Va-PoReg Country Report Haiti 1900–2025

On 01/01/1804 Haiti, once France’s richest colony, gained independence from France as the first Caribbean State.¹ On 09/22/1804, the Generals of the Haitian Revolution Army proclaimed Jean-Jacques Dessalines as emperor, and on October 6th, he conducted his coronation ceremony, adopting the name Jacques I.² The constitution outlined the succession process for the throne, stipulating that the crown would be elective and granting the reigning emperor the authority to designate his successor.² Since, the monarchy was not rooted in an aristocracy it resembled more a personalist autocracy. In 1806 Jacques I. was assassinated and a split between northern and southern Haiti took place. In 1844 the Dominican Republic seceded from Haiti. The crisis of the 1865 to 1868 civil war led to the formation of two political parties, the National and the Liberal Parties, and marked a transition toward a modern party-based regime. On 10/26/1879, Lysius Salomon was elected president, and the National Party controlled the government for nearly a decade (Stieber 2020). Florvil Hyppolite was president from 1889 until 1896. Following Hyppolite, the political landscape in Haiti grew even more precarious, with governments notably brief in their tenure (Greene 2001). During the 20th century the mulattos, despite constituting less than 10% of the population, managed to establish themselves as the dominant elite by leveraging both their education and skin color. The black military elite after the revolution harbored resentment toward being excluded from the circles of the mulattos. Black rural farmers voiced their demands for land reforms and resorted to taking up arms. They voiced their dissatisfaction with the dominance of mulatto individuals and called for the election of a black president, hoping for greater consideration of their concerns. One method employed to address these grievances during the 19th century was the “politique de doublure,” wherein the mulatto elite installed a black figurehead president, at times even an individual lacking literacy. From 1847 to 1915, a majority of presidents were of dark complexion (Ulloa 2005: 374). From 1896 to 1902 Tirésias Simon Sam was president.³ He was a member of the National Party and was instituted by parliament.⁴ Nonetheless, starting in 1879, the presidencies concluded through coercion or the imminent prospect thereof (Greene 2001). During this period, the military exerted significant influence. According to Sheller, Haiti struggled to achieve the "subordination of the military to civil control” (Sheller 2000). The military was the ultimate arbiter of Haitian politics (O'Neill 1993). Between 1867 and 1950, the president was elected indirectly through an absolute majority vote by a joint session of both parliamentary chambers. From 1816 to 1918 the chamber of deputies also elected the senate indirectly. Before 1950, voting rights were exclusively granted to men and were subject to specific property and income requirements (Ulloa 2005: 378-379). While the president was elected by a parliament there are no traces of popular elections of the parliament itself. Vanhanen records values of 0 and 0.2 for the years 1896 and 1902 respectively, whereby the latter is his own estimate (Vanhanen 2019). Therefore, we classify this period as an electoral oligarchical autocracy. Simon Sam abdicated on 05/12/1902 and Pierre Boisrond-Canal became provisional president.⁴ According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held. According to LIED no political competitiveness was achieved. V-Dem’s EF&FI indicates that no elections were held during this time. Therefore, V-Dem’s CEI scores no cleanliness. Moreover, political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as not really present by V-Dem’s PCLI. In 1902, a civil war erupted between the government of Boisrond-Canal and General Pierre Nord Alexis against rebel groups led by Anténor Firming. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

General Nord Alexis prevailed and became president on 12/17/1902 by leading troops into the country’s Chamber of Deputies and forcing legislators to declare him president.⁵ This method of assuming power, relying on military force and the suppression of legislative authority, is indicative of a military autocracy. Once in power, Alexis’ regime was characterized by centralized control, with decisions and authority largely emanating from the military leadership rather than civilian political structures. According to LIED only legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held during this period. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For this period political liberties were coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem’s PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

On this date, Pierre Nord Alexis was ousted by a rebellion led by General F. Antoine Simon (Nicholls 1986: 312). Antoine Simon was unanimously elected president of the republic by the Haitian Congress on 12/17/1908 (The New York Times 1908). According to LIED only legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held in 1908. From 1909 onward no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Political liberties were coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem’s PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

On this day, Cinciannatus Leconte orchestrated a military coup against General Antoine Simon, seizing control (Lentz 1999: 218, Casey et al. 2020: 8). Leconte assumed the presidency of Haiti with a unanimous vote from Congress on August 14, serving a seven-year term. During his tenure, he implemented discriminatory measures against the local Syrian population, who were Christian migrants from Ottoman Syria, compounding the persecution faced by this already marginalized minority group. Despite being elected to a seven-year term, Leconte’s time in office was short lived. On 08/08/1912, an explosion destroyed the National Palace, killing the president and several hundred soldiers.⁶ Following the death of Leconte, Haiti went through a series of transitional governments. Tancrède Auguste was chosen by the National Assembly to succeed Leconte and continued the policies of his predecessor, but his presidency was short-lived due to his death in May 1913. After Auguste’s death Michel Oreste was elected by the National Assembly. His term was also brief as he faced several rebellions and ultimately resigned in January 1914 due to political unrest. General Oreste Zamor led one of the rebellions against Oreste and assumed power after Oreste’s resignation. His term was plagued by political instability. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 1911. From 1912 onward only executive elections were held. Moreover, LIED’s score for the political liberties continued to be coded as absent and V-Dem’s PCLI outcome is still at a not really present level. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

On this date, the junta was ousted by another group of officers (Lentz 1999: 218, Casey et al. 2020: 8).

On this date, Joseph Davilmar Theodore took control through a coup and subsequently secured the presidency for a seven-year term. Théodore did not hold a formal military rank before or during his presidency. His rise to power was facilitated by his leadership within the political realm, leveraging the influence of the Cacos, a peasant militia group (Lentz 1999: 219). According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held. In 1914 political liberties were absent per LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem’s PCLI. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

On this date, the USA invaded and occupied Haiti, motivated by American business interests. During the occupation, the United States of America installed wealthy and pro-American Haitians in positions of power and ruled as a military regime through martial law led by Marines and the Gendarmerie. A new constitution was approved on 06/12/1918 and allowed foreigners to control Haitian land. Due to efforts to oppose the rewriting of the constitution, Haiti remained without a legislative branch until 1929.⁷

Stenio Joseph Vincent, who served as mayor of Port-au-Prince, was elected president in 1930 amid the U.S. occupation (Nicholls 1986: 311, 317, Nicholls 1998: 157, Casey et al. 2020: 8). Those elections were one of the few fair presidential elections in the country´s history (Ulloa 2005: 375). However, LIED lists male suffrage during this period as absent. According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty were held in 1915 and 1916, from 1917 to 1929 no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held and from 1930 onward multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. For this time LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI indicate that political liberties were absent and not really present. From 1916 to 1920, and then again from 1930 to 1934, During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. In the timeframe between, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

On this date the last contingent of U.S. troops departed but it maintained direct fiscal control until 1941.⁷ Under President Vincent’s leadership, the government suppressed opposition, and he implemented a new constitution that granted extensive powers to the president (Lentz 1999: 219-20, Nicholls 1990: 550, Casey et al. 2020: 9). For example, the new constitution granted the right to dissolve the legislature and reshuffle the judiciary (Greene 2001: 284). On 05/15/1941 Vincent resigned following the elections held in May 1941 (Nicholls 1990: 550, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 65-66, Casey et al. 2020: 9) and transferred power to Èlie Lescot. On 06/05/1941 He was confirmed by the elected assembly and began to suppress the opposition immediately (Smith 2009: 43, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 65-66). Overall, he grew more authoritarian. He asserted the role of military commander in chief, oppressed the populace, imposed press censorship, and coerced Congress into bestowing upon him considerable powers to manage the budget and appoint legislators without the need for elections (Greene 2001: 284). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair while their CEI scores them as not clean. In addition to that, LIED scores an absence of political liberties. V-Dem’s PCLI indicates them as not really present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions.

Populist and ethnic-inspired popular uprising led to President Élie Lescot’s resignation. Lescot and his cabinet fled into exile.⁸ Colonel Lavaud, his lieutenant Antoine Levelt, and American Ambassador Orme Wilson Jr administered executive power through a junta, the Conseil Exécutif Militaire (CEM).⁹ The CEM employed exclusively caretaker legitimation, immediately pledging upon taking power to hold free elections "as soon as possible, apparently within about two months" and designating itself as "provisional government" governing "until new elections can be held." The proclamation cited the government's "inability to form a Cabinet" and "failure to restore calm to Haitian life" as reasons for intervention, but coupled this with guarantees to restore "all the liberties demanded by the people" rather than invoking military necessity or existential threat requiring guardianship. The junta's legitimation discourse centered on procedural facilitation and temporal self-limitation, not on claims that only the military possessed unique capacity to rescue the nation from crisis. LIED states correctly that in 1946 multiparty executive and legislative elections were held, however, this refers to the period after this regime episode (see below). Political liberties were coded as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem’s PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

On this date, the interim military government oversaw elections (Nohlen 1993: 389, Smith 2009: 80-81, 89, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 65-66). The electoral process of 1946, often heralded as “the Revolution of 1946”, was in essence a consequence of governance that was marked by incompetence, dishonesty, and repression. Dumarsais Estimé emerged victorious in these elections, securing his win with the support of the military (Greene 2001: 285). In 01/1950, elections resulted in the formation of a lower house in the National Assembly entirely obedient to the president (Smith 2009:144). On 04/03/1950, President Estimé pushed through a constitutional revision that barred reelection, which was unanimously approved in the Chamber of Deputies but rejected in the Senate. On 05/08/1950, Estimé dissolved the cabinet and the Senate in violation of the constitution and declared a new cabinet the next day, causing tensions within the army high command (Smith 2009:146). The strength of his political opponents, open ethnic conflict, and an attempt to extend his term in office floundered the Estimé regime. In 1950, the principle of universal suffrage was established; however, the electoral cleanliness of the following elections was still compromised by widespread ballot manipulation.¹⁰ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair while their CEI scores them as not clean. Furthermore, political liberties remained absent (LIED) and not really present (V-Dem PCLI). According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

On this date, Estimé signed a resignation letter, and the military junta, which had overseen Lescot’s removal, once again assumed its role as the transition government (Nohlen 1993, Smith 2009: 147, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 66). In order to organize presidential elections, Colonel Franck Lavaud temporarily took power with Magloire joining him. The goal was to enable a civilian to be officially elected.¹¹ As per Polity5’s classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time.

On this date, Paul Magloire was elected president, becoming the first military president since 1915. However, Magloire was the only candidate and elected unopposed with 99 per cent of the vote running under the Peasant Worker Movement banner (Smith 2009, Ulloa 2005).¹² The election was army-monitored and Magloire enjoyed official backing from the army, church, elite, and the American embassy. It was the first election with universal male suffrage.¹³ During his presidency, Magloire used state-sanctioned violence, such as the threat of force against opponents, to consolidate his power. He reinstated the secret police, targeted dissidents regardless of political beliefs and effectively controlled the army (Smith 2009: 153-154). In January 1955, Magloire manipulated the Deputies’ election to ensure the defeat of Daniel Fignolé, a well-liked political figure, former leader of the MOP, and labor organizer in Port-au-Prince, by a significant margin. Subsequently, Magloire incarcerated Fignolé and shut down Haiti Democratique, a newspaper established by Fignolé. Furthermore, schools nationwide were shuttered as potential hubs of dissent, and the Faculty of Medicine was disbanded.¹⁴ According to LIED executive and legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held in 1950; from 1951 onward multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. LIED classifies elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair while their CEI scores them as not clean. Regarding the political liberties, LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI maintained their scorings. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Until 1955, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1956, V-Dem’s JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

On this date, popular unrests forced President Magloire to resign and flee. The Colpus Dataset codes here a protest rather than a coup because the popular strike, not the military, hindered Magloire’s continued rule. Instead, the army enabled the constitutional succession to Justice Pierre-Louis (Chin/Wright/Carter 2021b: 31). In accordance with the constitution, the head of the Supreme Court, Pierre-Louis, who agreed on competitive elections, was inaugurated on a provisional basis (Hall 2012: 272, 2009: 171-72). On 02/07/1957 a general strike forced Pierre-Louis out of the provisional presidency and Franck Sylvain was appointed interim president by the parliament.¹⁵ According to LIED political liberties were absent, while V-Dem’s PCLI indicates that they were not really present in this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

On this date, rioting and violence following an election Sylvain allegedly forced the chief of the army, Léon Cantave, to demand Sylvain’s resignation “on the grounds that he was an accessory to civil unrest” (Smith 2009: 176). The army installed a civilian government, the Conseil Exécutif Gouvernement (CEG) comprised of thirteen representatives of the six principal candidates, entrusted with electoral preparation (Smith 2009). Consequently, Haiti was without a government or a unified military (Smith 2009). On 05/18/1957 a bloody battle forced Cantave to oust the CEG and declare martial law.

On this date, violence forced Cantave to resign and Daniel Fignolé became provisional president. Due to his political popularity, he was seen as the sole candidate possessing sufficient influence to stabilize the deteriorating situation (Smith 2009: 179).

On this date, Fignolé, who had previously attempted to weaken the military, was kidnapped by army officers, and forced to resign and flee. Haiti was from then on ruled again by a military junta, the Conseil Militaire de Gouvernement (CMG), headed by Kébreau (Smith 2009). New elections were announced for September 1957. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. In 1957, both LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI indicate that political liberties were fully absent.

On this date, the junta supervised an unfair election in which their favored candidate, François Duvalier, was elected. (Nohlen 1993: 389, Smith 2009: 177-83, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 66). These were the last presidential elections until Duvalier’s son Jean-Claude Duvalier fled Haiti. We code this regime change event as a voluntary exit, since the military withdrew from the government. Duvalier did have support from the military but acted as a civilian president. He cultivated support among segments of the rural poor and used noiriste rhetoric to mobilize followers, yet his rule relied primarily on repression, manipulation, and clientelist networks rather than on genuine widespread popular support. Both Duvalier governments banned or severely restricted opposition political parties. In 1964 François Duvalier declared himself President for Life and remained in power until he died in April 1971. Jean-Claude Duvalier was chosen by bis father as successor and inherited the title President for Life in 1971. He ruled until 1986. While the political regime was clearly a personalist autocracy from 1964 to 1986 the classification for the years 1957 to 1964 is much harder. However, Haiti is also coded from 1957 to 1964 as a personalist autocracy. The National Unity Party which became the sole party in Haiti was just a vehicle to support the presidency of the Duvaliers (Ferguson 1987, Ferguson 1993). In a presidential referendum on 04/30/1961 François Duvalier was the only candidate. The official count was all votes in favor of Duvalier and none against. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 1960, from 1961 to 1970 executive and legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held, from 1971 onward only legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held. From 1957 to 1960, according to the Polity5 indicator, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. Since 1961, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. In addition to that political liberties were indicated as absent per LIED and per V-Dem’s PCLI.

On this date, Jean-Claude Duvalier fled because of popular uprising and was replaced by an interim government (Nicholls 1998: 165-66).¹⁶ The formation was supposed to be an interim transitional government, the Conseil National de Gouvernment, made up of two civilians and three officers, led by Lieutenant General Namphy. This government is not treated as a continuation of the previous regime because it authorized legal proceedings against Duvalier allies and banned them from holding office for ten years (Payne/Sutton 1993: 80-84), thus changing the rules for choosing leaders. The first attempted election in November 1987 was cancelled because of violence. While LIED observed legislative elections, which were not multiparty in this period, we could not detect any election in this period. For the relevant period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. The regime never consolidated around military rule as a stable legitimation pattern, it remained in provisional status. The mixed civilian-military composition (2 civilians, 3 officers) and transitional framing prevent classification as Military Autocracy.

On this date, Leslie Manigat was elected. The military dominated the elections, manipulating them to ensure the emergence of a winner deemed acceptable to the military (Payne/Sutton 1993: 89, Nicholls 1998: 169, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 66). However, since the interim government, which was made up of military officers and civilians and did not include Manigat, withdrew from governmental positions, we code this regime change event as a voluntary exit. LIED classifies the election as not competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores it as not really free or fair while their CEI scores it as not clean. According to FH, for 1986, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. For the remaining period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Besides, political liberties were still absent (LIED). V-Dem’s PCLI scores changed to ambiguous for this short regime period.

On this date, General Henri Namphy overthrew Leslie Manigat, who was elected in a presidential election controlled by the military, and declared himself president.¹⁷ The reason was that Manigat had tried to dismiss Namphy (Payne/Sutton 1993: 89, Nicholls 1998: 169, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 66-67).¹⁸ The 1988 regime represents direct military autocracy by Namphy as a single general declaring himself president, a coup that overthrew an elected president, no transitional intent, and military legitimation pattern consolidated. The regime remained rooted in military hierarchy and command structures. Namphy ruled through his position as general and military chief, not by creating personalist networks independent of military institutions.

On this date, a military coup by junior officers and non-commissioned officers ousted the government led by General Namphy and high ranking officers (Nohlen 1993: 390, Payne/Sutton 1993: 90).¹⁹ The coup brought General Matthieu Prosper Avril to power. During the Duvalier regime, Avril held the role of a trusted member of François Duvalier’s Presidential Guard and served as an adviser to Jean-Claude Duvalier.²⁰ According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. As classified by FH for 1989, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Political liberties were still classified as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous by V-Dem’s PCLI. For 1989, V-Dem’s JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1990, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. The coup by junior officers and non-commissioned officers represents a fundamental rupture in elite composition and power networks within the military institution. This is not just a leadership shuffle but a transformation of which military factions control the state. Namphy represented senior officer corps interests. Avril came to power through a coup by junior officers and NCOs against those senior officers. This breaks the previous elite coalition and establishes a new one, even though both are military-based. Va-PoReg principle: Regime changes occur when there is a fundamental break in who can access power and how succession works, even if the broader legitimation pattern (military, electoral, ideological, etc.) remains constant.

A popular uprising forced General Prosper Avril to flee after mass public protests. The military transferred power to the army chief of staff, General Hérard Abraham, on 03/10/1990, to oversee a transition to an electoral regime (Hall 2012: 272, Nohlen 1993: 390, Payne/Sutton 1993: 92-94). Abraham voluntarily gave up power on 03/13/1990 and Ertha Pascal-Trouillot became provisional president. She was responsible for organizing general elections.²¹

On this date, elections were conducted by a provisional civilian government, resulting in a victory for populist leader Jean-Claude Aristide, who secured 67 percent of the vote in the first round and assumed office in 02/1991. (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 33). The elections were monitored by the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) and the Organization of American States (OAS), and are regarded as free and fair (Ulloa 2005). Due to the continued high influence of the military and a weak judiciary, FH classifies Haiti as partly free in 1991 (McColm 1991). Only GWF categorizes the regime period as democratic, LIED and HTW classify it as a multiparty autocracy, RoW as an electoral autocracy and BR as a civilian autocracy. According to our classification, the regime is an electoral hybrid regime. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED classifies the elections as not competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores them as free and fair but their CEI as not clean. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Besides, political liberties were absent (LIED). V-Dem’s PCLI scores them with an ambiguous presence. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

A military coup led by Brigadier General Raoul Cedras overthrew Aristide. Cedras ruled as executive through the military junta but had puppet presidents (Nohlen 1993: 390, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 67, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 80).¹⁶ According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Furthermore, according to LIED political liberties were coded as absent. V-Dem’s PCLI indicates with an ambiguous level.

The military regime led by Cedras was ousted by a foreign intervention (Operation Uphold Democracy, 09/19/1994-03/31/1995) which oversaw the return of the previously elected president (Ulloa 2005: 377).²² The operation was effectively authorized by the 07/31/1994 United Nations Security Council Resolution 940.²² Jean-Bertrand Aristide was restored to power (Malone 2008: 133, Hall 2012: 272, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 67).²³ As classified by FH for the period until 1999, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. For the remaining period a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Political liberties remained absent according to LIED and can be interpreted as ambiguous according to V-Dem’s PCLI until 1994 and somewhat present afterwards. On 12/17/1995 a presidential election was held, that was won by René Préval. Parliamentary elections were held on 04/06/1997.²⁴ The parliamentary elections faced controversy after the initial round and were ultimately canceled. This initiated a new political crisis (Ulloa 2005: 377). On 01/12/1999 the legislature refused to confirm his third nominee for prime minister, amid accusations of vote rigging in legislative elections when elected President Rene Preval dismissed the Chamber of Deputies and all but nine members of the Senate. He began to rule by decree (Erikson 2004, Wucker 2004: 45, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 34, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 67). Parliamentary elections were held on 05/21/2000 and 07/09/2000. They were overall deeply flawed. International observation missions characterized them as not free and fair and questioned tabulation method (Ulloa 2005: 377).²⁵ Presidential elections were held on 11/26/2000. They were boycotted by the opposition due to the experience of the spring parliamentary elections. Jean Bertrand Aristide won with over 90%.²⁶ The opposition proclaimed its own president. The Organization of American States mediated the negotiations between both sides (Ulloa 2005: 377-378). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections as competitive from 1994 to 1998 and later as not competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair during this period. Their CEI scores them as not really clean from 1999 onwards, having scored their electoral cleanliness as ambiguous before. In 1995, according to Polity5, the executive’s constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. From 1996 to 1998, based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. Since 2000, according to Polity5, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 1995 to 1998, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 1999, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. From 2000 to 2003, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

Aristide fled in response to an armed rebellion led by the National Revolutionary Front for the Liberation and Reconstruction of Haiti, a rebel group formed of a former police chief and criminal gang leaders (Erikson 2005: 86, Hall 2012: 272). By 02/25/2004, the rebel group controlled nearly the entire north of Haiti and forced Aristide to resign on 02/29/2004. After Aristide’s departure, Prime Minister Gérard Latortue and President Boniface Alexandre, Chief of Justice of the Supreme Court in Haiti, formed an interim government.²⁷ According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Political liberties continued to be coded as absent per LIED and can be interpreted as somewhat present (V-Dem PCLI). For 2005, V-Dem’s JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 2006, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

On this date, general elections were held to elect the replacements for the interim government of Gérard Latortue, which had been put in place after the 2004 Haiti rebellion. Following four delays, presidential and legislative elections took place on 02/07/2006. Former president Préval secured victory in the presidential race, narrowly evading a runoff with 51.2 percent of the vote in the initial round. However, the legitimacy of the outcome was questioned due to the Electoral Council (CEP) excluding approximately 85,000 blank ballots from the tally, a decision met with strong opposition criticism based on dubious legal grounds. Préval’s inauguration was postponed until 05/14 due to inconclusive legislative results, which necessitated a runoff poll on 04/21, with only 15–20 percent of eligible voters reportedly participating (Lansford 2021: 690). Jovenel Moïse of the Haitian Tet Kale Party (PHTK), the handpicked successor of then President Michel Martelly, won the 2015 presidential election, but the results were nullified due to extensive fraud. Moïse went on to win a repeat election in 2016, taking 55.6 percent of the vote. Elections for a portion of the Senate and the runoff elections for the remaining seats in the Chamber of Deputies were held in 2016 along with the repeat presidential election, and the contests were marred by low voter turnout and fraud.²⁸ According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held until 2010, from 2011 to 2014 only executive elections were held, in 2015 no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held, from 2016 to 2018 multiparty executive and legislative elections were held and in 2019 and 2020 only executive elections were held. During this period LIED categorizes elections as not competitive except between 2006 and 2009. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores their freedom and fairness as ambiguous while their CEI scores them as not really clean. Per FH’s evaluation for this regime period, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Furthermore, LIED still indicates no political liberties and V-Dem’s PCLI outcomes stayed at a somewhat present level. Between 2006 and 2009, according to Polity5, the executive’s constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. In 2017 and 2018, based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. From 2007 to 2009, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 2010, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. For 2011 and 2012, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 2013 to 2016, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2017-2018, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. From 2019 to 2021, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

The first half of the year was dominated by protests and political disputes over the expiration of President Jovenel Moïse’s term, his plans to hold a referendum on constitutional reforms, and the continued postponement of overdue elections. On 07/07/2021, President Moïse was assassinated by a group of heavily armed men who entered his residence, and the resulting succession crisis was exacerbated by the lack of a sitting Parliament, as the terms of most lawmakers had expired in 2020. ²⁸ Joseph assumed political control of the government. At that time, Joseph stated that he was in control of the country. The legal succession to the presidency was unclear. Meanwhile, eight out of ten sitting members of Haiti’s Senate chose the Senate speaker Joseph Lambert as the interim President on 07/09. On 07/19, Joseph announced that he will stand down as prime minister in Favor of Henry.²⁹ General elections were scheduled to be held in Haiti on 11/07/2021 to elect the president and Parliament, alongside a constitutional referendum. However, in September 2021 they were postponed following the dismissal of the members of the Provisional Electoral Council by acting Prime Minister Ariel Henry.³⁰ On 12/12/2022, Henry signed an agreement with representatives of the civil society, political parties, and the business sector to hold elections in 2023 and install an elected government in 2024.³¹ However, no general elections were held in 2023 either, which means that no elections have been held in the country since 2016. On 03/11/2024 Henry announced that he will resign and that his government will hand over power after a transitional council (The High Transition Coucil) has been appointed.³² Without a functioning government, lawlessness, crime, and violence are widespread, and, paired with increasing food shortages present an acute humanitarian crisis.³³ According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 2021. According to FH’s classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Political liberties were still coded as absent in 2021 (LIED). Whereas V-Dem’s PCLI still indicates a somewhat present level for them. For 2022, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2023, V-Dem’s JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

Non-Electoral Transitional Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Ferguson 1988, Mattarollo 2002, Shamsie 2004, Rotberg/Clague 1971)