Va-PoReg Country Report Cuba 1900–2025

During colonial rule by Spain for over 200 years, it was briefly occupied by Britain in the 18th century.¹ The Republic of Cuba in Arms was created by Cuban revolutionaries who sought the independence of Cuba, occupied at that time by Spain. It was constituted on 04/10/1869, naming Carlos Manuel de Céspedes as its first president.² The Constituent Assembly of La Yaya, held on 10/10/1897, designated Bartolomé Masó as the new president of the revolutionary government, taking office on 10/30/1897. On 04/24/1898, Bartolomé proclaimed the document known as the Sebastopol Manifesto, where he stressed the slogan of independence or death to counteract the intrigues of the autonomist tendency. On 11/09/1898, the pro-independence government was dissolved by handing over its powers to the Assembly of Representatives of the Cuban Revolution gathered in Santa Cruz del Sur.³ In 1898 the USA and Spain signed the Treaty of Paris ending the War. Under this treaty, coming into effect on 04/11/1899, Spain ceded Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the USA.⁴ However, on 01/01/1899 the first occupation of Cuba by the USA took place.⁵ Municipal elections were held in Cuba on 06/16/1900. The elections were held under the auspices of the US military government with a system of restricted suffrage.⁶ While only a small fraction of the population participated, we still code this period as an indirect rule occupation regime since the ruling elite participated in the government of the country. According to LIED, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were present during this period. Political liberties were coded absent according to LIED and can be interpreted as somewhat present following V-Dem’s PCLI. For 1900, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For the rest of the period, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.

On this date, the Republic of Cuba emerged as an independent state (Lansford 2021: 412). However, based on the Platt Amendment, the USA retained the right to intervene in Cuban affairs and to supervise its finances and foreign relations (Suter/Nohlen 2005).⁷ It is a borderline case between a protectorate and a sovereign state. This continued until most of the Platt Amendments were repealed by the Cuban-American Treaty of Relations in 1934 (Lansford 2021: 412).⁸ The Constitution of 1901 implemented a representative democratic system, founded on the separation of powers and universal suffrage for men aged 21 and above. Nevertheless, the democratic system and elections as a form of self-governance struggled to solidify. The Cuban political landscape continued to be marked by personalism and corruption, especially evident in the local oligarchy involved in the sugar trade and foreign companies. These entities, through military coups and dictatorships, collectively wielded control over the political, social, and economic sectors (Suter/Nohlen 2005: 195). Tomas Estrada Palma assumed office unopposed in 1902, as the electoral commission was filled with his supporters, and his primary rival withdrew from the candidacy (Aguilar 1993: 36, 39-40, Lentz 1999: 112, Suchlicki 2001: 33, Casey et al. 2020: 4). In 1904 the first parliamentary elections took place, two parties – the Republicans and the National Liberals – contested. The elections were described as a farce. Both factions aimed to secure victory through el copo, which refers to fraudulent tactics designed to prevent minority representation (Hugh 1971: 472). Some candidates achieved more votes than were cast. The Liberals lost the elections and deadlocked the legislative by nonattendance. General elections were held in Cuba on 12/01/1905 and were won by Tomás Estrada Palma who became the country’s first president (Hugh 1971: 472-473).⁹ Palma faced severe allegations of vote rigging leading to rebellions and the collapse of the regime.⁹ On 09/28/1906, after Estrada Palma appealed to the U.S. for intervention against a revolt led by the Liberal Party, but Washington declined, leading to his resignation (Maurer 2013: 64, Aguilar 1993: 41, Lentz 1999: 112, Suchlicki 2001: 36, Casey et al. 2020: 4). This regime change event is coded as a negotiated transition rather than a voluntary exit because the withdrawal of U.S. troops was explicitly conditional on the Cuban Constitutional Assembly’s acceptance of the Platt Amendment. While the negotiations were highly asymmetrical, the process involved formal bargaining, as evidenced by Cuba successfully negotiating a reduction in the number of U.S. naval bases stipulated in the agreement.¹⁰ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores their freedom and fairness as ambiguous while their CEI scores them as not really clean. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and somewhat present according to V-Dem’s PCLI in this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also moderate.

On this date, the USA intervened in Cuban affairs based on the Cuban American Treaty of Relations of 1903 by sending military troops establishing a U.S. provisional government.¹¹ The provisional government lasted until the elections in 1908.¹¹ Although elections were held during this period, however, the male suffrage was severely restricted. However, we code this period as an indirect rule occupation regime. As per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. According to LIED, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were present during this period. For this time political liberties were coded absent (LIED) and can be interpreted as somewhat present (V-Dem PCLI).

José Miguel Gómez won the presidential election running under the Liberal Coalition banner on 11/11/1908.¹² Following the election of Gómez, U.S. officials judged the situation in Cuba as sufficiently stable to withdraw the military troops, a process that was completed in February 1909.¹¹ However, the U.S. continued intervening in Cuban affairs.¹³ As before 1906 this is a borderline case between a protectorate and a sovereign state. From 01/28/1909 Cuba was clearly sovereign. Jose Miguel Gomez, the candidate of the Liberal Party, was elected as the U.S. started preparing to withdraw from its second occupation of Cuba. He assumed office on 01/28/1909. The Miguel Gomez administration violated democratic institutions and engaged in repression. Conservative Party politicians continued to rule after Gomez stepped down in 1913. The 1916 election was marred by fraud. In 1924, incumbent president Zayas backed General Gerardo Machado who won the election. In 1927, Machado pushed through the Constitutional Assembly the extension of presidential terms to six years and an invitation to accept a new term in power. In 1928, Congress passed an Emergency Law prohibiting opposition nominations of presidential candidates. Machado was reelected on 11/01/1928 unopposed (Aguilar 1993: 42-46, 50-51, Perez 1993: 60, Casey et al. 2020: 4-5). While most regime datasets covering this period agree that it was autocratic, BMR coded the period from 1909 to 1916 as democratic. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores their freedom and fairness as ambiguous while their CEI scores them as not really clean. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and somewhat present according to V-Dem’s PCLI for this period. From 1909 to 1927, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1928 to 1932, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also moderate.

Military coup led by senior officers ousted President Gerardo Machado (Aguilar 1993: 53, Perez 1993: 66-67, Lentz 1999: 114). The first leader of the post-Machado government was Carlos M. Cespedes. According to LIED, no multiparty executive and legislative elections were present during this period.

The military coup led by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista, by unofficial sergeants, corporals and other soldiers which was aided by student activists in the Directorio Estudiantil Universitario deposed Carlos Manuel de Céspedes y Quesada as president, installing a new government led by a five-man coalition, known as the Pentarchy of 1933.¹⁴ After only five days, the Pentarchy gave way to the formal presidency of Ramón Grau.¹⁴ The new government incorporated three political factions: Antonio Guiteras represented the revolutionary left wing, Batista was the head of the traditionalist right wing, and Grau was the bridge between the two and representative of the national reform wing.¹⁵ During the 100-day government of Grau on 02/01/1934, Cuban women received the vote.¹⁶ Batista became the head of the armed forces. From mid-September 1933 until 1940, Batista and his fellow officers did not rule directly and instead appointed and removed several formal heads of government (Aguilar 1993: 54-55, Perez 1993: 66-77, Casey et al. 2020: 5). On 11/18/1934, the junta named Carlos Mendieta President of Cuba.¹⁷ According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were present after 1936. However, these „multiparty elections“ were heavily controlled and restricted by the military, with little to no chance for the opposition, and thus cannot be seen as fair and free. Moreover, LIED codes political liberties in this time as absent, whereas V-Dem’s PCLI indicates a somewhat present level for them. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1934 to 1939, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the year 1940, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

On this date, Fulgencio Batista, who ran for the People’s Socialist Coalition won the presidential election. In almost all datasets including BMR, GWF, Polity5 and PCR covering the regime period is considered democratic. The only exception is RoW who classifies the regime as an electoral autocracy.¹⁸ The 1940 constitution instituted a comprehensive system of checks and balances, securing the judiciary’s autonomy.[2] While there were severe defects of democracy especially considering a lack of constraints on the executive, there was an alternation in power through elections in this period and no systematic electoral fraud (Perez 1993: 79, Domínguez 1998: 115, Casey et al. 2020: 5). In the 1944 presidential elections on 10/10/1944, opposition candidate Ramón Grau won the presidential election for the Auténtico-Republican Alliance banner. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. According to LIED, elections in this period were competitive. During this period, LIED categorizes Cuban elections as competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair, however, their CEI scores them as not really clean. LIED classifies political liberties as absent in this period. V-Dem’s PCLI codes political liberties as present from 1940-1950 and as somewhat present in 1951 and 1952. Based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Cuba between 07/14/1940 and 03/10/1952 is classified as Electoral Democracy, explicitly framed as a borderline case above the threshold of an electoral hybrid regime. Competitive multiparty elections produced genuine and consequential alternation in executive power, most clearly demonstrated by the opposition victory in 1944 and the peaceful transfer of office, which constitutes the decisive criterion under the Va-PoReg codebook. Although corruption, political violence, patronage, and uneven enforcement of civil liberties substantially reduced democratic quality, these deficits did not critically weaken liberal legitimation to the point of neutralizing elections as mechanisms of authorization. Legislative constraints operated robustly and judicial constraints moderately, indicating reduced but still operative institutional checks rather than merely minimal ones. The fact that Batista resorted to a military coup in 1952 to prevent an expected electoral defeat shows that systematic manipulation was insufficient to secure power, confirming the classification as electoral democracy rather than electoral hybrid regime.

Retired General Fulgencio Batista ran for president again in 1952. Faced with impending defeat in the presidential elections just three months before they were scheduled, Batista seized power in a military coup led by junior officers. He ousted the outgoing president, Socarras, and the coup resulted in Batista’s return to the presidency (Suchlicki 2001, Gott 2005:146, Lansford 2021:412, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 56). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Regarding the political liberties they are still coded as absent according to LIED. V-Dem’s PCLI indicates them as somewhat present in 1952 and as ambiguous until 1954. According to our coding rules it is a military autocracy. However, the classification of the regime is disputed. CGV classify it as a military regime from 1952 to 1958. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

On this date, presidential elections took place, which were not free and fair. They were won by Batista. The main opposition candidate, Ramón Grau, withdrew his candidacy before election day.¹⁹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Elections during this phase are characterized as not competitive by LIED. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair and their CEI scores them as not clean. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and ambiguous according to V-Dem’s PCLI in this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited.

On this date, Batista fled the country, and Fidel Castro and his insurgent forces took Havana. In the aftermath, Castro and his ruling group installed a revolutionary regime legitimized through armed liberation (Domínguez 1998: 130-131, Lansford 2021: 412, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 56). Initially, Castro’s 26th of July Movement Underground and leaders of the anti-Batista political opposition formed an interim government. Judge Manuel Urrutia became president, and José Miró Cardona became prime minister. On 02/16/1959, Castro became prime minister of the revolutionary government, replacing Miró Cardona. On 07/16/1959, Castro forced President Manuel Urrutia to resign, and Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, linked with the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) became president. Between 1959 and 1965, authority was organized through military command structures rather than institutionalized party-state fusion. Castro, Che Guevara, and Raúl Castro functioned as guerrilla commanders, not party cadres. The revolutionary government immediately initiated radical economic and social transformation. On 17 May 1959, the Agrarian Reform Law was enacted, limiting landholdings to 402 hectares and expropriating all foreign-owned rural property. The law established the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) as the implementing agency, which rapidly became the most powerful institution in Cuba, controlling agriculture, sugar policy, and later industry and education (Thomas 1971, Núñez Jiménez 1961). Castro assumed the presidency of INRA, making it the central locus of revolutionary power. Over 4.4 million hectares were affected, with large estates converted into 622 sugarcane cooperatives and 263 state farms. By 1960, systematic nationalizations targeted US enterprises: Resolution No. 1 (August 1960) expropriated 21 sugar mills, Law No. 890 (October 1960) nationalized the remaining 105 sugar mills and 16 rice mills, and Resolution No. 3 (October 1960) completed the expropriation of major industries (Aranda 1968, Rodríguez 1963). Ultimately, 80-85% of Cuban land came under state control. A rationing system was introduced in 1962 following food shortages. Subsequently, Castro formed alliances with the Soviet Bloc and the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). In his December 1961 speech, Castro publicly declared himself a Marxist-Leninist, and the government initiated comprehensive nationalizations, centralized economic planning, and political alignment with the Soviet Bloc. Political pluralism was abolished. In July 1961, the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI) was formed from the merger of the 26th of July Movement, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), and the Revolutionary Directorate. However, the ORI represented a de facto fusion of revolutionary forces without institutionalized party structures. In March 1962, Castro publicly criticized the ORI leadership for sectarianism and loss of contact with the masses, leading to its reorganization into the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURSC). Throughout this period, decision-making flowed through informal revolutionary networks and military hierarchies rather than formal party organs. Mass mobilization was organized through revolutionary organizations rather than party structures. The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR) were established in September 1960, reaching 800,000 members by 1961 and organizing revolutionary vigilance, voluntary labor, and ideological education at the neighborhood level (Domínguez 1978, Harnecker 1979). The National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP) was created in May 1961, mobilizing over 200,000 peasants. The Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) reached 400,000 members by 1962. These mass organizations functioned as instruments of revolutionary mobilization and social control, penetrating every neighborhood, workplace, and farm, but they operated under military command structures rather than party discipline. Despite socialist policies, nationalization programs, Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, and alignment with the Soviet Bloc after 1961, the regime lacked the institutionalized party supremacy required for classification as communist ideocracy. The decisive criterion is not ideological commitment or transformative policy orientation, but institutionalized party-state fusion through embedded party committees and nomenklatura systems. Until 1965, INRA--not a communist party--served as the primary governing institution, and authority flowed through military command hierarchies. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period (1959-1965). According to Polity5, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

On this date, the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) was formally founded, replacing the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURSC). This marks the transition from Military Autocracy to Communist Ideocracy, as the regime institutionalized itself as a Marxist-Leninist party and established the formal organizational structures required for party-state fusion. The Central Committee and Politburo were constituted, and Marxism-Leninism was formally adopted as the operative doctrine of governance. However, between 1965 and 1976, the PCC remained institutionally weak. The Communist Party was not the central locus of power but rather an ideological and organizational appendage of Fidel Castro’s charismatic and militarized rule. The party’s cadre structure remained weak, its internal organs lacked autonomy, and decision-making was dominated by informal networks rather than institutionalized party channels. The 100-member Central Committee rarely met, and it was ten years before the first party congress was held in 1975. Economic policy during this period pursued command planning influenced by Maoist models and Che Guevara’s ideas. The Second Agrarian Reform (1963) nationalized all farms exceeding 67 hectares, bringing 70% of arable land under state control while 30% remained in private hands (Aranda 1968). Central planning subordinated economic production to ideological and political objectives, with comprehensive state control over agriculture, industry, and commerce. The regime pursued collectivization campaigns and mobilized mass organizations for voluntary labor in agriculture and construction {Mesa-Lago, 2019 #47378). Despite economic experimentation and ongoing transformation, party institutions remained secondary to Castro’s personal authority and revolutionary command structures. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period (1965-1976). According to Polity5, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Until 1975, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1976, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. As classified by FH since 1972, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. On 11/02/1976, Cuba held its first parliamentary elections since the revolution, based on the newly ratified socialist constitution adopted earlier that year. The 1976 constitution fully institutionalized party supremacy and established the organizational mechanisms of party-state fusion, marking the consolidation of communist ideocracy. The constitution codified the PCC as the sole legal party and supreme governing force, eliminated any legal foundation for multiparty competition, and established systematic party penetration of state institutions through parallel hierarchies. The National Assembly of People’s Power was established as the supreme organ of state authority, yet in practice it remained subordinate to the PCC’s executive leadership, headed by Fidel Castro as both First Secretary of the PCC and President of the Council of State and Ministers {White, 1987 #46830: 175--177, Kapcia 2008: 29-31). Throughout this period, the regime maintained strict control over political participation, public discourse, and institutional life. The Cuban Communist Party remained the sole legal party, and all candidate selection processes were filtered through mass organizations aligned with the PCC. While elections to municipal and national assemblies took place periodically, they were conducted within a framework of non-competitive, single-party endorsement (Domínguez 1993, Siavelis/Morgenstern 2008). Internationally, Cuba continued to align itself with the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991, after which it entered the so-called „Special Period“ marked by economic crisis and intensified regime-led mobilization to preserve the revolutionary system (Eckstein 1994, Ritter 2004). Despite material hardship, the core political institutions remained unchanged. On 07/31/2006, Raúl Castro was named acting head of state and elected president on 02/24/2008. He was succeeded by Miguel Díaz-Canel on 10/10/2019. Despite this leadership change, Cuba’s regime type has not changed. The government continues to outlaw political pluralism, suppresses dissidents, and restricts basic liberties. The only elections with multiple candidates are those for municipal assemblies, but campaigning is prohibited. A new constitution was enacted on 04/10/2019 and identifies the PCC as the only legal political party. Raúl Castro Ruz retired in 2021 during a party congress and was succeeded by Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez. Elections in March 2023 saw record low turnout rates at 75% and incumbent president Miguel Díaz-Canel was reelected unanimously by the parliament, which continued to pass laws that limit civil liberties and political rights in 2023. Per FH, for this regime period (1976-present), the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Furthermore, both LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI indicate that political liberties were constantly absent since 1960. According to LIED, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. Between 1976 and 2005, according to Polity5, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 2006 to 2017, based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. In 2018, the executive’s power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

Communist Ideocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Domínguez 2003, Gelius 2013, Hoffmann 2009, Horowitz/Suchlicki 2003, Lievesley 2004, Mesa-Lago 1993, Saxonberg 2013)