Va-PoReg Country Report Egypt 1900–2025

Egypt was until the end of the First World War officially a province of the Ottoman Empire. In 1882 British troops occupied the Ottoman Egypt in the aftermath of the ‘Urabi revolt’ that escalated on 06/11/1882 with the bombing of Alexandria¹ and ended with the battle of Tel el-Kebir on 09/13/1882 that ultimately restored British power over the territory.² However, from this date onwards it was semi-officially a virtually independent state with its own monarchy, armed forces, and territorial possessions in Sudan. For practical purposes it was a puppet state of the United Kingdom. The literature also speaks of a “veiled protectorate” established by Britain during that time.³ After 1879, Egypt was subject to the control of the British advisers in its commercial matters (Willoughby/Fenwick 1974). Britain had posted a British agent and consul general in Egypt (Crawford 2006:287, McIlwraith 1917). From 12/18/1914 on Britain established a formal protectorate by treaty over Egypt (Crawford 2006:287). A British high commissioner replaced the British agent and consul general (Crawford 2006:287). Khedive Abbas II of Egypt was removed from power by the British because of his pro-Ottoman positions. He was replaced by his uncle Hussein Kamel, who declared Egypt’s independence from the Ottoman Empire and proclaimed himself as Sultan (Crawford 2006:287, McIlwraith 1917). According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held. Since the United Kingdom heavily interfered in domestic affairs this is a borderline case between a protectorate and a (de-facto) colony.⁴ From 1900 to 1919, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. The remaining years of this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified as robust, indicating strong and regular judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. However, political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem’s PCLI. Therefore, we classify this period as an autocratic monarchy.

Egypt became independent from Britain as the Kingdom of Egypt officially as of 03/15/1922. However, four matters were still reserved to the British government’s discretion: defense, the security of imperial communications, the protection of foreign interests and of minorities, and the administration of the Sudan (Ibrahim 1973). Beyond these British prerogatives and the constant intervention of the British High Commissioner in “Egyptian affairs” after independence (Roberts 1986), Egypt nevertheless retained complete jurisdiction and had her own Ministry of Foreign Affairs and diplomatic envoys in the majority of countries globally (O'Rourke 1936). This rules out that Britain maintained a protectorate over Egypt in the post-independence period. Egypt became formally a constitutional monarchy. In 1923 male suffrage was introduced (LIED). The 1923 constitution provided for an independent judiciary, a bicameral parliament and laid the executive powers with the king.⁵ Sultan Ahmad Fu’ad (a son of Isma’il), who had succeeded in 1917, took the title of King of Egypt (Roberts 1986). However, he “violated the constitution the same year it was adopted and suspended it in 1930” (Vatikiotis 1961:23, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 58). In 1930 a new constitution granted more extensive powers to the executive in form of the king and his ministers. It was repealed in 1935 following extensive protests and replaced by the 1923 constitution.⁵ On 04/28/1936, King Fu’ad died and was succeeded by his son Faruk.⁶ In 1936, Egypt received a greater autonomy concerning its own diplomatic affairs and assumed control over its own military. Egypt also became a Member of the League of Nations (Roberts 1986). According to LIED only multiparty legislative elections were held in 1924, from 1926 to 1927, from 1931 to 1933 and from 1936 onward. Thus, according to LIED no multiparty executive elections were held from 1922 to 1923, in 1925, from 1928 to 1930 and from 1935 to 1935. From 1922 to 1927, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. Between 1930 and 1933, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. Since 1935, the executive’s authority was on par with or below that of other branches, reflecting executive parity or subordination. For this time political liberties were coded as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as not really present per V-Dem’s PCLI.

A military coup by the Free Officers, an organization of junior and mid-level officers, led by Major General Mohamed Naguib and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, assumed power on this date (Haddad 1973: 11-12, 21-22, Perlmutter 1974:49).⁷ They established the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) made up of members of the Free Officers’ executive committee to rule (Haddad 1973: 11-12, 21-22, Brooker 1995: 148, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014b: 58). The most notable economic manifestations of Arab Socialism were the land reforms in 1952 and the nationalization of major industries and the banking systems in the country.⁸ Naguib called for a return to civil rule early on but was thwarted by other forces in the RCC. Naguib’s tenure as president came to end in November 1954 due to disagreements with other members of the Free Officers, particularly with Nasser, who forced him to resign and succeeded him as president.⁷ The Liberation Rally was a short-lived political organization created after the Egyptian revolution of 1952 to organize popular support for the government. Formed around a month after all other parties were outlawed, it supported pan-Arabism, Arab socialism, and British withdrawal from the Suez Canal. The Rally was dissolved in 1957 and replaced by the National Union.⁹ Because the regime was ruled by a junta the period is classified as a military autocracy. The one-party autocracy can be seen as a continuation of the ruling military group which gained power through the coup in 1952. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Besides, political liberties are coded as absent by LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. For the year 1953, V-Dem’s JCE is classified as robust, indicating strong and regular judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1954 to 1956, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

On this date the RCC dissolved itself.⁸ Its dissolution marked the end of the initial phase of military rule and the beginning of Nasser’s personal rule, which continued to be characterized by a strong military influence in the government. The coup also led to the independence of Sudan. In 1956 female suffrage was additionally introduced.¹⁰ Under Gamal Abdel Nasser there was a single-party rule.¹¹ The National Union and later the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) were based on the principles of Nasserism and Arab socialism.¹² While ASU remained the sole legal party in the parliamentary elections on 10/28/1976, as in previous elections, these elections were unique in having three distinct political factions of the party compete against each other (the right-wing Socialist Liberal Organisation, the centrist Arab Socialist Organisation and the left-wing National Progressive Unionist Party). Between 02/22/1958 and 09/28/1961 Egypt was united with Syria as United Arab Republic. Egypt continued until 1971 to name itself as the United Arab Republic. The UAR soon turned into a state dominated by Egypt. Hence, the UAR is coded under the vaporeg_identifier for Egypt in this period. The period is classified as a one-party autocracy. However, the regime had strong military features because of the military character of Nasser’s rise to power by coup d’état as well as his strict military allegiance. Following Gamal Abdel Nasser’s death, Anwar Sadat took the presidential office on 10/15/1970 and launched the “Corrective Revolution” on 05/15/1971 to consolidate his power. He dismissed and imprisoned Vice President Ali Sabri and the Minister of the Interior, Sharawi Gomaa. ¹³ On 10/02/1978 Nasser’s successor Anwar Sadat announced the founding of the National Democratic Party (NDP), on 07/09/1978. It was then officially approved on 10/02/1978. While Sadat had introduced several reforms to instate a multi-party, democratic electoral system, there was a de facto one-party rule. A new state organ known as the Political Parties Committee (PPC) was created which was able to suspend other parties’ activities under law 40. PCC was chaired by NDP.¹¹ All parties emerged from the ruling party. Consequently, the regime is viewed as a de facto one-party autocracy.¹⁴ This is underlined by the fact that in the presidential elections there was only one candidate from the NDP and no competition. Since its creation in 1978, the NDP held no less than three-quarters of the seats in the parliament. The party’s ideology intentionally stayed ambiguous and open to interpretation.¹¹ Even though the first multi-party parliamentary elections in Egypt since 1952 took place on 06/07/1979¹⁴, the NDP wielded uncontested power in state politics and is usually considered a de facto single party regime.¹¹ The parliament was restricted to the role of rubber-stamping presidential authority because it is confined by presidential powers beyond its control.¹⁵ This period represents a borderline case between a military autocracy and a one-party autocracy because Sadat, the founder of the NDP,¹⁶ as well as his successor Mubarak were military officers.¹⁷ Anwar Sadat was a senior member of the “Free Officers” who overthrew the King in the 1952 coup d’état during the Egyptian Revolution which led to Nasser’s accession to power.¹⁶ Sadat was assassinated on 10/06/1981. Sufi Abu Taleb served as interim president from 10/06/1981 to 10/14/1981, after which Hosni Mubarak took the presidential office.¹⁸ Until Mubarak’s deposition in 2011 Egypt had operated under a “state of emergency” for all but five months since 1967, allowing the president to outlaw demonstrations, hold detainees indefinitely without trial, and issue law by decree.¹¹ State repression and surveillance was constant and widespread, limiting Islamist and liberal opposition groups, as they were targeted by state violence, arrests, and legal harassment.¹⁹ The Muslim Brotherhood, the largest opposition group, though officially banned, had some success by running as “independent” candidates in elections.²⁰ According to LIED only executive elections were held in 1956, in 1957 executive and legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held, from 1958 to 1962 only executive elections were held, from 1963 onward executive and legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held. As classified by FH for 1972 and 1973, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Between 1974 and 1983 the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In 1984 and 1985 the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. For the regime period from 1986 to 1991 a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. For the remaining period Egypt scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Furthermore, LIED classifies political liberties as absent for this period. V-Dem’s PCLI categorizes political liberties as absent until 1972 and as not really present from 1973 onwards. Since 1956, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. For 1957, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For the year 1958, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the year 1959, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also moderate. For 1960, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the year 1961, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. In the two following years, For the relevant period, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are moderate. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. From 1964 to 1970, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1971 to 1989, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For the rest of the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

The first multi-candidate presidential elections in the history of Egypt were held on 09/07/2005.²¹ All Egyptians over the age of 18 were required to vote but only around 40% of the population were registered as voters. Parties were allowed to propose presidential candidates which were subsequently reviewed by the Presidential Election Commission. In 2005, only around one third of the initially presented candidates were allowed to run in the elections. Monitoring was carried out by Egyptian Judges, international oversight, however, was not allowed.²¹ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED categorizes elections during this period as not competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores them as not really free or fair while their CEI scores them as not clean. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. Besides, political liberties are categorized as absent by LIED and can be interpreted as not really present by V-Dem’s PCLI. Based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

After two weeks of mass protests (Egyptian revolution) President Mubarak’s resigned, entrusting the Supreme Council of Egyptian Armed Forces with the leadership of the country. The military junta was headed by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi who served as the Minister of Defense under Mubarak.²² This regime is classified as military autocracy rather than non-electoral transitional autocracy based on its legitimation pattern. While SCAF initially employed caretaker rhetoric, describing itself as managing a transition and organizing elections, it simultaneously invoked guardianship legitimation. SCAF claimed authority to protect Egypt’s national interests, presented the military as the guardian of the revolution and national stability, and asserted the armed forces’ unique capacity to navigate the crisis. In public statements, SCAF emphasized the military’s role as the protector of the nation and the revolution, not merely as a facilitator of transition. This combination of guardianship and transitional rhetoric is decisive: the presence of guardianship claims reveals a substantive legitimation of military rule rather than purely procedural facilitation. Had SCAF employed exclusively caretaker legitimation without invoking the military’s special guardianship role, classification as non-electoral transitional autocracy would be warranted. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Based on Polity5’s evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Political liberties are still coded as absent per LIED, whereas V-Dem’s PCLI outcomes can be interpreted as ambiguous in 2011.

First mostly free and fair democratic presidential election of Egypt’s history, which were won by Mohamed Morsi of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood.²³ However, from the start of Morsi’s presidency there were severe restrictions to democracy. Shortly after taking office, in 11/2012, a temporary constitutional declaration was released, providing him with unlimited powers and the authority to legislate without judicial oversight (Kirkpatrick/Sheikh 2012). The aim of this was to avoid judicial control by the judges of the Mubarak era. Independent press agencies called this process an Islamist coup. Morsi revoked this decree during the protests in 2012. A new constitution was passed by referendum.²⁴ Restrictions on political and civil rights in regard to the freedom of association, speech, and press remained.²⁵ Per FH’s evaluation for this regime period, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to LIED political liberties were coded as absent and V-Dem’s PCLI scores them as ambiguous. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The 2012 elections are categorized as not competitive by LIED. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores it as somewhat free and fair while their CEI scores it as ambiguously clean. Based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

A military coup led by General Abdul Fatah al-Sisi ousted President Mohamed Morsi. The constitution of 2012 was suspended, and Adly Mansour was declared interim President. The independence of the judiciary was weakened, and the military’s role strengthened (Lenze Jr. 2016).²⁶ The interim phase is defined by substantial unrest and instability leading to sectarian attacks against minority groups and wide-spread repression and arrests of the opposition and extremist groups by the military. On 05/28/2014 former Military General Al-Sisi was elected President receiving 97% of votes. Transparency and fairness of the presidential election was criticized. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held in 2013, in 2014 only executive elections were held. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem’s PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present in 2013 and are absent afterwards. For 2014, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the year 2015, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are robust. At the same time, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive.

10/17[-12/02]/2015 End Military Autocracy/Start Electoral (Military) Autocracy: The 2019 constitutional amendments extended the military’s scope of action into civilian-defined area. Thereby, the EAF can de jure intervene against the executive leader at any given time, as their veto power over the presidential authority is anchored in the new constitution.²⁷ Decision-making today is in the hands of former army leaders who left the military establishment and entered the civilian sphere. Significant political opposition is nearly non-existent, as expressing dissent can result in criminal prosecution and imprisonment. Civil liberties, such as press freedom and freedom of assembly, are closely restricted.²⁸ Although there is no formal junta, the military wields significant power over civilian governance and public life. The political environment under Sisi has been marked by severe restrictions on political opposition, media freedom, and civil liberties. From 2015 onward LIED reflects that multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. According to LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI political liberties were not present ever since 2015. From 2014 to 2018, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. For the year 2016, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 2017, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 2018, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Since 2019, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Elections in December 2023 were uncompetitive with no opposition and marked by intimidation and arrests. Incumbent president Al-Sisi won his 6th consecutive term with a reported 89.6% of the vote. The regime continues to highly restrict political rights, civil liberties and media freedom²⁹ and its crackdown on political opponents and dissidents.³⁰ New legislation in early 2024 has further entrenched the military’s authority, allowing for the deployment of military personnel in civilian facilities and expanding their role in controlling markets and public order.

Electoral (Military) Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Albrecht 2005, Blaydes 2011, Breivik Andersen 2011, Brown 1997, Brownlee 2007, Hinnebusch 1988, Oppenheim/Roxburgh 1920, Ottaway 2015, Richter 2007, Rutherford 2008, Tripp/Owen 1989)