The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) ended the 1992-95 Bosnian War. The war parties agreed on a highly decentralized parliamentary republic, therefore we code this regime change event as a negotiated transition. Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into two autonomous zones. The two entities were the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska. Special status was granted to the border region encompassing the town of Brčko, designating it as a distinct district. Although the various parts of the country are under a common central government, its authority is restricted to very limited powers.16 On 09/14/1996, the first general elections were held since 1990. However, the parties involved in the DPA (the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with its two constituent entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska) had failed to establish the necessary prerequisites for elections. Consequently, given these challenges, the elections were destined to validate the actual ethnic-based division of the country, which indeed materialized.17 Moreover, the DPA made Bosnia and Herzegovina into an unacknowledged protectorate, characterized by elements of hegemony from neighboring Croatia and Serbia as co-signatories to the Agreement, wherein significant authority is vested in the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina18 The Office of the High Representative (OHR), established by the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), functioned as the highest political authority in the country and the chief executive officer for the international civilian presence. High Representatives were traditionally appointed from European Union countries, with their principal deputies hailing from the United States. The Principal Deputy High Representative’s responsibilities included serving as the International Supervisor for Brčko, representing international interests in the Brčko District. The substantial powers and veto authority of the High Representative in Bosnian politics led to comparisons with a viceroy, highlighting the significant influence of this role.19 Bosnian politics are generally assumed to be defined by corrupt patronage networks, certain foreign powers wield outsized influence as well as limited opportunities for political participation by citizens from other communities other than Bosnian, Serb, and Croat communities. The political sphere is moreover characterized by severe partisan gridlock.20 Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classified elections as competitive since 1996. V-Dem’s EF&FI rates them as free and fair between 1996 and 2004, before reducing the score to scoring them as only somewhat free and fair. V-Dem’s CEI initially rated the elections as somewhat clean but reduced the score to speak of ambiguity in regards to electoral cleanliness since 2007. FH is more skeptical about the quality of the elections of the legislative and executive and rates them on a scale from 1 to 4 with a 2. International observers also raised concerns surrounding the elections on 10/07/2018, about the „integrity of the elections, including about a high number of ballots disqualified by the Central Electoral Commission (CIK)”.20 The assessment of the electoral regime differs significantly in different data sets. BMR considers the regime as democratic, LIED and RoW as an electoral democracy. HTW, MCM and CGV classify the regime as non-democratic.21 As classified by FH for the regime period until 2000, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Between 2002 and 2003 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. From 2004 to 2015, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. From 2016 onwards, Bosnia and Herzegovina receives a score of 8 to 9, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. Political liberties have been absent for the whole regime period according to LIED. V-Dem’s PCLI classifies political liberties as somewhat present from 1996 to 1999 except for 1998 during which political liberties are coded as present. From 2000 to 2017 political liberties were present and from 2018 onward political liberties are somewhat present. For the year 1996, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1997 to 2004, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. Between 2005 and 2014, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 2015 and 2017, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Since 2018, V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate, while our classification of JCE alternates between robust (2018, 2022) and moderate constraints (2019-2021, 2023). GWF until the end of their observation period classifies the country as foreign-occupied. The general elections in 2022 were found to be competitive, however international observers reported media bias and the opposition claimed the election was marred by irregularities. After evidence came to light of voting fraud, the CIK ordered a recount. While Dodik won the presidency, illegally printed ballots were discovered and paired with the large number of disqualified ballots, the electoral integrity is questionable. Campaigns often used divisive and ethnically charged speech and candidates continue to be limited ethnically to Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. According to FH, the judiciary is formally independent, however lacks power and is generally ineffective, while being subject to political pressures and interreference.22 According to our classification Bosnia and Hercegovina is an electoral hybrid regime between a highly defective electoral democracy and an electoral autocracy.
Electoral Hybrid Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.
Additional sources (Kasapović 2010a)