Va-PoReg Country Report Poland 1900–2025

Prior to the partition of Poland on 10/24/1795, only the male nobility was allowed to take part in political life. The final partition of Poland took place on 10/24/1795.¹ In the midst of World War I, on 01/14/1917, Berlin established the puppet „Kingdom of Poland”. This arrangement involved a governing Provisional Council of State and, commencing from 10/15/1917, a Regency Council (Rada Regencyjna Królestwa Polskiego). The Council administered the country under German auspices until the election of a king.² LIED and V-Dem do not provide data for Poland before 1918.

Poland regained its independence, after World War I, fixed in the Treaty of Versailles.³ Yet there were various regions of today's Poland that were not included. On 11/14/1918, Following its dissolution, the Council relinquished all authority to Józef Piłsudski, who assumed the role of Chief of State (Naczelnik Państwa). After consultation with Piłsudski, Daszyński's government disintegrated, making way for a new government led by Jędrzej Moraczewski.² For 1918, V-Dem's JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are comprehensive. Simultaneously, V-Dem's LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. In 1918, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, whereas V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present.

On this date, free and fair elections for a constituent assembly based on universal suffrage for men and women over 21 were held. The decree introducing universal suffrage was signed by Piłsudski on 11/28/1918, immediately after restoring the independent Polish state.⁴ The March Constitution of 03/17/1921 was a critical milestone, formalizing parliamentary democracy with a bicameral legislature and severely limited presidential powers (Polonsky 1972). The constitution established the Sejm as the dominant institution, with the president elected by parliament and possessing minimal executive authority. The government was accountable exclusively to the Sejm, which held the power to dismiss cabinets through votes of no confidence. The 1922 elections returned over 20 parties to the Sejm, including the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), Polish People's Party (PSL "Piast"), National Democracy (Endecja), Christian Democrats, and ethnic minority parties (Rothschild 1974). This extreme fragmentation created a centrifugal political system where coalition formation became nearly impossible. The ethnic Minority Bloc, representing Ukrainian, Jewish, German, and Belarusian constituencies, held 25-30% of Sejm seats and systematically obstructed legislation (Wandycz 1974). The parliamentary rule during this regime period was chronically unstable and institutionally ineffective (Polonsky 1972 (Polonsky 1972, Stachura 1999, Stachura 2004). Between 1921 and 1926, ten cabinet governments formed and collapsed in rapid succession, with an average tenure of less than one year. Coalition negotiations consumed weeks or months while urgent economic and security matters languished. The Sejm's proportional representation system with no threshold produced a political marketplace where minor parties extracted concessions for temporary support, preventing coherent policy (Rothschild 1998 (1974)). Political scandals progressively eroded public confidence in parliamentary democracy (Polonsky 1972). Corruption accusations became endemic, the failed 1919 coup attempt demonstrated institutional fragility, and the assassination of President Gabriel Narutowicz in 1922 by a nationalist fanatic exposed dangerous political polarization. The PSL "Piast" under Wincenty Witos emerged as the critical "broker" party, but its conservative agrarian base resisted reforms that threatened landowner interests. Rights of minorities were established in principle through the 1921 Constitution and the Minorities Treaty of 1919, and royal titles and state privileges were banned (Bernhard 2005, Bernhard 1999).⁵ However, implementation remained contested, particularly regarding language rights and land reform in ethnically mixed territories. The economic situation compounded political instability and delegitimized parliamentary institutions (Polonsky 1972, Rothschild 1998 (1974)). Hyperinflation plagued Poland from 1919 to 1923, with prices rising by an estimated 2.5 million percent and destroying savings of the middle class. The złoty currency, introduced by Finance Minister Władysław Grabski in 1924, temporarily stabilized the economy, but fiscal discipline required to maintain monetary stability proved politically impossible given Sejm fragmentation. Governmental paralysis prevented essential structural reforms (Polonsky 1972)). The Sejm's fragmentation among over a dozen parties, combined with minority bloc obstructionism, repeatedly blocked land reform legislation critical for agricultural modernization, budget appropriations for infrastructure development, and military reorganization essential for national security following the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1921). Throughout the period competitive multiparty executive and legislative elections were held (see also LIED). During this democratic transition, the elections were competitive (LIED). V-Dem's CEI scores somewhat cleanliness since 1920. The overall election conditions are considered as somewhat free and fair by V-Dem's EF&FI. LIED considers political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI indicates that political liberties were present. Based on Polity5's assessment, during this period, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For the relevant regime period, 1919-1925, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust.

The regime change was the result of a military coup led by Józef Piłsudski and loyal factions within the armed forces against the constitutional government of President Stanisław Wojciechowski and Prime Minister Wincenty Witos.⁶ The May Coup involved three days of fratricidal fighting (12-05/14/1926) between units loyal to Piłsudski and forces defending the constitutional government, resulting in approximately 500 deaths (Rothschild 1962, Rothschild 1963, Rothschild 1966, Watt 1979). Although Piłsudski held no formal military command at the time, the coup was executed through coordinated armed action by military units and resulted in the violent overthrow of the constitutional government. Despite lacking full support from the entire officer corps, the decisive role of military actors under Piłsudski's charismatic leadership makes this a military coup (Rothschild 1974). The subsequent regime under Piłsudski was immediately established as a post-coup authority, reflecting the decisive role of military force despite resting on the loyalty only of parts of the military rather than the armed forces as a whole. The Sanation movement, which endorsed authoritarian rule, was built upon a group of individuals closely associated with Piłsudski—primarily military officers forming the "colonels' clique" including Walery Sławek, Aleksander Prystor, and Kazimierz Bartel (Polonsky 1972). It preached the primacy of the national interest in governance, and contended against the system of parliamentary democracy. Following the coup, Piłsudski did not directly head the government but indirectly controlled the regime as Minister of Military Affairs, with Ignacy Mościcki serving as figurehead president (Rothschild 1998 (1974), Stachura 2004). In accordance with LIED, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For 1926 and 1927, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. In this timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as suggesting that political liberties were somewhat present. Poland classifies as a military autocracy rather than a non-electoral transitional regime because Piłsudski's coup employed guardianship legitimation invoking crisis and civilian incapacity rather than caretaker rhetoric. Piłsudski justified the coup by declaring he was "ready to fight the evil of sejmocracy" (contemptuous term for parliamentary rule) and promising "sanation" (restoration to health) explicitly framing parliamentary democracy as systemic failure requiring military correction (Rothschild 1974 (Rothschild 1998 (1974), Stachura 2004)). This guardianship language (moral crisis, corrupt politicians, primacy of national interest) mandates Military Autocracy classification under Va-PoReg's framework, which specifies that guardianship claims invoking crisis and military necessity define military autocracy while caretaker rhetoric characterizes transitional regimes. Marshal Piłsudski led the coup through loyal military factions as former Chief of State (1918-1922) and Polish-Soviet War commander, with authority deriving from military prestige despite holding no formal command position at the time. The regime's legitimation remained guardianship throughout rather than provisional crisis management pending elections, making this a paradigmatic case of military autocracy established through coup and sustained through guardianship legitimation.

On this date, parliamentary elections took place. Unlike subsequent elections during the Sanation period, opposition parties were allowed to campaign with minimal hindrances and succeeded in securing a significant number of seats. Piłsudski's Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government (BBWR) won only 122 of 444 Sejm seats, while opposition parties, especially the Centrolew alliance, maintained substantial representation (Polonsky 1972, Rothschild 1998 (1974)). The Sanation government nullified the May 1930 election results by dissolving the parliament in August. Under mounting pressure on the opposition, a new campaign was initiated, and new elections were scheduled for November. Taking advantage of the anti-government demonstrations as a pretext, 20 members of the opposition parties, including many leaders of the Centrolew alliance (comprising the Socialists, Polish People's Party "Piast," and Polish People's Party "Wyzwolenie"), were arrested at Brest Fortress in September 1930 and subjected to harsh treatment (Polonsky 1972, Watt 1979). The November 1930 elections, conducted under these intimidating circumstances, delivered a BBWR majority. The April Constitution, promulgated on 04/23/1935, fundamentally restructured Polish governance by concentrating power in the presidency and subordinating the Sejm to executive authority (Polonsky 1972, Stachura 2004). The constitution established a presidential system where the executive dominated legislative institutions, reversing the parliamentary supremacy of the 1921 Constitution. Following Piłsudski's death on 05/12/1935, his regime retained control through compromise among ruling factions, with Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły emerging as first among equals in a collective leadership (Rothschild 1974, Watt 1998).2 However, the regime decomposed progressively without Piłsudski's charismatic authority, marking the transition from semi-democratic to openly authoritarian governance (Rothschild 1998 (1974)).

On this date, the Germans established the General Government over the part of Poland which fell to Germany under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Poland had been invaded by Nazi Germany from the west on 09/01/1939 and the regime surrendered on 09/27/1939. This invasion was the Start of World War II. On 10/06/1939 the last Polish troops capitulated; the German-occupied area was partly annexed to Germany. During the German occupation, three million polish Jews were murdered, half of all Jews murdered by the Nazi regime during the Holocaust.⁷ Part of the country was occupied from the east by the USSR. In June 1941 Germany took over the Soviet-occupied areas (Lukowski/Zawadzki 2019: 327 f.).⁸ On 01/17/1945 the Russian army, accompanied by the Polish First Army arrived in Warsaw.³ No elections were held during this period (LIED). LIED identifies political liberties as absent for this period. V-Dem does not provide data for Poland during the German occupation.

On this date, Soviet troops reached Warsaw and took over the city. On 12/31/1944, a provisional government had been established, a coalition of leftist parties controlled by the communist Polska Partia Robotnicza (Polish Worker’s Party, PPR). The provisional government announced on this date governed a substantial part of Poland, from which the Soviets had driven German troops. It faced no serious domestic challenges because of the defeat in October 1944 of the Warsaw uprising led by the Home Army. We code this regime change event as a foreign-imposed regime change, specifically as an occupation rather than a liberation by foreign forces, since Soviet forces did not support the Warsaw Uprising but waited for its defeat in order to install a pro-Soviet government after the Nazi retreat.⁹ After the Home Army’s defeat, Mikolajczyk, premier of the Polish government-in-exile in London, agreed to negotiate with the communists. When other members of the government-in­exile refused to support his compromise, he resigned from the government-in-exile. He joined the communist dominated coalition in 1945. Although non-communist leaders held some formally important positions in this and later governments, the communists held control. Through their control of the security forces and the Interior Ministry, they assured the repression and disorganization of more popular parties and won the 1947 election (Hiscocks 1963: 87-91, 101-6, Lukas 1982: 4-8, 20-28, 70-75, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 89). The communist regime in Poland ascended to power with the coercive apparatus being under Soviet control (Johnson 1981: 8, Naimark 2010: 178). Stalin covertly established the Polish National Liberation Committee (PKWN) by recruiting former Polish Communists residing in Moscow Naimark, 2010 #32794: 178}. In Poland as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Soviet military missions oversaw the reorganization of military forces, embedded commanders, advisers, and technicians within the armed forces and defense ministries and purged pre-communist officer corps (Johnson 1981: 2, 7-8). In the early 1950s, the defense minister, chief of the general staff, commander of the ground forces, heads of all service branches, and commanders of all four military districts were former Soviet officers (Johnson 1981: 08). Soviet troops remained in Poland throughout the entire communist regime’s tenure (Barany 2016: 101). Throughout the history of the communist regime in Poland, there were riots against it. On 10/21/1956 the communist party denounced Ochab’s handling of the riots and what they called his political opportunism. Gomulka was instated as party secretary. In the face of a stagnating post-war economy, Polish Communist leader Władysław Gomułka, the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), decided to end government subsidies for food and other everyday items in late 1970.¹⁰ On 12/14 to 12/19/1970 riots over wages were violently suppressed under Gomułka which led to the Communist party ousting him from leadership positions.¹¹ Edward Gierik became his successor. On 09/06/1980 a new round of price increase riots exacerbated by the formation of the Solidarity movement and prompted the communist party to remove the aging Gierek replacing him with Kania. By the beginning of 1981, Solidarity boasted a membership exceeding 10 million people, encompassing nearly 80% of the total workforce. In that year, Solidarity organized its inaugural national congress, during which Lech Walesa, a key figure in the union’s establishment, was elected president.¹² On 10/12/1981 Kania was ousted from his position by the communist party under pressure from the USSR because of his inability to tackle Solidarity and for his anti-Soviet comments. General Wojciech Jaruzelski assumed power and declared martial law. The Military Council of National Salvation, a military junta, was established. It consisted of 21 members: fifteen generals, one admiral and five colonels.¹³ However, since the takeover of a general occurred in the framework of the communist regime it is not classified as a regime change (to a military autocracy). In the beginning of 1982, the Citizens’ Committees of National Salvation were formed, composed mostly of PZPR members. In July 1982, they joined the newly formed Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth.¹³ According to LIED, only executive elections were held until 1946, but they were not categorized as multiparty. In 1947 multiparty executive and legislative elections were conducted and from 1948 onward, both executive and legislative elections were held but they were not categorized as multiparty. Per FH, from 1972 to 1979, the country scores between 11 and 14 as not free, which we also interpret as not free. As classified by FH in 1980, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. As classified by FH from 1981 to 1986, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Per FH’s evaluation from 1987 to 1988, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. From 1947 to 1980, according to Polity5, during this period, the executive encountered slight limitations on decision-making power imposed by other institutions. In 1981 and 1982, the executive’s constraints fell into Intermediate Category 1, between unlimited authority and slight limitations. From 1983 to 1988, the executive’s authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. For 1944-1986, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1987 and 1988, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the given period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem’s PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent and are not really present from 1980 and 1981 and since 1986.

In 1989, negotiations dubbed the Roundtable Talks unfolded between the martial law government led by Wojciech Jaruzelski and the Solidarity opposition movement. These discussions yielded a transitional agreement, allocating two-thirds of parliamentary seats to the Communists and their allies. The remaining one-third of seats was subjected to competitive elections, resulting in a resounding victory for Solidarity. Despite Communist predominance, the parliament in 06/1989 appointed Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a prominent figure in Solidarity, as the first non-communist to helm an Eastern European government since the late 1940s (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 53). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED considers the election as competitive. V-Dem’s CEI scores ambiguous cleanliness. Moreover, the overall election conditions are ambiguous according to V-Dem’s EF&FI. Per FH, in 1989, the country scores between 6 and 7, categorized as partly free, which we interpret as rather free. As per FH’s classification in 1990, the country is considered free with a score ranging from 2 to 4, which we also interpret as free in our framework. Furthermore, in 1989 no political liberties were present according to LIED. But since 1990, LIED confirms their presence. V-Dem’s PCLI scores somewhat political liberties in 1989. Since 1990, political liberties are given. In 1989 and 1990, based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive’s power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. For 1989, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were comprehensive, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1990, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. The end of communist rule occurred because some of the small parties that had historically been coopted into the communist led front, defected to join the opposition (Pease 1994, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 89).¹⁴ In January 1990 the Communist Polish United Workers’ Party dissolved. Based on our observations our judgement differs from LIED and V-Dem. The elections of 1989 were clearly not democratic according to common standards.

On this date, free and fair parliamentary elections were held.¹⁵ Lech Walesa became the first elected president.¹⁶ In 1992, the „Little Constitution“ was adopted, establishing a parliamentary-presidential system and setting the groundwork for democratic governance. This interim constitution paved the way for the more comprehensive 1997 Constitution, which further solidified democratic institutions (Michta 1997). Poland’s integration into Western political and economic structures was marked by its accession to NATO in 1999 and the European Union on 05/01/2004. These memberships reflected Poland’s commitment to democratic values and international cooperation.¹⁷ Throughout this period, Poland worked on reforming its judiciary to align with EU standards, ensuring judicial independence and adherence to the rule of law. These reforms were essential for consolidating democracy and were closely monitored by EU institutions. The political landscape during this period was dynamic, with shifts between left-wing and right-wing parties. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) governed in the early 2000s, followed by the conservative Law and Justice Party (PiS) winning the 2005 elections. In 2007, the centrist Civic Platform (PO) secured victory, with Donald Tusk becoming Prime Minister. When President Lech Aleksander Kaczyński died in a plane crash is 2010, the marshal of the Sejm, Bronisław Maria Komorowski, took over as acting president and was later elected president, underscoring the effectiveness of constitutional procedures.¹⁸ According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. For the relevant regime period, 1991-2015, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating comprehensive constraints on the executive. For the given period, LIED identifies political liberties as present, and V-Dem’s PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are present. The country scored constant electoral competitiveness since 1991 per LIED. Elections were clean in this regime period per V-Dem’s CEI. For the timeframe, the overall election conditions were free and fair per V-Dem’s EF&FI.

On 12/22/2015, the Law and Justice Party (PiS), having secured a parliamentary majority in the October 2015 elections¹⁹, passed the „Law on the Constitutional Tribunal,“ severely undermining judicial independence. This event marked the beginning of systematic autocratization, characterized by the deliberate dismantling of key liberal democratic checks and balances. Since the 2015 election won by PiS, politicians and government-affiliated entities have filed almost 200 lawsuits against independent media outlets and journalists.²⁰ Poland’s electoral system and its execution have typically safeguarded free and fair elections. However, legislative modifications introduced in 2017/2018 have elevated the possibility of political influence over the National Electoral Commission (PKW), responsible for managing elections and overseeing party finances, including the authority to withhold state subsidies.²⁰ On 04/29/2020, the Commission launched an infringement procedure on the law of 12/20/2019 amending a series of legislative acts governing the functioning of the justice system in Poland.²¹ On 03/31/2021, the Commission decided to refer Poland to the Court of Justice and asked for the interim measures. On 07/14/2021, the Court of Justice imposed interim measures on Poland, related to the functioning of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court in Poland, granting the request of the Commission on all points.²² The 2016-2018 made reforms of the Polish judiciary are described as drastically weakening the judiciary’s independence.²³ While there has been a decline in democratic quality and Poland was moving in the direction of an electoral democracy it fulfilled in a comparative perspective still the criteria of a democracy.²⁰ On 10/15/2023 Poland held parliamentary elections, which the OSCE characterized as free and competitive. While voters were given political alternatives, the ruling party PiS enjoyed a disproportionate competitive advantage through its influence over public media and the use of state resources, creating an uneven playing field. Freedom of assembly and association were respected during the election. Voter turnout was high, with approximately 74%.²⁴ While the PiS won the most seats with 34.4%, the Civic Coalition under Donald Tusk formed a coalition with The Left and the Third Way Party to take power from the PiS, with a combined seat count of more than 50%. While judiciary independence is still in question, election-related cases were handled by the highest court with transparency.²⁵ After two months of waiting, President Duda swore in Donald Tusk as Prime Minister in a peaceful transition of power. Donald Tusk and the President entered a constitutional dispute after Duda pardoned two right-wing lawmakers. Duda has threatened the use of his power of veto to impede Tusks efforts of reform, putting Poland’s semi-presidential system to the test.²⁶ Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The elections were competitive following LIED. Moreover, the elections were clean until 2019. Since 2020 somewhat cleanliness is scored (V-Dem’s CEI). V-Dem’s EF&FI underlines the presence of free and fair elections until 2018. Since 2019, according to V-Dem’s CEI, the overall electoral conditions can be interpreted as somewhat free and fair. According to FH, for the assessed regime period, the country is categorized as free with a score between 2 and 4, which corresponds to our interpretation of free. Additionally, political liberties were present until 2016. Since 2017, LIED considers them as absent. V-Dem’s PCLI scores full liberties until 2016. Since 2017, the scores changed to somewhat present. In 1991, according to Polity5, the executive’s constraints fell into Intermediate Category 3, between substantial limitations and executive parity or subordination. Until 1994, as per Polity5’s categorization, the executive’s authority was significantly constrained, nearing parity with other branches, placing it in the third intermediate category. Since 1995, based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive was either equal to or subordinate to other institutions, demonstrating strong constraints on decision-making authority. For 2016-2018, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating robust constraints on the executive. From 2019 to 2022, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For 2023, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were comprehensive.

Electoral Democracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional Sources (Bernhard 2005, Dziewanowski 1977, Materska-Sosnowska 2010, Roos 1964)