Va-PoReg Country Report Afghanistan 1900–2025

Afghanistan had been a sovereign state since 1747. With the Peace of Gandamak Treaty of 05/26/1879, Afghan rulers accepted British control over foreign affairs, effectively placing the country under British tutelage (Willoughby/Fenwick 1974). On 05/31/1880, Abdur Rahman established an autocratic monarchy after defeating domestic rivals and consolidating power under British protection. From this point until 08/08/1919, Afghanistan functioned as a semi-sovereign polity, with external affairs conducted under the authority of the United Kingdom. Power was subsequently transferred to his son Habibullah Khan, who ruled until his assassination in February 1919, after which Amanullah assumed power (Barfield 2010). At the beginning of the systematic observation period on 01/07/1900, Afghanistan was an autocratic monarchy under British protectorate status. Throughout this period, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held, and political competition remained absent, consistent with its classification as an electoral oligarchy (see also LIED).

Afghanistan reached independence through the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1919. Already on 02/28/1919 Amanullah proclaimed himself Emir. From this date to 06/09/1926 he ruled as Emir, after that date as King until 01/14/1929. In 1919, King Amanullah Khan established Afghanistan’s inaugural constitution, eliminating slavery, establishing a legislative body, ensuring secular education, and implementing equal rights for both men and women.¹ According to our observations and LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. The constitution was approved and ratified on 04/11/1922 by 872 tribal elders and government officials.² Along with the constitution, Amanullah supported several other „Western style”-reforms, as for example his 1928 plan to incorporate a legislative reform on the emancipation of women, which enraged the Muslim religious leaders.³ On 11/14/1928, the Shinwari tribe in Jalalabad began to revolt against Amanullah’s ideas on the emancipation of women. This marked the beginning of the Afghan Civil War. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the years 1901 and 1902 V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are absent. Simultaneously, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1903-1922, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. During the rest of the regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. In this regime period per LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI political liberties were absent.

One month after the initial revolt on 11/14/1928, a concurrent Saqqawist revolt, led by Habibullah Kalakani, attacked Kabul on 12/14/1928.⁴ They succeeded in capturing Kabul on 01/17/1929. Next to the Saqqawists in Kabul, a rival government in Jalalabad led by Ali Ahmad Khan emerged and was defeated by the former on 02/09/1929. Nevertheless, they were not able to defeat King Amanullah and Nadir Khan. The latter, however, left the country on 05/23/1929. Following Nadir Khan’s departure, Habibullah Kalakani continued to rule in Kabul. However, his authority was increasingly challenged, and the country remained in a state of civil war. Eventually, Nadir Khan’s troops managed to push back and capture the Presidential Palace in Kabul. This marked on 10/13/1929 the end of the Afghan Civil War and the fall of Habibullah Kalakani’s rule.⁵ Although short-lived, this regime phase can only be characterized as the personalist autocracy of Habibullāh Kalakāni. Different from the Pashtun aristocracy Kalakāni was an ethnic Tajik and came from a rather poor family.⁴ According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. Political liberties remained absent per LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period.

On 10/10/1929 tribal forces led by Mohammad Nadir Khan and his brothers seized Kabul after defeating insurgents who had ousted the previous hereditary monarch, a distant relative of Nadir.⁶ After the end of the Afghan Civil War on 10/13/1929, Nadir began to reign over Afghanistan on 10/15/1929. On 11/01/1929, he executed Habibullah Kalakani, who had taken over Amanullah’s monarchy, by firing squad. Some of his family members as well as his inner circle were also executed. Nadir abolished most of Amanullah’s reforms. Like in the GWF dataset the monarchy is counted as a new regime because Khan ousted the previous hereditary monarch and was only a distant relative of the former monarch (Baxter 1997, Herb 1997: 287). The previous constitution and all voting rights were removed. From 1929-1932 he faced a number of revolts and uprisings. Meanwhile, religious, and tribal forces were becoming stronger in Afghanistan. In September 1930, a cabinet of ten members, which had been named by Nadir Kahn and consisted mainly of his family members, confirmed Nadir’s accession to the throne. In 1931, Nadir Kahn introduced a new constitution, which was approved by the National Council consisting of 105 members (Kakar/Schiwal 2021: 5). The constitution named sharia law as an alternative to statutory law and used heavily religious language and. Additionally, the constitution gave real power to the clergy. Power was vested both in the monarch and in the ulema (Kakar/Schiwal 2021). A number of constitutional concessions were made to the religious and conservatives which empowered the ulema. Additionally, important cabinet positions were given to religious conservatives which placed the judiciary, especially, in conservative hands for a generation. While the constitution did establish a National Consultative Assembly and vested the power in it to approve the conclusion of treaties and conventions and the granting of concessions (Art. 46), the King held the prerogative to declare war and conclude peace and all treaties (Art. 7) (Nations 1953: 3). This period is not coded as a constitutional monarchy because popular participation was an illusion, and the constitution created a de facto absolute monarchy.⁷ On 11/03/1933, Nadir Khan was assassinated. This however had no significant impact on the regime, as his son Mohammed Zahir Shah was immediately proclaimed King and accepted by all ministers, the ulemas and the tribal leaders.⁸ During World War II, Afghanistan began developing its infrastructure and education system and established close relationships with the Axis powers. Nazi Germany played a significant role in Afghan development during this period.⁹ However, during Zahir’s reign, the Afghan government faced tribal revolts from 1944 to 1947. These revolts were initiated by tribal leaders, including Mazrak Zadran, due to worsening conditions for farmers, oppressive taxation, and changes to conscription laws. The conflict ended with a victory for the Afghan government in 1947.¹⁰ In 1953, Mohammed Daoud Khan became Prime Minister and introduced a decisive shift toward Pashtun nationalism. This led to highly tense relations with Pakistan.¹¹ On 03/10/1963 a policy dispute resulted in the forced resignation of the prime minister and direct rule of the royalty under Zahir Shah. In 1964, King Zahir Shah promulgated a constitution which provided for two chambers. However, „there [was] little collective decision-making in the lower house and „sessions [were] frequently marked by curious and confusing practices” (Weinbaum 1972: 62-63), therefore we do not classify this period a constitutional monarchy. It is, however, worth noting, that with the constitution universal suffrage was introduced and in the 1965 parliamentary elections six women in total were elected into the parliament, four in the lower and two in the upper chamber (Emadi 2002: 9). The constitution was abrogated in 1973, when Mohammed Daoud Khan succeeded in his coup.¹ According to V-Dem’s PCLI, political liberties were absent until 1963. Between 1964 and 1973, the index indicates that political liberties were minimal or only marginally present. According to LIED political liberties were absent for the whole period. Until 1963, according to Polity5, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Between 1964 and 1972, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. For the period 1930-1962, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1963, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For 1964-1972, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1973, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held from 1929 to 1931, from 1932 to 1963 only legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty were held, from 1964 to 1972 only multiparty legislative elections were held.

Army general and prince Mohammed Daoud Khan led a successful military coup against his cousin King Mohammed Zahir Shah on this date (Baxter 1997, Craddock 2011, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 39). Zahir Shah formally abdicated on 08/24/1973, remaining in Italy in exile. Despite his affiliation with the Musahiban Barakzai dynasty, Daoud Khan chose to dismantle the monarchy, opting instead to establish a new republic. In doing so, he proclaimed himself as both the head of state and head of government.¹² The earlier constitution, which instituted a parliament with elected representatives and a division of powers, got replaced by a predominantly appointed loya jirga (meaning „grand assembly“). As a result, the parliament was disbanded.¹¹ In 1975, he founded his own political party, the National Revolutionary Party, intending it to be the focal point of all political activities. The aim was to ensure that his former supporters in the PDPA were kept out of political power. Although the party was designated to approve candidates for the upcoming election under the new constitution, Daoud Khan personally appointed the party’s central committee in advance, bypassing any consultation process. Consequently, the committee ended up being filled with his close associates. In January 1977, a loya jirga endorsed a new constitution, introducing several new articles and revising others, including the establishment of a government with a presidential one-party system.¹¹ The classification of the regime is disputed. HTW and MCM classify the regime as a military regime, while GWF and AF subsume it under the category personalist regime. LIED categorizes it from 1973 on as a one-party autocracy which seems problematic since a one-party regime came de jure only in existence in 1977. In this case we would argue that indeed the party founded in 1975 was solely an instrument of the ruler with no real power, which could be seen in its internal structure. Therefore, the regime is classified as a personalist autocracy. Per FH, the country is classified as not free with a score between 11 and 14 and falls into the not free category in our interpretation. According to V-Dem’s PCLI and LIED there were no political liberties for that period. Based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For almost the entire relevant period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified as absent, indicating no judicial oversight of the executive. Concurrently, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. For 1978, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED only legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty were held until 1976, in 1977 executive and legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty, were held.

On this date, a coup by a revolutionary faction of the army allied with the Communist People’s Democratic Party ousted Daoud Khan. A new regime under the control of Nur Muhammad Taraki and his Marxist-Leninist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) took over and established a ruling Revolutionary Council.¹³ On 03/27/1979 as the civil war in Afghanistan grew in intensity, the Soviet-led authority forced Taraki out of the executive (Baxter 1997, Newell 1997). On 12/27/1979 after suffering a strain in relations, the USSR carried out a coup against President Amin and replaced him with Kamal.¹⁴ De facto the regime was a mixture between an indirect rule occupation regime and a communist ideocracy. However, different from HTW this regime period is not coded as an occupation regime in this dataset. It might also be disputed if the regime is rightly classified as a communist regime since the PDPA in its final years moved away from Marxism–Leninism and towards Afghan nationalism. The PDPA sought to modernize the country through socialist reforms, which met strong resistance from Afghan society, leading to permanent instability and conflict. However, the instability was not merely a result of internal ethnic and ideological divisions in Afghanistan but was deeply shaped by international geopolitical struggles, particularly the Cold War. The Soviet intervention in 1979 exacerbated the situation, triggering a prolonged civil war. Afghanistan in this period is a prime example of a weak state caught in global power struggles (Rubin 2002). After the After National Reconciliation talks in 1987, the official name of the country reverted to the Republic of Afghanistan as it was known before 1978 (Hippler 1997). Under the leadership of Mohammad Najibullah in 1990, the party was renamed the Homeland Party and much of the party’s symbols and policies were altered or removed. Karmal, who developed the ideology of the moderate wing of the PDPA, believed that Afghanistan was not developed enough for a Leninist revolutionary approach and instead sought a patriotic and anti-imperialist united front to take the next steps toward revolution.¹⁵ FH classifies the country as not free with a score between 11 and 14 during this period and falls under the not free category in our interpretation. Between 1989 and 1991, as per Polity5’s categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. For the year 1979, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 1980-1987, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For 1988-1990, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For the year 1991, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent. For 1992, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to LIED only legislative elections, which weren’t multiparty were held from 1978 to 1984, in 1985 and 1986 no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held, from 1987 to 1991 multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. The legislative body, the National Assembly, collapsed in 1992 ending our classification of legislative elections in accordance with LIEDs observations. According to V-Dem’s PCLI and LIED political liberties were absent in that period.

On this date, the government of Mohammad Najibullah was ousted by the Mujaheddin insurgency. Afghanistan is from this point on coded as a case with no effective central government. Shortly after, on 04/25/1992, fighting between various Mujahideen factions over Kabul began, triggering the beginning of the second Afghan Civil War. On 06/28/1992 battles between Islamic insurgents forced President Mojadidi to resign (Rais 1993: 910, Ewans 2001: 178, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 39).¹⁶ This resulted in widespread destruction and the deaths of thousands of civilians. Key actors included Jamiat-e Islami, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, and Junbish-i Milli, who were often supported by regional powers such as Pakistan, Iran, and Russia. The conflict was characterized by shifting alliances and intense urban warfare.¹⁷ FH classifies the country as not free with a score between 11 and 14 during this period and falls under the not free category in our interpretation.

The Islamist Taliban captured Kabul, forced the government of Rabanni to flee and a new regime led by Omar enforced strict Islamic rule (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 39). The Taliban leaders quickly renamed the country as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Advocating for the primacy of Islamic law, they chose not to introduce a new constitution.¹⁸ Per FH, the country is classified as not free with a score between 11 and 14 and falls into the not free category in our interpretation. Based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the relevant period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight. Concurrently, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which can be cautiously interpreted as indicating an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. Since 1992 political liberties were still not present per LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period.

The USA invaded Afghanistan beginning on 10/07/2001. On 11/13/2001 the Taliban government in Kabul was defeated (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 39).¹⁹ According to LIED, during this period, no popular multiparty executive and legislative elections took place. Therefore, we code this period as a direct occupation regime. In June 2002 Hamid Karzai was voted into office by the Emergency Loya Jirga (Casey et al. 2020: 27, Derpanopoulos et al. 2016, Suhrke 2011: 164, 179-80). FH classifies the country as not free with a score between 11 and 14 during this period and falls under the not free category in our interpretation. In this timeframe, V-Dem’s JCE indicates that judicial constraints on the executive are limited. At the same time, V-Dem’s LCE shows no value, which, with appropriate caution, can be interpreted as an absence of legislative constraints on the executive. According to V-Dem’s PCLI political liberties were somewhat present from 2002 on, while LIED still considers them absent. In 2004 universal suffrage was reintroduced.¹

On 10/09/2004, presidential elections under universal suffrage were held (LIED). Therefore, we code this period as an indirect rule occupation regime. In 2004, the country was classified as not free by FH, with a score between 11 and 14, which aligns with our interpretation as not free. From 2005 to 2007, the country’s score ranged between 9 and 10, indicating a rather non-free status in our interpretation. In 2008, the country was once again classified as not free, with a score between 11 and 14. On 09/18/2005, multiparty parliamentary elections were held. According to LIED only executive elections were held in 2004, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held from 2005 onward. For 2005 and 2006, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. During the rest of this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. Political liberties were still not present (LIED, V-Dem PCLI).

The occurrence of fraudulent presidential elections is recognized as the event that signified some degree of independence for the government of Hamid Karzai from U.S. influence (Casey et al. 2020: 27, Derpanopoulos et al. 2016, Suhrke 2011: 164, 179-80, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 39). In November 2009, the Afghan attorney-general announced that 15 current and former cabinet members were under investigation for alleged corruption (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 39). By 2014, the Afghan state had almost no legitimacy, and violence blanketed the country as a resurgent Taliban gained ground. President Karzai left office that year at the end of his second term, and U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan came to a close, with the United States transitioning to an advise-and-support role for Afghan forces (Murtazashvili 2022). Per FH, the country is classified as not free with a score between 11 and 14 and falls under the not free category in our interpretation. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED has consistently categorized Afghani elections as not competitive. The EF&FI drops down to speaking of ambiguity when it comes to the freedom and fairness of elections. The 2014 presidential election was mired in so much corruption that the actual winner was hard to identify. V-Dem’s CEI drops back down to rating the cleanliness of elections as none at all, after having assessed it as not really clean between 2005 and 2014. The elections in September 2019 were the first time in Afghanistan’s history that power was democratically transferred.²⁰ On 09/28/2019 Aschraf Ghani was declared winner of the presidential elections. In May 2020 Ghani and Abdallah signed a sharing agreement.²¹ Following Ghani’s 2019 election, the V-Dem EF&FI score plummets back down to calling the election not really free or fair. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as somewhat present by V-Dem’s PCLI for this period. From 2014 to 2018, based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive’s power was noticeably limited but not substantial, fitting Intermediate Category 2. For 2010-2017, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the rest of the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

In April 2021, US President Joseph Biden announced the complete withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan by 09/11/2021 (Murtazashvili 2022). The Afghan government collapsed on this date after President Ashraf Ghani fled the country into exile, following rapid territorial gains by the Taliban. This was neither a formal declaration of independence nor a peaceful transfer of power. According to our regime change typology, the decisive use of (para)military force by a non-state actor qualifies as a revolutionary seizure of power through rebellion. Per FH, the country is classified as not free with a score between 13 and 14 and falls also under the not free category in our interpretation. From 2021 onward, V-Dem’s PCLI indicates that no political liberties exist; LIED also records the absence of political liberties. Under Taliban rule, the regime is coded as an Islamist ideocracy. The regime structure is characterized by the fusion of religious and executive authority. The supreme leader (Amir al-Mu’minin) exercises absolute power without institutional constraints, and legitimacy is derived exclusively from the Taliban’s interpretation of Sharia law. No separation of powers exists; the judiciary operates under direct religious authority, and there is no functioning legislature. V-Dem’s JCE is coded as limited, indicating weak judicial oversight, while LCE has no value, suggesting the complete absence of legislative constraints. No multiparty, executive, or legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

Islamist Ideocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Arjomand 2008, Baxter 1997, Blood 1997, Craddock 2011, Dorronsoro 2005, Enterline/Greig 2008, Ewans 2001, Halliday/Tanin 1998, Hippler 1997, Newell 1997, Rais 1993, Sarbi 2001)