LIED. V-Dem’s PCLI outcomes increased to an ambiguous level. In this timeframe, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held.

On this date the first post-war general elections were held, which lasted until 05/28/1993. Vote counting started a day later. The elections were organized and supervised by UNTAC.¹² The election resulted in a hung parliament, with FUNCINPEC, led by Sihanouk’s son Ranariddh, emerging as the winning party. To maintain stability, a power-sharing agreement was reached, appointing both Ranariddh and Hun Sen of the Cambodian People’s Party as interim co-Prime Ministers. This decision was made after the CPP threatened to secede part of the country if full power was transferred to FUNCINPEC.¹³ On 09/24/1993 , a new constitution was promulgated, which reinstated the monarchy and Norodom Sihanouk returned as king.¹⁴ After his reinstatement as king he formalized the power-sharing arrangement and appointed both co-Prime Ministers.¹⁵ In the following years a power-struggle between the agenda of the king and the two Prime Ministers emerged. But it became evident that the power of the king to assert influence over national affairs shrank. Furthermore, the government faced resistance and a failed coup attempt in 1994. As tensions between the co-Prime Ministers and their parties FUNCINPEC and CPP increased, King Norodom Sihanouk tried to mediate.¹⁶ This setup aligns well with the concept of a parliamentary monarchy, where the monarch serves more as a symbol of unity and continuity, while the elected parliament and its leaders handle the actual governance of the country. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. In addition, LIED categorizes the elections as not competitive. Elections during this period are being scored as somewhat free and fair by V-Dem’s EF&FI. Their cleanliness is scored as ambiguous by V-Dem’s CEI. According to FH, for the regime period until 1994, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. For the rest of the regime period the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. LIED classifies political liberties for this period as absent. According to V-Dem PCLI the presence of political liberties was ambiguous. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the relevant period, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

A disagreement between the two co-heads of state devolved into an armed conflict. President Norodom Ranariddh, the second son of King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and the royalist faction were ousted because of their alleged involvement with the Khmer rebels and Hun Sen, a former military commander, became the sole executive leader.¹⁷ Different to the Report of the United Nations Special Representative on Human Rights in Cambodia¹⁸, we do not classify the regime change event on 07/06/1997 as a (military) coup. While this is certainly a borderline case between the two categories, the existence of different militias loyal to party factions and politicians¹⁹ and the absence of a national army, led us to the classification of rebellion. Based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. In this timeframe, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.. According to FH’s classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

On this date, general elections were held, which were contested by the opposition. The claim of irregularities was supported by international observers.²⁰ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED no electoral competitiveness was achieved. From this point on, the V-Dem EF&FI scores electoral freedom and fairness as ambiguous. Their CEI scores the elections as not clean. During election day in 2003 voters in rural areas were intimidated by the CPP. The media landscape was dominated by the CPP.²¹ The general elections on 07/28/2008 also fell short of international standards.²² Elections in this period are generally considered to have been controversial with the CPP gradually increasing its power and majority in the National Assembly in order to rule without coalition, while the chances of opposition groups are step by step diminished. In early 2006, the CPP strengthened its grip on power by pushing through an amendment to the constitution via Parliament. This amendment allowed for a 50% plus one majority in the National Assembly to form a government, rather than the previous requirement of a two-thirds majority. This move aimed to decrease the party’s dependency on FUNCINPEC or any other coalition partner in the future.²³ During the Senate elections on 01/29/2012, the CPP claimed 46 seats, whereas the SRP obtained 11 seats out of the 61-member chamber. The election faced criticism from monitoring groups due to a perceived lack of transparency. In a contentious vote on 07/28/2013, the CPP secured a diminished majority with 68 seats, while the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), a merger of the HRP and the SRP, gained 26 seats, totaling 55. Subsequently, Hun Sen was re-elected as the prime minister on 09/23 (Lansford 2021: 253). According to FH’s classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED classifies political liberties as absent in this period. V-Dem’s PCLI states that the presence of political liberties was ambiguous until 2015 and not really present from 2016 onward for this period. Severe deficits in the electoral process and competition persisted during the whole period, therefore we classify this period as electoral autocracy in line with MCM, LIED, HTW and GWF, which all contest this period either (limited) multiparty or party-based autocracy. From 1999 to 2012, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive experienced moderate limitations on authority, placing it in the second intermediate category. From 2013 to 2016, according to the Polity5 indicator, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For the relevant period, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

Prior to legislative elections in 2018, the opposition party CNRP was dissolved on November 11/16/2017, and elected officials as well as members of parliament and locally elected figures either lost their positions or were banned from politics on the pretext of an alleged coup (Lansford 2021: 253). During the elections on 07/29/2018, the incumbent CPP won all seats in the National Assembly with 77.5% of the vote in the absence of any opposition. The elections have been criticized by international observers and opposition groups and described as deeply flawed and neither free nor fair.²⁴ Communal elections were held on 06/05/2022 in which members of 17 parties contested. In the absence of any opposition, Hun Sen was subsequently re-elected for another five-year and frequently uses the police and armed forces as means to coerce and squash the (Lansford 2012f: 253).²⁴ There is an assumption that Hun Sen himself has been consolidating power, increasingly centralizing authority, and individuals outside of his close circle exert minimal influence on policymaking.²⁴ However, following the election, there was a notable pattern of ongoing arrests of opposition supporters.²⁵ The regime in Cambodia in the period under review, that is beginning with the crackdown on the opposition in November 2017, meets the coding rules as a de-facto one-party rule. Although general elections were held in 2018, there was no competition allowed since the opposition party CNRP was permitted and thus voters had no real choice. Even though communal elections were recently conducted with a variety of parties contesting, this diversity does not reflect in the general elections on the national level. Government in Cambodia since 2018 is led by only one party whose representatives occupy all seats in the National Assembly and hold on executive power in governance through the position of prime minister Hun Sen (who himself rules for nearly 24 years by 2022). According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. From 2017 onwards political liberties are still considered as absent by LIED. V-Dem’s PCLI decreased to a not really present level. In 2017 and 2018, as per Polity5’s categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. In this timeframe, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. In 2023 the CPP won almost all parliament seats in an uncompetitive election process heavily bolstered by the instrumentalization of the media. Nepotism is prevalent, Hun Manet succeeding his father as the new prime minister in August 2023 and multiple cabinet members being the children of ex-ministers.²⁶ The CPP thus rules as a sole party and dominating all spheres of governance and the political process, while holding tight on the power they have gradually consolidated over the past decades.

One-Party Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Chandler/Kiernan/Boua 1988, Kiernan 2004, Kiernan 2008, Thomson 1945, Tully 2005)