Va-PoReg Country Report Burkina Faso 1900–2025

The French gained power over the territory of today’s Burkina Faso, by taking the city of Ouagadougou on 09/05/1896¹ and made Burkina Faso a protectorate.² While the country has been de facto a colony already before, including our start date of 01/01/1900. On 03/01/1919 the country became officially a colony of France. In 1919, the colony of Upper Volta was established from regions that were formerly territories within the colonies of Upper Senegal and Niger, as well as the Côte d’Ivoire.³ On 09/05/1932 the colony was dismantled and being split between the French colonies of Ivory Coast, French Sudan and Niger. Hence, the colonial status continued. However, the territory of Burkina Faso as such was dissolved.³ On 09/04/1947, the colony was re-established as a French territory with its previous boundaries.³ Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem’s PCLI. For this colonial time only outcomes between 1919 and 1931 were provided by LIED and V-Dem. V-Dem’s JCE and LCE again provide data from 1947 onwards. During these years V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

On this day, the first parliament of the Republic of upper Volta was elected with male suffrage. The territorial election was held alongside elections to the French National Assembly. In 1957, universal suffrage was introduced (LIED). On 12/11/1958 Burkina Faso attained self-governance as the Republic of Upper Volta. However, it was still governed by a French high commissioner until independence. On 04/19/1959 after a constitutional referendum, parliamentary elections were held. The constitution established a presidential system. The first political parties were banned in the first few months of 1960 (Grotz 1999: 123). Based on our observations, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the election as not competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI ranks the freedom and fairness of Burkinabe elections as ambiguous, during this period and the CEI scores them as not really clean. According to LIED political liberties were absent. V-Dem’s PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present from 1947 to 1954 and ambiguous from 1955 onward. For most of the regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1960, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

On this date, independence was reached under a single party rule by the Voltaic Democratic Union-African Democratic Rally. Opposition parties were banned shortly before independence (Collier 1982:109, Englebert 1996:34-35). In December 1960, Maurice Yaméogo, the newly elected president of UDV/RDA, hindered the participation of opposition parties in the municipal elections and detained several opposition politicians (Englebert 1996:44, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 49). As a result, the parliamentary and presidential elections in 1965, which reaffirmed Yaméogo and the UDV-RDA, lacked competitiveness (Grotz 1999: 123). Yaméogo also purged the UDV-RDA of his enemies.⁴ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. While LIED and the EF&FI did not change their scoring during this time, the CEI increased its score to ambiguous electoral cleanliness. Moreover, political liberties are considered absent by LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous following V-Dem’s PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1961 to 1965, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the year 1966⁵, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

In the chaos of a nationwide strike, the military forced Yameogo to step down or face a civil war. General Lamizana took over afterward. In response to a general strike and upon the unions’ request, the military, under the leadership of Chief of Staff Lieutenant Colonel Lamizana, chose not to employ force against unarmed demonstrators. Instead, they intervened by suspending the constitution and establishing a new governing entity known as the Superior Council of the Armed Forces, composed of officers holding ranks above captain (Africa Confidential 1968:5, Englebert 1996:46). Later on, the composition of the regime was expanded to encompass civilian members as well (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 49). Following Lamizana’s declaration that the military intended to establish only an interim regime, a liberalization of the Voltaian political regime commenced four years later (Grotz 1999: 123-124). As a result, political parties were allowed again in November 1969 (Grotz 1999: 124). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. Furthermore, political liberties are considered as absent by LIED and as ambiguous by V-Dem’s PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. The period beginning on 01/03/1966 is classified as a non-electoral transitional regime because the military did not constitute itself as a durable governing actor. Authority was exercised on an explicitly interim basis, without the institutionalization of military rule or the establishment of a stable autocratic power structure. The governing arrangement remained open, was later expanded to include civilian actors, and did not articulate a project of long-term military domination. The absence of elections reflects the unresolved transitional status of the regime rather than the consolidation of a military autocracy. On 06/14/1970 a referendum on a new constitution was held. The constitution sought to establish a dual executive system.

On this date, the first parliamentary elections since independence were held, which were won by UDV-RDA and led to a two-third majority in the parliament by this party (Grotz 1999: 124). Gerard Kango Ouedraogo became prime minister between 1971 and 1974.⁶ But Lamizana stayed president without a popular mandate. Presidential election did not take place, because the power struggle between the speaker of parliament and the prime minister escalated in light of the planned presidential elections and led to Lamizana´s self-coup (Grotz 1999: 124). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED claims that elections in this period have not been competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores the 1970 election as being of ambiguous freedom and fairness and the CEI as not clean. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as ambiguous by V-Dem’s PCLI for this period. As per Polity5’s categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. For 1971, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Between 1972 and 1974, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Therefore, we classify this period as an electoral autocracy.

On this date a bloodless military coup took place, which was essentially a self-coup by President Lamizana against the government of Gerard Kango Ouedraogo. Lamizana dissolved the National assembly, suspended the constitution, and established a new government compromising himself as prime minister and eleven military officers and four civilians.⁷ In contrast to the coup in 1966, this one did not rest on a broad social consensus (Grotz 1999: 124). On 06/14/1976, the people of Burkina Faso ratified a new constitution that marked the beginning of a four-year transition period towards full civilian governance. President Sangoulé Lamizana, a military officer, maintained his position as the leader of military or mixed civil-military governments. Following conflicts surrounding the 1976 constitution, a new constitution was drafted and ratified in 1977.⁸ Part of it was the legalization of political parties.⁹ Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to FH, for the regime period under consideration, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. Besides, political liberties were still absent according to LIED and ambiguous by V-Dem’s PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive’s constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. From 1975 to 1977, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1978, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

On this date parliamentary elections were held. The Voltaic Democratic Union-African Democratic Rally won the most seats, in total 28 out of 57. The new constitution restricted the number of allowed parties in parliament to three. Meaning only the three largest parties were allowed to participate in the assembly.¹⁰ On 05/14/1978 presidential elections were held. They were the first multi-party presidential elections in the country´s history. Because no candidate received more than 50% of the vote, a second round was held on 05/28/1978.¹¹ Sangoulé Lamizana was elected with 56% of the votes.⁹ This election is widely regarded as one of the most democratic ever conducted in West Africa.¹² But still not only did the constitution restrict political competition, due to the number of allowed parties, but also the military continued to play an important role. Since independence the system has displayed a recurring pattern of authoritarian systems alternating with efforts to implement democratic governance (Grotz 1999: 123). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED, the elections were not competitive. During these two years, V-Dem’s EF&FI scores electoral freedom and fairness as ambiguous. Their CEI rates electoral cleanliness as ambiguous also. As per FH’s classification for this regime period, the country receives a score of 5 as free, which we categorize as rather free. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as ambiguous by V-Dem’s PCLI for this period. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

With the support of labor and civil groups Colonel Zerbo overthrew recently elected president Lamizana. Zerbo established the Comite Militaire de Redressement pour le Progrès National. All key posts were granted to militaries (Englebert 1996:51-52). The 1966-80 regime is considered different from the earlier period because civilians were excluded from the ruling group. The period from 1980-82 is considered by GWF as a different regime because Lamizana’s civilian coalition partners were excluded from the ruling group (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 49). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as ambiguous by V-Dem’s PCLI in this period. In this period, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

A group of non-commissioned officers led by Colonel Some seized power after accusing Colonel Zerbo that he was turning the military into an agent of terror. Afterwards the Provisional People’s Salvation Council junta was formed and Ouedraogo became the head of the junta (Englebert 1996: 53-54). The new government is treated as a different regime from Zerbo’s because of a change in the rank of the group from which leaders could be chosen. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to FH’s classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held.

The army led by Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaoré launched a coup against the regime of Major Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo. Sankara created a Conseil National de la Revolution (CNR), a governing body consisting mostly of populist junior officers. Under Sankara the country was renamed from the colonial name of Upper Volta to Burkina Faso.¹³ Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Regarding the political liberties they are considered as absent per LIED and V-Dem PCLI indicates an ambiguous state regarding political liberties.

General Blaise Compoare launched a coup against Sankara. Sankara was killed by soldiers linked to Compaore. A few of Sankara’s military allies were executed (Wilkins 1989: 375). The government of Compaore is treated as a new regime because Compaore changed the identity of the groups that could influence policy and from which officials could be chosen. Leaders of the small parties that had collaborated with Sankara fled to exile, were repressed or merged into the new ruling single party, Organization for Popular Democracy – Labour Movement (ODP/MT), along with new parties representing some of the same political formations that had been excluded by Sankara after dominating politics in the sixties and seventies (Englebert 1996: 61-65).The CDRs were dissolved in early 1988. In short, the post-1987 regime included a much wider array of political actors but excluded some of those who had been important to Sankara’s support base. In result its leftism had been muted. By 1990, the ruling FP included seven parties besides ODP/MT and most unions, which had been excluded by Sankara (Englebert 1996:65, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 49-50). Based on our observations, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to FH’s classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED’s and V-Dem’s PCLI scores regarding the political liberties remained at an absent and an ambiguous level. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

Compaoré implemented modest democratic changes in 1990. With the introduction of the new constitution in 1991, elections were held in December of that year.¹⁴ These elections marked the first in the country since 1978, yet opposition parties boycotted them. The outcome resulted in the incumbent President Blaise Compaoré securing a victory as the sole candidate, despite a low voter turnout of only 27.3%.¹⁵ In 1998, Compaoré achieved a resounding victory in the elections.¹⁴ Again, the 1998 presidential elections were boycotted by the major opposition parties.¹⁶ Presidential elections were regularly held in 2005 and 2010.¹⁷ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes all elections during this period as not competitive. Until this point, V-Dem’s EF&FI scores electoral freedom and fairness as ambiguous. Going forward, it increased to scoring the elections as somewhat free and fair. V-Dem’s CEI switched several times between scoring the elections cleanliness as between ambiguous and not given during this period. As classified by FH for 1991, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. For the period between 1992 and 1998, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Per FH’s scoring during 1999 and 2003, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. In 2004, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free and from 2005 onwards Burkina Faso is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. According to LIED political liberties were absent. V-Dem’s PCLI classifies political liberties as somewhat present from 1992 to 1998 and as present from 1999 onward. Between 1992 and 1999, based on Polity5’s evaluation, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. Since 2000, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1992 to 1998, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. From 1999 to 2012, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the year 2013, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 2014, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In 2005 Compaoré ran a third time as candidate, although the constitution only allowed two terms. The Constitutional Court backed him and ruled that the constitutional amendment could not be applied retroactively. He won with 80% of the votes, but this time the opposition took part in the elections. One of the main political issues was the freedom of the press.¹⁸ The presidential elections in 2010 were characterized by numerous allegations of fraud. Seven candidates registered, but Compaoré won again with 80% of the votes.¹⁹

Wide-spread protests and riots against constitutional changes that would have allowed President Campaorè to extend his term in office resulted in a military coup. Following brutal and violent protests that culminated in the burning of the National Assembly on 10/30/2014, a state of emergency was declared and the government was dissolved.²⁰ Initially, Campaoré resigned and the military under Lieutenant Colonel Yacouba Isaac Zida (former leader of the presidential guard) took power. On 11/01/ 2014, the armed forces collectively supported Zida to assume leadership on an interim basis, leading the country towards the 2015 presidential election.²¹ Opposition forces rejected the military’s power and demanded a transition to be carried out by civilians, as they were leading the protests of the Burkina Faso uprising.²⁰ Although the military temporarily assumed executive authority, it did not seek to institutionalize military rule or establish a durable autocratic order. Power was explicitly exercised on an interim basis and was normatively and politically oriented toward organizing a rapid transition to civilian, electoral governance, culminating in the 2015 presidential election. The military leadership lacked an autonomous project of long-term domination and operated under strong pressure from opposition forces and civil society to relinquish control. The brief suspension of constitutional order and concentration of authority therefore reflect a transitional breakdown of the electoral autocracy rather than the onset of a military autocracy.

On this date, Michel Kafando, as civilian interim head of state, was chosen to replace Zida, as a result of the ratification of the transition charter on 11/14/2014. We code this regime change event as a negotiated transition. As per Polity5’s categorization, the executive’s authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

On this date, the plans for transition were halted by members of the Regiment of Presidential Security (RSP), a military unit loyal to former president Campaoré, seized power, arresting acting president Kafando and prime-minister Zida. The RSP successfully took control of Ouagadougou and declared the formation of a new junta, led by General Gilbert Diendéré, tasked with overseeing the transition to new elections.²² The junta failed to consolidate its authority across the country, and faced protests as well as intense pressure from regional leaders, and eventually from the regular army, to restore the transitional government. Protests and international pressure resulted in the release of Kafando and Zida and the restoration of civilian rule.²²

Only a week after the coup the junta was replaced by Michel Kafando who continued to govern on an interim basis leading a 25-member technocratic government and a National Transitional Council with Zida as his prime minister indicating dominating military influence of the planned transition (Lansford 2021: 232). The period between October 2014 and September 2015 is marked by two coups and two periods of political uprisings.

Roch Marc Christian Kaboré won the presidential election with 53.5 percent of the vote, defeating 13 other candidates (Lansford 2021: 232).²³ These elections, deemed the „freest and fairest“ in the country’s history, were conducted under universal suffrage.²⁴ Despite challenges such as extreme poverty, terrorism, and corruption, civil society and the media stood as strong proponents of democracy and the safeguarding of civil liberties. While the judiciary was formally independent, it remained fragile and prone to influence from the executive branch.²⁵ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes the elections as competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores elections as somewhat free and fair. Their CEI scores them as somewhat clean. As classified by FH for the period until 2018, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. From 2019 onwards the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. According to LIED political liberties were absent, whereas V-Dem’s PCLI classifies political liberties as present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive’s constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. According to our observations it is a borderline case between an electoral democracy and an electoral hybrid regime. From 2016 to 2021, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. For the following year, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

On this date, democratically elected President Kaboré was arrested by military soldiers. Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba was appointed as Interim President and on 02/2022 declared president by the Constitutional Council. The military junta approved a military-led transition for three years.²⁶ We classify this regime change event as a forced regime change, namely a military coup.

On this date, a coup d’état removed Interim President Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba over his alleged inability to deal with the country’s Islamist insurgency. Captain Ibrahim Traoré took over as interim leader. Headed by Traoré, the army dissolved the interim parliament and suspended the constitution.²⁷ The event is coded as a regime change because the coup was launched by a different group in the military than the coup in January 2022. In September 2023 the military junta postponed elections intended for July 2024 indefinitely, citing security reasons. On 07/17/2025, Burkina Faso continued to be classified as a military autocracy. The junta dissolved the independent electoral commission and transferred responsibility for elections to the Interior Ministry.²⁸ This institutional change further centralized power but did not alter the fundamental nature of the regime. Since it remained grounded in direct military rule without electoral legitimacy, the classification as military autocracy persists. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to FH’s classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED codes political liberties as absent for the entire coded period. According to V-Dem’s PCLI political liberties have been somewhat present since 2023. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

Military Autocracy as of 07/17/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Collier 1982, Robinson 1992)

Burma see Myanmar