(Monarchical) Electoral Oligarchical Autocracy
In 1947, Pakistan consisted of West Pakistan (today’s Pakistan) and East Pakistan (today’s Bangladesh). Upon achieving independence, authority transitioned to a government headed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Jinnah had been elected shortly prior to independence by a Constituent Assembly, which itself was formed through a combination of appointments by the rulers of princely states and selections from provincial legislatures, either elected through restricted franchise elections or comprising delegates from the Indian Central Assembly who opted for Pakistan (Feit 1973: 70, Gauhar 1996: 16, Zingel 2001). The Constituent Assembly, which had 69 members, served as the legislature, remained in office for seven years without producing the constitution that would set the rules through which future legislatures would be elected. During that time the executive, the Governor General, continued to function under the rules of the colonial administration, which allowed him to choose and dismiss prime ministers without consulting the legislature and to dismiss elected provincial governments (Shehab 1995: 201, Gauhar 1996: 25-29). He dismissed a bill from the Constituent Assembly that required the Governor General to choose prime ministers responsible to parliament (Shehab 1995: 234-38, Gauhar 1996: 23-24). A new Constituent Assembly was chosen in 1954, again mostly by provincial assemblies, some of which had been intervened by the Governor General (Asfar 1991: 54, Feit 1973: 70, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 84-85). In 1948, as per Polity5’s classification, the executive’s authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. In 1949 and 1950, according to Polity5, the executive’s constraints were categorized as Intermediate Category 2, between slight and substantial limitations. Since 1951, based on Polity5’s assessment, during this period, the executive encountered substantial institutional limitations on power. For 1947, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive. For 1948, V-Dem’s JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, while V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. For 1949, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were robust, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. From 1950 to 1952, V-Dem’s JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, whereas V-Dem’s LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited. For 1953-1957, V-Dem’s JCE and LCE are both interpreted by us as indicating moderate constraints on the executive.