Va-PoReg Country Report Sudan 1900–2025

In 1899 the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was declared, providing for the Sudan to be administered jointly by Egypt and Great Britain, with a governor-general appointed by the khedive of Egypt but nominated by the British government. In reality, however, there was no equal partnership between Britain and Egypt in the Sudan, as the British dominated the condominium from the beginning.139F¹ The Sudan was divided into 15 Provinces. The governors of the provinces were British Officers of the Egyptian Army. Administration was carried out through British inspectors in charge of one or more districts into which the provinces are subdivided (Willoughby/Fenwick 1974). The local representative of the British monarch as effective head of the government was Lord Cromer, the agent of British overrule in Egypt. Cromer treated the governor-general (from 1899 to 1916 Reginald Wingate) as a mere executive subordinate (Roberts 1986). During this time, however, two political parties emerged by 1945. There were two main parties involved: the National Unionist Party, headed by al-Azhari, advocated for the unification of Sudan and Egypt, receiving endorsement from Sayed Sir Ali al-Mirghani, a prominent religious leader. On the other side was the Umma Party, supported by Sayed Sir Abdur-Rahman al-Mahdi, which strongly pushed for complete independence without any ties to Egypt.140F² There was no parliament or electoral system in Sudan under the colonial regime of the United Kingdom. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 1948. Thereafter, multiparty legislative elections were conducted. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem’s PCLI. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present. Until 1947, V-Dem‘s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem‘s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive. From 1948 onwards, V-Dem‘s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem‘s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

On this date Sudan was granted self-government as well as full Sudanisation of the administration within three years. In January 1953, Egypt and Britain arrived at a formal agreement of independence for the Sudan (Crowder 1984).141F³ In the same year male suffrage was introduced (LIED). Under continued pressure, the United Kingdom conceded to Egypt's demands in 1953, with the governments of both Egypt and the United Kingdom agreeing to terminate the condominium, and grant Sudan independence in 1956.142F⁴ In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as being ambiguous about the status of political liberties. For the relevant period, V-Dem‘s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem‘s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

On this date, parliamentary elections were held, in which the National Unionist Party (NUP) won. The election, in which only males had the right to vote, was by observers regarded as free and fair.143F⁵ On 08/18/1955 the first Sudanese Civil War started. This was a conflict between the northern part of Sudan and the southern Sudan region that demanded representation and more regional autonomy. Half a million people died over the coming 17 years and the war was divided into four major stages: initial guerrilla warfare, the creation of the Anyanya insurgency, political strife within the government and establishment of the South Sudan Liberation Movement. For the period under consideration, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties.

Independence became effective and the Sudan became the Republic of Sudan (Barbour 1980). Additional internal conflicts within the NUP concerning religious policies resulted in a division in February 1956, leading to the formation of the independent People's Democratic Party (PDP).144F⁶ The PDP got together with the Umma party, to bring down al-Azhari and then formed a coalition government. They governed for the rest of the parliament´s tenure, however their reign was marked by internal conflict. Nevertheless, they were determined to keep working together.145F⁷ The coalition comprising the Umma Party (securing 36% of seats) and the PDP (gaining 16% of seats) won the February 1958 elections after entering into an electoral agreement.146F⁸ The new parliament was divided on many issues and faced factionalism and corruption, making it hard for the government to exercise its leadership.147F⁷ Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. From 1953 and 1955 the elections were not competitive. The following two years the elections were categorized as competitive by LIED. Furthermore, between 1953 and 1958 a somewhat freedom and fairness is given (V-Dem EF&FI). V-Dem’s CEI reflects a not really cleanliness of elections from 1954 to 1958. The LDI indicates a none scores corresponding to an autocracy and according to LIED political liberties were absent. However, V-Dem’s PCLI indicates ambiguous political liberties from 1953 to 1955. The remaining years even somewhat political liberties were given. In 1956 and 1957, based on Polity5's assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. From 1953 to 1955, V-Dem‘s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem‘s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the remaining years, V-Dem‘s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem‘s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. In the years 1956 and 1957, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties are somewhat present. For 1958, our interpretation of the PCLI indicates an ambiguous state of political liberties.

A military coup led by General Ibrahim Abboud in a context of widespread anti-government demonstrations happened. The coup was orchestrated by Prime Minister Abdallah Khalil, a retired army general (Marshall 2018a).⁹ Abboud established the Supreme Council of the armed Forces made up of twelve senior officers as a military junta (Haddad 1973: 183-85, Ofcansky 1991, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 95) and declared a state-of-emergency.149F¹⁰ The interim constitution was put on hold, and all political organizations were disbanded.150F¹¹ Parliament was dissolved and the government ruled by decree.151F¹²Although this event could be classified as a ruptural self-coup by the prime minister, we categorize it as a military coup due to the decisive role of the armed forces and the subsequent establishment of a junta. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. For 1959, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. In the period 1960-1963, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent. For 1964, our interpretation of the PCLI indicates that political liberties were not really present. According to Polity5, from 1958 to 1962, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. In 1963, the executive's constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. Polity5 does not provide a categorization for 1964. In 1959, V-Dem‘s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, and V-Dem‘s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the remaining years, V-Dem‘s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem‘s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Since there was no parliament in this period V-Dem’s values for LCE are clearly wrong, while the values for the JCE seem doubtable to say the least.

On this date, Abboud was forced out due to a popular uprising to appoint a transitional civilian cabinet and resign (Haddad 1973: 195, Ofcansky 1991, Shepherd 1964: 12, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 95). Al-Khalifa became acting president of the new civilian regime. According to LIED, only executive elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No legislative elections were present. In 1964 female suffrage was introduced in Sudan.152F¹³ The UNF government was dominated by the Communist Party of the Sudan (CPS), the People's Democratic Party and their allies in the trade union movement. National elections were scheduled for March 1965 despite the ongoing conflict in the south, which prevented elections from being carried out in this region. Political parties were split on the question of whether the elections should be carried out only in the north or whether they should be postponed.153F¹⁴ In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's indicates in our interpretation an ambiguous state regarding political liberties. For the relevant period, V-Dem‘s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem‘s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Again, V-Dem’s LCE seems misleading since there was no parliament in this period.

Elections were held in the North from 04/21 to 05/08/1965, and the Umma Party (UP) won 90 out of 207 seats in the Constituent Assembly. Finally, the election for the constituent assembly was held in the South on 04/18/1967154F¹⁵ GWF classifies the country from 1966 to 1968 as democratic, MCM, BR, AF and LIED from 1965 to 1969. We code this period as an electoral hybrid regime, because it was characterized by internal party conflicts as well as conflicts between parliament and head of parties. Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. From 1965 to 1968 the elections were classified as competitive by LIED. V-Dem’s CEI indicates no cleanliness for the elections. In 1966 and 1967 no elections were held. In 1968 the overall election conditions are considered as ambiguous (V-Dem EF&FI). V-Dem’s LDI declares the absence of liberal democratic indicators, referring to an autocracy. Furthermore, regarding the political liberties, LIED scores absence at this time (LIED) and V-Dem’s PCLI is coded as ambiguous until 1969, when our classification of PCLI changes to not really present. However, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the relevant period, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. This situation resulted in two simultaneous governments in Khartoum - one convening inside the parliament building and the other on its lawn - both asserting to represent the legislature's will.155F¹⁴ The different governments in this period were incapable of ensuring the stability and guarantee of institutions, as well as the guarantee of political and civil liberties, such as religious freedom.156F¹⁶

A military coup led by General Gaafar Nimeiry seized power from the civilian government on the basis that it had not solved the economic or social problems. He established a new junta with a leftist pan-Arab orientation, the Revolutionary Command Council (Haddad 1973: 209-13, Ofcansky 1991, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 95). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. For the given timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. For the relevant period, V-Dem‘s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem‘s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. As observed for many regime periods for Sudan the LCE is misleading since there was no functioning parliament in this period. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) assumed both executive and legislative powers, effectively replacing parliamentary structures.

Communists backed by Major Hashem al Atta overthrew Nimeiry and established an extremely short-lived communist government.¹⁷

Nimeiry and loyalist forces launched a counter coup against the communist regime headed by Atta. Nimeiry resumed his chairmanship of his previous junta and began to suppress communists in his country. Nimeiry executed leading members of the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP). This victory allowed him to begin restructuring the state to centralize authority: In 08/1971, he published a provisional constitution establishing a presidential government intended to replace the collective Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).¹⁸ The transfer of ultimate authority was formalized in September 1971, when Nimeiry was elected president for a six-year term via a national referendum (plebiscite). Following his election, Nimeiry dissolved the RCC and transferred ultimate authority from the military collective to the presidency. He further institutionalized the one-party state by establishing the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) as the country's sole legal political organization in 1973, a status confirmed by a new constitution adopted that same year. Additionally, Nimeiry signed the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which granted autonomy to the southern region and temporarily ended the First Sudanese Civil War.¹⁹ According to LIED, only executive elections were held until 1973, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No legislative elections were present. From 1974 onward, both executive and legislative elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. As per Polity5's categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. As classified by FH for the period 1972-1977, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Per FH’s evaluation for 1978 to 1983, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH’s classification for the years 1984 and 1985, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED indicates the absence of political liberties through the entire regime period. V-Dem’s PCLI does change over the regime period. From 1972 to 1978, PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. The PCLI for the years 1979 to 1984 are classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present. For 1985 we code the PCLI data to indicate an ambiguous state of political liberties. Until 1973, V-Dem‘s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem‘s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. As observed above the LCE is misleading since there was no parliament in this period.

A conservative officer-led coup was carried out as a response to riots. This resulted in the removal of Nimeiry from power and the instalment of a Transitional Military Council, which joined forces with previously marginalized civilians that had been excluded under the Nimeiry administration (Anderson 1999: 14-26, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 96).157F²⁰ Following the coup the junta appointed a largely non-partisan civilian cabinet, promulgated a revised constitution and oversaw elections for a Constituent Assembly, which were held as scheduled in April 1986 (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 60). According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints during this time. As classified by FH for 1985, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Per FH’s evaluation for 1986, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. In the specified timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties are somewhat present. For the relevant period, V-Dem‘s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem‘s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Again, the LCE is misleading since there was no parliament in this period and the indications of the JCE seem doubtable to say the least. Regarding Sudan neither V-Dem’s JCE nor LCE seems reliable.

Between 04/01 and 04/12/1986 the first multi-party elections in the country since 1968 were held. Power was returned to civilians (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 96).158F²¹ Although these elections had been relatively free and fair, they could not be conducted throughout the entire national territory. The Umma Party emerged as winner but had to form a coalition government.159F²² Although Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma party and elected prime minister, promised to restore judicial independence, religious freedom and end the civil war those goals could not be achieved.160F²³ Therefore, this regime period is marked by deficits in the electoral process, as well as in the guarantee of political and civil rights and the independence of the judiciary. Based on our observations, multiparty, executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED scores the elections as competitive in this period. While V-Dem’s CEI acknowledges that the elections were not really clean, V-Dem’s EF&FI scores the elections as somewhat free and fair. According to FH, for the period between 1986 and 1988, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. V-Dem’s low LDI indicates that Sudan was an autocracy in that period and the absence of political liberties is stated by LIED. However, according to V-Dem’s PCLI somewhat political liberties were achieved. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was even subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. Based on the mixed information we classify the regime as an electoral hybrid regime. For most of the relevant period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are somewhat present. In 1989, PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were absent. For the relevant period, V-Dem‘s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem‘s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

A military coup led by General Omar Hassan Ahmad al­ Bashir and an Islamist faction against Sadiq al- Mahdi's elected all-party coalition government, imposed a state of emergency, dissolved all parties and unions, took possession of their assets, banned demonstrations, and established the 15 members, all military Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (R.C.C.) to rule. The new rulers dismissed much of the officer corps (Hoogland 1991, Burr/Collins 2003: 2, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 96, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 88). On 12/12/1999 al-Bashir ordered tanks and troops to oust Hasson al-Turabir, a political rival, who was speaker of the parliament. This moves concentrated absolute power in al-Bashir's hands. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held between 1989 and 1995. Subsequently, both executive and legislative elections were held until 1998, though they were not categorized as multiparty. In 1999, only executive elections were held, but they were not categorized as multiparty. No legislative elections were present. Both executive and legislative elections were held again between 2000 and 2004, but they were not categorized as multiparty. Since 2005, multiparty executive and legislative elections have been held. According to Polity5, from 1989 to 2004, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 2005 to 2009, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. From 2010 onward, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. According to FH’s classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. LIED indicates that political liberties were absent for the entire regime period. V-Dem's PCLI is likewise classified by us as showing that political liberties are absent until the year 2004. We code the PCLI data for 2005-2018 as showing that political liberties are not truly present. For 2019 PCLI we interpret PCLI’s assessment as indicating an ambiguous state of political liberties. Between 1992 and 2018, V-Dem‘s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem‘s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

On this date Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was overthrown by the Sudanese army after popular protests demanded his departure. At that time the army, led by Ahmed Awad Ibn Auf, toppled the government and National Legislature and declared a state of emergency in the country for a period of three months. He proclaimed himself the de facto Head of State, declared the suspension of Sudan's constitution, enforced a curfew, effectively quelling the ongoing protests. Additionally, he dissolved the National Legislature, national government, state governments, and legislative councils across Sudan. On 04/12/2019 the military regime in power agreed to potentially shorten its tenure and hand over governance to a civilian administration pending successful negotiations for its formation. Later that evening, Auf resigned from his position as head of the military council, appointing Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan, the general inspector of the armed forces, as his successor. Subsequently, on 04/13/2019 discussions between the protestors and the military commenced officially to facilitate the transition to a civilian-led government. By 04/27/2019 a consensus was reached to establish a transitional council comprising both civilians and military personnel. However, the specifics of the power-sharing agreement had not been finalized, as both factions sought to secure a majority representation.161F²⁴ The Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), the political coalition consisting of civilian and rebel coalitions, negotiated the power-sharing plan with the Transitional Military Council (TMC) in July 2019. The agreement was reached on 07/17/2019.162F²⁵ It included a 39-month transitional period aimed at restoring democracy as well as the establishment of executive, legislative and judicial institutions along with their respective procedures.163F²⁶ This constitutional declaration was signed by the TMC and FFC in August 2019. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during this period. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free.

On this date the Transitional Sovereignty Council took over as the collective head of state of Sudan. It consisted of five civilians chosen by the FFC and five military officers chosen by the TMC as well as one civilian chosen through consensus between the FFC and TMC. For the initial 21 months, the chair was designated to be a military representative, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, while for the subsequent 18 months, a civilian member was to assume the role.164F²⁷ Abdalla Hamdok was appointed prime minister by the council on 08/20/2019 and sworn in on 08/21/2019.165F²⁸ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. Per FH, for this regime period, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. In the timeframe 2019-2020, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as being ambiguous about the status of political liberties. For 2021, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present. For the relevant period, V-Dem‘s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem‘s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

On this date, a military coup led by Lieutenant General Abdelfattah El Burhan ousted prime minister Abdalla Hamdok and the military seized power followed by the declaration of a state of emergency. Hamdok was reinstated later, however the military retained control over the government. He resigned on 01/02/2022 amid continuing protests – leaving the government in the hands of the military leaders.166F²⁹ The military declared not to hold elections until 2023. This power shift was encountered with violent protest by the people.167F³⁰ By 2023 the military had consolidated power of all governmental institutions. In April 2023, tensions between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) spiked and brought negotiations over the formation of a new government to a standstill. Violence erupted as the groups became increasingly hostile. International Organizations in 2023 report that the conflict has led to over 12,000 deaths and 6 million displaced persons. The RSF has reportedly committed mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region, killing or forcibly removing non-Arab parts of the population.168F³¹ In December 2023, Sudan's military and civilian leaders agreed to a new framework aimed at restoring civilian rule. The transition efforts are however stalled because of the ongoing civil war between the SAF and RSF as well as several militias and armed groups. For now, no side seems able to break the stalemate which raises the question of the existence of a central authority.169F³² For now, we classify Sudan as a military autocracy referring to the internationally recognized government of Sudan. The reasoning behind this choice is, that the RSF do not aim to secede or abolish the government's authority, but to usurp it. Defending governmental authority against a usurper is, in this case, a reason not to speak of a case of no central authority. It remains to be seen how the military situation on the ground plays out. According to FH’s classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present. For the relevant period, V-Dem‘s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem‘s LCE indicates no values, as no parliament exists, and thus no legislative constraints on the executive are possible.

Military Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Metz 1991)