Va-PoReg Country Report Niger 1900–2025

Niger was an object of centuries-old contention among different African peoples. On 08/05/1890, the Franco-British agreement was signed, dividing the territory between the two colonial powers.¹ Starting from there, the French conquered the territory step by step in military campaigns against the indigenous people (Fuglestad 1983).

A formal Zinder Military Territory was formed on 07/23/1900. This military territory only governed what is modern southern Niger, with only nominal rule east of Zinder or north of Tanout.² LIED and V-Dem do not treat Niger for this time. For 1900-1921, V-Dem do not list Niger in their database. On 10/13/1922, Niger officially became a French colony. Political evolution began under a constitution granted by France in 1946, with Niger becoming a self-governing republic within the French Community in 1958 and attaining full independence in August 1960. In 1948 universal suffrage had been introduced. According to LIED, universal suffrage was introduced in 1957. While Niger was officially only a colony from 1922 onwards, de facto it was already ruled as a colony before. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 1945. In the period between 1946 and 1947, multiparty legislative elections were held. From 1948 onward, multiparty executive and legislative elections remain absent. Both LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI classify political liberties as absent. In this timeframe, from 1922 to 1955, V-Dem’s JCE is classified as robust, indicating strong and regular judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

On this date the French National Assembly voted the Loi-Cadre, a reform act which should transform France’s colonial powers towards an elected territorial government. As a result, elections were held in most of French African colonies also in Niger. Niger turned to an autonomous state in the French Community.³ LIED confirms the presence of legislative and multiparty elections since 1957. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

The independence of Niger came into effect on this day.⁴ The prohibition of the Marxist-oriented Sawaba (Freedom) Party in 1959 transformed Niger into a one-party state under the Niger Progressive Party (Parti Progressiste Nigérien, PPN), led by President Hamani Diori, who belonged to the Djerma tribe (Lansford 2021: 1214). The PPN won the December 1958 pre-independence election with help from the French. Prior to independence, the most popular rival party was outlawed, and its leaders jailed. Power was centralized under Diori, who controlled ministerial appointments without parliamentary scrutiny, could appoint and dismiss civil servants and military officers, and could decree and veto laws (Higgott/Fuglestad 1975: 385, Collier 1982: 109, Ibrahim 1994: 21-24). According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during the period between 1961 and 1964. From 1965 onward, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. In this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem’s PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. During this regime period, from 1960-1973, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free.

Diori was accused of consolidating power to himself and to his family while diverting food and other resources. He was overthrown trough a military coup by army chief of staff Kountche who established himself as president of a military junta (Conseil Militaire Supreme) (Higgott/Fuglestad 1975: 385) (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 82). Within a year of the coup, the majority of CMS members had been either killed or imprisoned as Kountche solidified his personal power (Higgott/Fuglestad 1975: 385, 397, Robinson 1992: 155, Ibrahim 1994: 25, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 82). In 1981 Kountche began to increase civilian representation in the CMS, and in 1982 preparations were undertaken for a constitutional form of government. A civilian prime minister, Mamane Oumarou, was appointed on 01/24/1983. In January 1984, he established a commission to draft a pre-constitutional document, termed a ‘national charter’.⁵ The charters main points were the establishment of non-elective, consultative institutions at both national and local levels. On 06/16/1987 the „national charter” referendum took place and was approved by 96.8% of voters with a 99.58% turnout.⁶ After Kountches death Ali Saibou secured his nomination by the Supreme Military Council as Kountche’s successor, subsequently sending military rivals overseas with diplomatic tasks. Saibou took over the office of president on 11/14/1987.⁷ On 09/24/1989 Saibou had a new constitution approved. It would render Niger as a one-party state with the ‘National Movement for the Development of Society’ (MNDS) as sole legal party. The government would have a presidential system, as well as the continued involvement of the Armed Forces, which had ruled the country since the military coup in 1974. It was approved by 99.3% of voters with a 94.9% turnout. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent until 1988 and were not really present afterwards. From 1974 to 1986, based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For 1974, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1975 to 1988, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. Between 1987 and 1989, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. According to FH’s classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category.

On this date the first general elections under the new constitution were held. Saibou was elected as president unopposed under the sole legal party MNDS.⁸ Saibou permitted in response to widespread demonstrations and strikes, the convening of a National Conference in July 1990. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. As per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For 1989, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1990, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present.

On this date, the National Conference that stripped Saibou of all but ceremonial powers opened (Gervais 1997: 92). Without delay, it declared its decisions to hold sovereign authority, superseding existing institutions. The dissolution of the government followed, with ministries instructed to directly report to this authority, and the removal of the army commander. The National Conference then selected a transitional government, led by a technocrat and a professor without ties to the previous regime, to guide the transition to democracy. The National Conference formulated a new constitution adopted on 12/26/1992, aiming to institute a multiparty political system, and set elections for March 1993. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. For this period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present. As classified by FH in 1991, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. In 1992, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. For 1991 and 1992, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

On this date, fair multiparty elections took place, and the victors were granted the right to assume power, concluding the successful transition to democracy (Ibrahim 1994: 29-38, Gervais 1997: 96, Ibrahim/Souley 1998: 148-50, Lansford 2012, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 82-83). Mahamane Ousmane emerged as the winner, leading a coalition led by the Democratic and Social Convention (CDS) (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 47).⁹ BTI characterized those elections as „relatively free and fair”¹⁰, nonetheless deficits continued. During this transition, LIED confirms that competitive elections were present. V-Dem’s CEI indicates somewhat cleanliness outcomes from 1993 to 1994 and an ambiguous state in 1995. In addition, V-Dem’s EF&FI scores free and fair elections. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 in 1993 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. In 1994 and 1995 the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. However, LIED indicates the absence of political liberties for this period. In addition, V-Dem’s PCLI declares somewhat political liberties are given. Based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, 1993-1995, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive.

On this date the army, led by Colonel Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara overthrew incumbent president Mahamane Ousmane, who had been elected in 1993.¹¹ Mainassara subsequently claimed victory in a rigged election in July 1996 that barred all of the main opposition candidates from competing and seated himself as chairman of the National Salvation Council. He remained in power until his assassination in 1999 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 83, Ibrahim/Souley 1998: 164).¹² According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period. For that timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties were somewhat present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the year 1996, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are robust. At the same time, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1997 to 1999, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free.

In 1999 authoritarian ruler Colonel Ibrahim Mainassara Bare was killed by his own presidential guard. Following the coup within the army, Major Daouda Mallam Wanke declared a 9-month transition plan to take place under a military Council of National Reconciliation and seated himself as chairman. An extensive debate about the nature of institutional arrangements both within appointed Technical and Consultative Committees and in the press followed. The military imposed a solution, which was validated in a referendum in 1999. The junta promised a return to democracy within the year.¹³ As per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time.

Presidential and legislative elections took place in October and November 1999, and the new administration assumed office under the designation of the Fifth Republic in 2000 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 48, Lansford 2012, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 83).¹⁴ The presidential and legislative elections were hailed as free and fair by international observers. Mamadou Tandja, a former army officer, won the presidency in a second round of polling with about 60% of the vote.¹⁵ Tandia was re-elected for a second round of presidency in 2004. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Between 1999 and 2008 the elections were competitive (LIED). From 1999 to 2008 V-Dem’s CEI indicates ambiguous cleanliness scores. Moreover, V-Dem’s EF&FI states the elections as somewhat free and fair until 2003. From 2004 to 2008 the elections were free and fair. According to FH, from 2000 to 2003, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. From 2004 to 2008 the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. LIED view political liberties as absent, while V-Dem’s PCLI declares the full presence of political liberties. Until 2008, based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For the timeframe 2000-2008, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. In 2009 a constitutional crisis occurred due to a political conflict between Tandja and judicial and legislative bodies regarding the constitutional referendum that opponents claimed was an attempt to extend his mandate beyond the constitutional maximum of two terms. The Constitutional Court of Niger ruled on 06/12/2009 that the proposed referendum was unconstitutional. Although the judiciary was nominally independent, it was prone to corruption due to the low wages of judges. Defamation lawsuits were regularly used by political authorities to deter journalists. Further, an estimated 43.000 to 870.000 people were living in de facto slavery in 2002 (Freedom House 2010: 453).¹⁶

On this date, the president dissolved the courts and announced he was assuming emergency powers. The referendum was eventually held on 08/04/2009, despite major criticism from international groups. The crisis led to a coup d’état by military leaders.¹⁷ In 2009, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. For 2009, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Per FH’s evaluation for this regime period, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In 2009, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem’s PCLI indicates that political liberties were present.

Lieutenant General Salou Djibo led a military coup against President Mamadou Tandja. Djibo, as the leader of the Council for the Restoration of Democracy (Conseil Suprême pour la Restauration de la Démocratie—CSRD), suspended the constitution and dissolved parliament the next day. Former President Tandja and several of his ministers were placed under house arrest (Lansford 2021: 1217).¹⁸ The junta progressed towards civilian governance by facilitating multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections on 01/31/2011, despite objections from opposition party leaders. They argued that issues with the voter rolls warranted a postponement (Lansford 2021: 1217). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. As per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For 2010, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. Especially V-Dem’s LCE seems misleading again since there was no parliament in this regime period. According to FH, for the regime period under consideration, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. In 2010, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were present.

The presidential election on this date resulted in a victory for Mahamadou Issoufou of the Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS), who defeated Seyni Oumarou of the National Movement for the Development of Society (MNDS). In the National Assembly elections, the PNDS emerged as the largest party.¹⁹ Santiago Fisas, the chief of EU monitoring, praised the election as a triumph for the people of Niger, stating, ‘It serves as an exemplary model for the peaceful restoration of democracy.’²⁰ On 02/21/2016, President Mahamadou Issoufou secured his re-election for a second five-year term. The electoral atmosphere was marked by political tension, as the primary challenger for the presidency, opposition leader Hama Amadou, remained in custody throughout the electoral process, facing accusations related to a baby-trafficking scandal. The opposition chose to boycott the second round of the presidential poll, which Issoufou ultimately won with an overwhelming 92 percent of the vote.²¹ The opposition parties refused to accept the partial election results provided by the electoral commission, alleging disparities between the announced results and their own counts. Amadou Cissé, the candidate from the Union for Democracy and the Republic, contested the results and accused the government of establishing „thousands of polling stations“ to manipulate the outcome.²² On 12/27/2020, general elections were held in Niger to elect the President and National Assembly. On 02/21/2021 a second round was held. Mohamed Bazoum was declared the winner in the second round with 55.67% of the vote.²³ The vote marked what was expected to be the first peaceful transfer of power in Niger.²⁴ The presidential polls were marked by isolated reports of attempted vote buying, but were largely peaceful while for the national assembly, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) observers called the elections relatively free and fair, and lauded the participation of young and female voters.²⁴ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED between 2011 and 2015 the elections were competitive and not competitive since 2016. From 2012 to 2015 the elections are classified as somewhat clean, and since 2016 as ambiguous. Until 2019 V-Dem’s EF&FI indicates the overall election conditions as ambiguous. Since 2020 the elections are somewhat free and fair. Per FH, from 2011 to 2015, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. From 2016 onward the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. While LIED views political liberties as absent, V-Dem’s PCLI considers them as fully present until 2023. From 2011 to 2018, based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For 2011, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 2012 to 2020, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 2021 and 2022, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. On 31/03/2021 a coup attempt took place, that was staged by elements within the military. The alleged leader of the plot was Captain Sani Saley Gourouza. The coup was unsuccessful.²⁵

After a successful coup d’état led by the Presidential Guard Commander General Abdourahamane Tchiani on 06/26/2023, Nigers President Mohamed Bazoum was detained and removed from office, ending the already unstable constitutional order. Shortly thereafter General Abdourahamane publicly declared himself the leader of a newly formed military junta.²⁶ The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) demanded the release and reinstatement of President Bazoum and the regional bloc gave the military a one-week ultimatum, threatening measures that could include the use of force should it not comply with its demands. After the deadline passed without effect, sanctions were imposed and relations and boarders closed with Niger, Nigeria cutting it off from its energy supply, on which Niger depends on for 70% of its power.²⁶ Surrounding countries such as Burkina Faso and Mali, similarly led by coup-leaders, have pledged support for General Abdourahamane and threatened a forceful response should ECOWAS decide to intervene militarily, further increasing regional tensions.²⁷ On 07/27, supporters of the coup incited civil unrest after setting fire to the headquarters of the former governing party in Niamey.²⁶ For 2023, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. In 2023, the country’s FH score was 10, which FH classified as partly free and which our framework interprets as rather not free. In 2024, the score worsened to 13, a level that both FH and our framework classify as not free.

Military Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Decalo 1990, Basedau 1999)