Va-PoReg Country Report Bangladesh 1900–2025

On this date, the Dominion of Pakistan was established. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Governor General, had pledged to establish a new state that would uphold religious freedom and a secular democracy.¹ Even though the Dominion of Pakistan consisted of two geographically separated areas, it was governed as one entity. In 1956 however, it was split into West Pakistan and East Pakistan.² East Pakistan, the territory that later became Bangladesh, was both politically and economically dependent on West Pakistan. In the newly established state, Pakistan, the populace of Bangladesh, were denied access to positions of power and the accompanying privileges (Ahmed 2001: 516). Many of the positions in both civil service and the ministries were held by people from West Pakistan (Sayeed 1972: 389). The Pakistani ruling elites resorted to intimidation and force to retain their authority. During Pakistan’s first general elections in 1970, the Awami League (BAL), a party based in East Pakistan that mobilized against Pakistani governance, secured a significant majority of seats in the federal legislatures. Additionally, it claimed victory in nearly all seats in the provincial assembly. Instead of transferring authority to the BAL, however, the military leaders in Pakistan initiated a conflict against East Pakistan on 03/26/1971 (Ahmed 2001: 516). LIED only starts to provide data for Bangladesh since 1971.

On 03/26/1971, the Bangladesh Liberation War started, in which the Mukti Bahini fought a guerilla war against the Pakistani forces. In early December, India intervened in the conflict, supporting the Bangladesh efforts.³ On 04/10/1971, a Provisional Government of Bangladesh was established, after the Pakistani government newly elected in 1971 was never inaugurated. The reason that Pakistani officials did not want the new government to take office, was the victory of an East Pakistan party, the Awami League, which gained a majority of the seats in the National Assembly. This, in combination with Operation Searchlight, led to civil unrest and ultimately the civil war.⁴ Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, also known as Sheik Mujib or simply Mujib, the leader of the Awami League, was arrested on 03/25. However, a government had been formed with Sheikh Mujib as its president with the senior Awami League leaders who had attended the Mujib-Yahya talks as cabinet members. Tajuddin presented himself as the prime minister.” The Indian government allowed this provisional Bangladesh government to operate from within their borders. This government issued a declaration of independence on 04/10, which acted as a constitution for Bangladesh until 1972. The declaration announced the creation of a constituent assembly, composed of elected legislators, and proclaimed Bangladesh as a people’s republic with its fundamental principles centered on „equality, human dignity, and social justice.⁵ The parliament consisted of the elected Bengali members of Pakistan´s assemblies and they build the Constituent Assembly of Bangladesh. Furthermore, Bangladesh was divided into administrative units, which were governed by elected legislators.⁵ On 12/16/1971 the Bangladesh Liberation War ended. The Provisional Government of Bangladesh under Mujibur took over and started to transform „East Pakistan’s state apparatus into an independent Bangladeshi state”.³ While the Awami League had participated in elections in Pakistan prior to the country’s dissolution, the Mujib administration did not permit opposition parties or conduct fair elections (Blood 1988, Lansford 2012g). Universal suffrage was introduced upon Bangladesh’s independence in 1971.⁶ On 07/10/1972, the constituent assembly formally adopted the constitution of Bangladesh, delineating the nation’s structure as a secular, multiparty parliamentary democracy. Following this constitutional milestone, Bangladesh proceeded to join prominent international organizations, including the Commonwealth of Nations, the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the Non-Aligned Movement.⁷ As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. V-Dem’s PCLI classifies the presence of political liberties as ambiguous in 1971 and as somewhat present in 1972 und 1973, while they were absent following LIED. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the year 1972, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the following year, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period.

On this date, the first parliamentary elections, which were neither free nor fair, were held. Opposition candidates were sometimes prevented from participating by abduction, and vote counting was abruptly halted in constituencies where opposition candidates were in the lead. Bangladesh Awami League won 293 of the 300 seats. This resulted in an electoral autocracy which was de facto extremely close to a one-party autocracy.⁸ Under Mujibur´s rule, the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini was formed, a para-military force, which had to goal to crack down on left wing insurgencies. The group committed numerous human rights abuses without facing consequences. Based on our observations, non-competitive multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period (see LIED). However, during these years, the V-Dem EF&FI indicate that elections were somewhat free and fair, but not really clean. According to FH, for this regime period, the country is partly free with a score of 8, which we interpret as rather not free. V-Dem’s PCLI scores political liberties as somewhat present in 1973 and 1974 and as not really present in 1975. According to LIED political liberties were not present in this period. In 1974, based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

On this date, Mujibur Rahman declared a state of emergency, after unrest arouse after the 1974 famine. He subsequently banned in a self-coup all other political parties and gave himself more power. The only legal party became the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL).⁹ BAKSAL was a political front comprising Bangladesh Awami League, the Communist Party of Bangladesh, the National Awami Party (Muzaffar) and Jatiyo League. All civilian government employees, professionals, and trade union leaders were pressed to join the party.¹⁰ According to FH’s classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. As per Polity5’s classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period and continue to be absent until 1979, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

Shortly after declaring himself a practical dictator, a group of disgruntled military junior officers led by Major Syed Faruque Rahman violently overthrew and killed president Sheikh Mujibur. The officers devised a plan to substitute Rahman’s secular government with an Islamic one.¹¹ Brigadier General Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad, one of the junior officers leading the coup, was appointed as president (Blood 1988, Lansford 2012d:108).¹² In November 1975, martial law was declared. Tajuddin Ahmad, the country’s initial prime minister, along with four other leaders of the independence movement, were assassinated during that time. Following the assassinations, Chief Justice Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem assumed the presidency under military rule.¹³

On this date, a military coup led by Major General Khaled Mosharraf took place to remove the assassins of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from power. Mosharraf put Major General Ziaur Rahman, the Chief of Army Staff, who was not believed to have supported the August coup, under house arrest.¹¹ As per Polity5’s classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. In 1975, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as showing that political liberties are not truly present.

A coup led by socialist officers along with a mutiny by NCOs ousted on this date the military government and killed or arrested senior officers, among them Major General Khaled Mosharraf (Blood 1988, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 43).¹⁴ Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem was made chief martial law administrator and presided over a cabinet headed by the three chiefs of the armed forces. Ziaur Rahman, the chief of the Army, became a deputy chief martial law administrator along with the two other chiefs of the Navy and Air force.¹⁵ However, Bangladesh’s constitution did not have any provision for these arrangements. On 04/21/1977 Ziaur Rahman, assumed the presidency replacing Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem, after the latter resigned on health grounds.¹⁵ As President Rhaman founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in 1978.¹⁶ On 05/30/1977 voters were asked in a referendum „Do you have confidence in President Major General Ziaur Rahman?” and his adopted policies and programs was held, the result saw 98.9% vote yes, with a turnout of 88.1%. Although there is no serious challenge to the validity of the referendum, the critics are suspicious of such massive victory.¹⁷ During his tenure, Rahman lifted martial law, reintroduced multiparty politics, privatized industries and newspapers, created BEPZA, and organized the country’s second general election in 1979.¹ In the presidential elections of 1978, he was elected president by 76.6% of the vote.¹⁸ „This was the result of the popularity that he enjoyed at that time among the masses who extolled his sincerity and dedication to the business of the state” (Khan 1979: 1035). According to FH’s classification for the period between 1975 and 1977, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Per FH’s scoring for 1978, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. Political liberties by V-Dem’s PCLI can be interpreted as not really present and were classified as absent by LIED until 1979. Until 1977, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. In 1978, based on Polity5’s evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the years 1976 to 1978, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For the year 1979, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. According to LIED no multiparty executive and legislative elections were held from 1975 to 1977, in 1978 only executive elections were held.

On this date, general elections were held. The announcement of the elections divided the opposition. Part of the opposition raised demands that should be met by the president so that the elections would not be boycotted. Rahman fulfilled many of these demands, such as the restoration of civil rights, which had been suspended by the emergency order of December 1974, and the commitment to release political prisoners. This led to the participation of almost all opposition parties (Khan 1979). The result was a victory for the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, which won 207 of the 300 seats.¹⁹ The participation of nearly all parties led observers to consider the elections as credible.¹⁹ After the elections, however, the opposition raised accusations of manipulation, an allegation for which there was never any real evidence. However, there were irregularities in the by-elections, which in turn lent credibility to the allegations of manipulation (Khan 1979). FH noted, „[t]he shadow of the violent military rule of the recent past still hangs over election processes and parliamentary independence” (Gastil 1980: 219). On 05/30/1981 Rahman was assassinated by military officers. Vice president Abdus Sattar succeeded him as acting president.²⁰ He was elected on 11/15/1981. AF, BR. HTW and MCM all classify this period still as military autocracy, at least until 1981, GWF and REIGN as personal and LIED as multiparty autocracy. We designate this era as an electoral autocracy due to the general elections of 1979, coupled with preceding concessions. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. The election was not competitive according to LIED. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores elections as somewhat free and fair. Their CEI scores them as not really clean. As classified by FH for this regime period, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. V-Dem’s PCLI classifies political liberties as somewhat present in 1979 and 1980 and as ambiguous in 1981. According to LIED they were absent for this period. As per Polity5’s categorization, the executive experienced minimal limitations on decision-making, placing it in the first intermediate category. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

On the specified date, a military coup orchestrated by General Hossain Ershad, the army chief of staff, deposed the BNP government and instituted a government under martial law (Blood 1988, Lansford 2012d, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 43). Ershad suspended civil rights and the constitution, dissolved the parliament and banned all political parties.²¹ In 1983 he assumed the presidency, promised presidential elections for the following year and legislative elections for the year after that. However, it took until 1986 for the elections to take place.²² Based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive operated with unlimited authority, facing no institutional checks on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Per FH’s evaluation for 1982, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Between 1983 and 1984 the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. In 1985 the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and as ambiguous by V-Dem’s PCLI. According to our observations, no multiparty legislative and executive elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

On this date, the government of Hussain Muhammed Ershad, who seized power in a military coup in 1982, lifted the ban on political parties and conducted a general election (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 14). The parliamentary elections on 05/07/1986 were won by Ershad´s newly founded Jatiya Party with 153 of 300 seats. The BNP boycotted the elections, other opposition parties participated. International Journalist considered the elections a farce, and opposition parties raised allegations of manipulation.²³ On 10/15/1986 presidential elections were conducted. Ershad won with 84% of the vote. However, all major opposition parties boycotted the elections. Again, international newspapers reported widespread fraud and irregularities. In July 1987 mass protests under the lead of a united opposition occurred. In response, Ershad declared a state of emergency and dissolved the parliament on 12/06/1987. In 03/06/1988 parliamentary elections were held, which were boycotted by all major opposition parties. Contrary to the secular constitution, his party declared Islam as the state religion in 1988.²² Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED underlines no electoral competitiveness for this time. Moreover, the V-Dem EF&FI scores elections under this regime as not really free or fair. Their CEI scores them as not clean. As classified by FH until 1988, Bangladesh scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. For 1989, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. Political liberties are classified as absent by LIED and ambiguous by V-Dem’s PCLI for this period. Based on Polity5’s evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. During this regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent.

Transition: Opposition parties and groups backed by students brought the economy and most of the country to a standstill leading to the ousting of Ershad. Power was handed over to Ahmed, the chief justice of the supreme court.²⁴ LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem’s PCLI is classified by us as ambiguous regarding the status of political liberties. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. According to LIED multiparty executive and legislative elections were held. The miscoding issue appears to be linked to the brief duration of this regime.

On this date, relatively free and fair elections were held, in which the BNP emerged as the largest party in parliament (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 14-15). Numerous international observers characterized the elections as both free and fair, with their outcome playing a crucial role in strengthening democracy following the anti-government protests of the late 1980s.²⁵ This marks the first time, that LIED classified elections in the country as competitive. V-Dem’s EF&FI scores them as somewhat free and fair. Their CEI scores electoral cleanliness as ambiguous. According to FH, until 1992 under analysis, the country is rated as free with a score of 5, which we interpret as rather free in our framework. For the period from 1993 to 2001, the country is partly free with a score ranging from 6 to 7, which we place in the rather free category. As per FH, from 2002 onwards, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. V-Dem’s PCLI scores political liberties as somewhat present from 1991 onward. According to LIED political liberties were absent. In response to escalating lawlessness, the government deployed around 40.000 army personnel in an anti-crime initiative starting in October 2002, which extended into 2005. Although initially popular due to public concern over rising crime rates and perceived impunity for criminals, both domestic and international critics have denounced the police and army for their excessive actions during operations. Despite these efforts, lawlessness persisted, compounded by the escalating threat of Islamist extremism across most of the nation. On 08/17/2005, nearly 500 small bombs exploded in 63 out of 64 districts, primarily targeting government buildings, courts, and press clubs. Political violence also surged following August 2004, when a series of grenades detonated at an AL rally in Dhaka, resulting in 22 fatalities and numerous injuries, including several prominent party leaders. Although the government pledged an independent commission to investigate the attacks, concerns arose regarding its impartiality, and the perpetrators remain at large without facing justice (Piano/Puddington/Rosenberg 2006: 69). Furthermore, the two biggest parties, the BNP and the AL, have disrupted the legislative process through prolonged parliamentary boycotts while in opposition. In recent times, political violence during demonstrations and general strikes has resulted in hundreds of fatalities and thousands of injuries in major urban centers. Additionally, law enforcement frequently resorts to excessive force against opposition demonstrators (Piano/Puddington/Rosenberg 2006). According to the Polity5 indicator, during this period, the executive faced substantial limitations on decision-making power. For almost the entire relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. Only for the year 2007, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. According to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were present during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

The military installed a civilian caretaker government (Alamgir 2009: 47, Lansford 2012d: 109). In 2007, the interim government took action against corruption and bribery allegations targeting the leaders of the two major political parties, as well as some of their top aides. The aim was to address the issue of corruption in the country, which had gained a reputation for being highly corrupt.²⁶ According to FH, for the regime period under consideration, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. V-Dem’s PCLI categorizes political liberties as ambiguous for that period. LIED still codes them as absent. Based on Polity5’s evaluation, during this period, the executive faced weak constraints, classified as Intermediate Category 1 between unlimited authority and slight limitations. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For this transitional period, according to our observations, multiparty legislative and executive elections were absent, which aligns with the observations of LIED.

On this date, more or less free and fair parliamentary elections were held. The winning party took over power (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 43). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. V-Dem’s EF&FI indicates that elections were somewhat free and fair while the CEI indicates that regarding cleanliness the elections were ambiguous. According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for the assessed regime period designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. LIED views political liberties as absent and V-Dem’s PCLI categorizes the presence of political liberties for this period as ambiguous with the exception of somewhat present in 2009. As per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks during this time. For 2009, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the years 2010-2012, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were absent. For 2013, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

Hamid was elected president unopposed in 2013. During the parliamentary elections of 12/30/2018, the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) headed by Sheikh Hasina gained the majority with 257 seats. The electoral process was marred by incidents of violence against dissent that saw thousands of people and several political candidates arrested, threats, harassment of the opposition and allegations of electoral irregularities were raised.²⁷ The Bangladesh Awami League was re-elected in 2014 in polls boycotted by the opposition and marred by violence (Lansford 2021: 129). On 12/30/2018, the Awami League won most seats in elections defined by violence, electoral irregularities and accused of vote rigging.²⁸ On 02/07/2018, Hamid was re-elected president since no other candidates chose to contend the balloting (Lansford 2021). According to FH, a score of 6 to 7 for 2013 designates the country as partly free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather free. Between 2014 and 2017, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. From 2018 onwards, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. LIED categorized political liberties as absent. V-Dem’s PCLI classifies political liberties as ambiguous until 2017 and as not really present from 2018 onward. General elections were held in Bangladesh on 01/7/2024, as required by the constitution. The Awami League, led by incumbent Sheikh Hasina, won the election for the fourth consecutive time, with less than 40% of eligible voters participating, according to the Election Commission, which is controlled by the ruling political party. The Awami League secured 224 seats, while independent candidates, many of whom were Awami League members posing as competition, won 62 seats.²⁹ REIGN is the only dataset to classify the regime after 2014 as democratic, while BMR classifies it as non-democratic, BR as a civilian autocracy and RoW and LIED as an electoral autocracy. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. LIED has classified elections as not competitive since 2014. The V-Dem EF&FI and CEI have scored elections as not really free or fair and not clean since 2014. In 2013, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was significantly constrained by institutional checks. From 2014 to 2017, based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. In 2018, based on Polity5’s assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem’s LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

On 07/01/2024, Bangladesh shifted from an electoral autocracy under Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League to a democratizing regime. What began as student protests against a government job quota system quickly escalated into a mass uprising, supported by opposition groups, ultimately forcing Hasina to resign and flee. During the movement, the July Massacre occurred, when security forces brutally cracked down on demonstrators between 07/16/2024 and 08/05/2024, leaving over 1.000 people dead and thousands injured or detained. With the collapse of the Awami League’s hegemonic grip on 08/05/2024, a caretaker authority under Muhammad Yunus assumed power. Although not elected, this authority presented itself as inclusive and transitional, explicitly aiming to prepare the country for new democratic elections.³⁰ Per FH’s evaluation for 2024, the country scores from 9 as partly free, which we categorize as rather not free. V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. V-Dem´s CEI continues to score as not clean. Political civil liberties based on V-Dem´s PCLI are classified as not really present.

On this date, the transitional caretaker government, initially designed to be inclusive and oriented toward democratization, banned and de-registered the Awami League after weeks of unrest.³¹ Even though eliminating the largest party and thus meaningful pluralism perhaps was stabilizing the immediate political climate, the regime crossed the threshold from a democratizing transitional arrangement into a non-electoral transitional regime.

Non-Electoral Transitional Regime as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Ahmed 2001, Heitzman/Worden 1988, Wagner 2008, Alamgir 2009, Blood 1988, Lansford 2012d, Maniruzzaman 1992)