On this date, Kazakhstan became independent with Nursultan Nazarbayev as president and a legislature dominated by ex-communists. Nazarbayev maintained much of the structure and personnel of the communist system (Kadyrzhanov 1999: 147, Olcott 2010: 92-93, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 72). Universal suffrage was guaranteed since independence in 1991 (LIED). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. V-Dem’s EF&FI and CEI score elections as not really free, fair or clean. In May 2007, an unprecedented legislative change was approved by the parliament, which involved lifting the two-term restriction on the presidency exclusively for Nazarbayev. This change did not constitute an appointment for a lifelong term, but rather allowed Nazarbayev the possibility of indefinite re-election.10 After stepping down from the presidency in 2019, Nazarbayev retained significant influence in Kazakhstan. He held the title of „Elbasy“ or „Leader of the Nation,“ a title that provided him with unique powers and privileges, including immunity from prosecution and a role in shaping domestic and foreign policies. This position and his continued influence in the political sphere made him a central figure in Kazakhstan’s governance even after leaving the presidential office. Parliamentary and presidential elections are neither free nor fair, and major parties exhibit continued political loyalty to the government. The authorities have consistently marginalized or imprisoned genuine opposition figures. The dominant media outlets are either in state hands or owned by government-friendly businessmen. Freedoms of speech and assembly remain restricted, and corruption is endemic.11 While Nazarbayev’s regime exhibited elements of personalist autocracy, especially given his strong personal control over the state and its institutions, the regular occurrence of multiparty elections (albeit flawed) and the presence of some formal institutional structures align more closely with the definition of an electoral autocracy. Snap-elections in March 2023 were purported to be neither fair nor free and media coverage superficial with self-nominated candidates facing obstacles.12 According to FH’s classification for the assessed regime period from 1994 onwards, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Additionally, political liberties have been absent since 1991 per LIED, while V-Dem’s PCLI indicates that political liberties were in an ambiguous state from 1991 to 2004 and since 2022. The remaining years political liberties were not really present. Until 1994, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1995 to 2004, based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. Since 2005, as per Polity5’s categorization, the executive has experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited from 1990-1994 and absent for the rest of the period. V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited between 1990-1999, 2005-2011 and 2022-present while absent between 2000-2004 and 2012-2021.
Electoral (Personalist) Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.
Additional Sources (Gumppenberg 2001, Schatz 2009, Sehring/Stefes 2010)