Va-PoReg Country Report Uganda 1900–2025

In the mid-1880s, Uganda underwent a period of political turmoil as four distinct religious factions competed for political dominance. In 1888, a coup orchestrated by the Muslim faction ousted King Mwanga II, replacing him with Kalema. The following year, Protestants and Catholics formed a coalition to unseat Kalema and reinstate Mwanga II. Collaborating with the Imperial British East Africa Company, they successfully removed Kalema, restoring Mwanga II to power in 1890. On 06/18/1894 Uganda was declared a British protectorate.¹ Uganda maintained a level of self-governance distinct from complete colonial administration. However, according to our coding rules the regime is a borderline case between a protectorate with internal sovereignty and a colony with no internal sovereignty.² According to LIED political liberties were absent. V-Dem’s PCLI classifies political liberties as not really present until 1955 and as ambiguous from 1956 onward. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held until 1957. Thereafter, only multiparty legislative elections were held during this period. No executive elections were present. Until 1920, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also limited. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate.

On this date, internal self-government was granted to Uganda in 1961, and the first elections were held. Benedicto Kiwanuka of the Democratic Party became the first prime minister. In April 1962 a new National Assembly was elected.³ On 04/25/1962 Milton Obote, leader of the majority coalition in the National Assembly, became prime minister and led Uganda to formal independence on 10/09/1962.³ In 1962 universal suffrage was introduced.⁴ However, elections were not held in all parts of the country, with the Parliament of Buganda nominating 21 members (all of whom belonged to the Kabaka Yekka party) to the national parliament instead.⁵ The constitutional position of Buganda (and the degree to which it would be able to exercise self-government) was a major issue in Uganda.⁶ Obote ruled in a coalition with the Kabaka Yekka movement/party, whose leader King (Kabaka) Mutesa II was named president.⁷ Under the Independence Constitution of 1962, the First Parliament of Uganda, the National Assembly, was partly elected and partly nominated. The Buganda representatives were to continue to be indirectly elected by the Lukiiko.⁸ Although universal suffrage was introduced in 1962, elections were not held throughout the entire country. In Buganda, representatives were indirectly elected by the Lukiiko, rather than directly by the people. This indirect method of election reduced the accountability of representatives to the general populace, a key feature of full democratic systems. Queen Elizabeth II briefly became the ceremonial monarch of Uganda from the 10/09/1962-10/09/1963. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Between 1962 and 1965 the country’s election scored competitiveness by LIED. Following V-Dem’s CEI the election process marks ambiguous cleanliness scores. Additionally, the overall conditions are classified as somewhat free and fair according to V-Dem’s EF&FI. Although one could also argue that the appointment of a quarter of the parliament marks the crossing of the threshold towards an autocracy, there is a qualitative difference between the period 1961-1966 and 1966-1971 that must be taken into account. Not only was there an intact constitution, but with reference to the Civil Liberty Index and the Liberal Component Index of V-Dem it can also be observed that both political and civil liberties as well as judicial and legislative restrictions on the executive increased during this period. However, LIED classifies political liberties as absent. But V-Dem’s PCLI indicates ambiguous political liberties for the entire time, except the year 1963 for which it shows that political liberties were somewhat present. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive was subordinate to or held equal power with other institutions, indicating executive parity or subordination. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. The regime was a borderline case between an electoral democracy and an electoral hybrid regime.

Due to a rift with Mutesa over the 1964 Ugandan lost counties referendum and later getting implicated in a gold smuggling scandal, Obote launched a self-coup with the support of the military. Obote suspended the constitution, arrested five ministers, and transferred all executive powers to himself after a no-confidence vote by members of his own UPC party. In March 1966, Obote relieved the president (the Kabaka, traditional leader of a different ethnic group) of his position. The imprisoned ministers, which were arrested according to the colonial law of Deportation Ordinance filed a lawsuit against Obote’s government yet failed, the Supreme Court Chief Justice ruling that Obote’s actions and ascent to power were legal. In a further case, the East African Court of Appeal found the ordinance unconstitutional. The government moved quickly to pass the Deportation Act, after the Ministers had immediately been rearrested after the court’s ruling.⁹ On 04/15/1966, a new constitution was promulgated that was intended to serve as a preliminary document until a Constituent Assembly had convened. It gave Obote extensive powers, renamed his previous position president, and abolished the post of the prime minister.¹⁰ On 09/08/1967 a new constitution proclaimed Uganda a republic, gave the president even greater powers, declared that incumbent (Obote) would serve a five-year term without a new election and abolished Uganda’s traditional kingdoms.¹¹ An election had been anticipated around 1969, but it never materialized. On 12/19/1969, President Obote survived an assassination attempt at a UPC party congress. The next day, 12/20/1969, Obote declared a state of emergency and banned all opposition political parties, turning Uganda into a de jure one-party state under the UPC.¹² Political liberties were absent according to LIED and according to our interpretation of V-Dem’s PCLI were in an ambiguous range in 1966, before switching into a range, which we would interpret as that political liberties were not really present. Based on Polity5's assessment, the executive faced slight limitations on power during this period. According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held between 1966 and 1970. However, this seems to be a miscoding. According to our observations in this period no multiparty executive and legislative elections took place.

Major General Amin removed Obote from power. On 02/02/1971, Amin proclaimed himself as the president of Uganda, assuming the roles of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Army Chief of Staff, and Chief of Air Staff. Subsequently, hundreds of troops from Obote's region were killed in their barracks (Welch 1974: 133, Kapuscinski 2002: 141, Lansford 2012d: 1480, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 103).¹³ On 06/25/1976 Amin was declared president for life.¹⁴ The regime is coded as a personalist autocracy and not as a military autocracy because there was no observable selection process by members of the military, but Amin just declared himself president. Furthermore, the military became increasingly disorganized under Idi Amin. Formal command structures became less important, while loyalty to Idi Amin became crucial. Consequently, advancement in the system depended on the personal relationship with Idi Amin.¹⁵ Because of the partial suspension of the constitution, the legislature was likewise no counterweight to the power of the executive under Amin.¹⁶ According to FH’s classification for the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and V-Dem’s PCLI. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held since 1971. According to Polity5, during this period, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. Since 1967, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. The coding rule that there are no (direct or indirect) popular multi-party/multi-candidate executive (s)elections is fulfilled. Furthermore, the lifelong term of office is a sufficient condition for coding it as a personalist autocracy.

A combined army of Tanzanian soldiers and Ugandan exiles successfully removed Amin from power. Following this, a coalition government led by former exiles assumed control, with Yusuf Lule assuming the role of provisional president (Mutibwa 1992: 135, Ingham 1994: 7, Lansford 2012a: 1480, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 103-104). Yusuf Lule was removed from his position as interim president by vote. The NCC (National Consultative Commission) of the Uganda National Liberation Front, which was to be an interim governing body with full legislative powers,¹⁰ voted on the motion via secret ballot. He was succeeded by Godfrey Binaisa who was appointed by the NCC as 5th President of Uganda.¹⁷ According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. As classified by FH for 1979, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. As per FH, for 1980, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. For the given timeframe, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, and V-Dem's PCLI is also classified by us as indicating that political liberties are absent. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, and V-Dem's LCE is similarly interpreted as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were also absent.

President Godfrey attempted to relieve the army chief of staff and this decision in turn, resulted in his immediate removal by the Military Commission led by Paulo Muwanga, a civilian. Muwanga ruled the country with a military junta for a few days. LIED does not provide any data during the specified period. As per FH, for 1980, the country receives a score of 8, which we interpret as falling into the rather not free category. From 05/22/1980, Muwanga chaired the civilian Presidential Commission of Uganda until 12/15/1980, assuming the powers of the president during this transitional phase.¹⁸ According to LIED, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which is a misclassification according to our knowledge. Per FH’s scoring for 1980, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem‘s PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties were not really present. The decision to treat the period from 04/11/1979 to 12/11/1980 as a single non-electoral transitional regime, rather than dividing it into three separate regime phases, is grounded in both empirical continuity and conceptual coherence. The brief episode from 05/12/1980 to 05/22/1980, when Muwanga assumed power after ousting President Godfrey Binaisa, does not justify the classification of a distinct military autocracy. Although Muwanga initially acted as head of a Military Commission the nature and function of this body fall short of constituting a fully-fledged military autocracy. The Muwanga-led junta was extremely short-lived, lasting just ten days—and primarily functioned as a transitional instrument aimed at facilitating the reorganization of a provisional civilian authority, namely the Presidential Commission that was installed shortly thereafter. There was no institutionalization of military dominance during this episode.

On this date, a parliamentary election tainted by fraud, violence, and intimidation resulted in a victory for the UPC, propelling Obote back to power as prime minister. The previous head of the interim government, aligned with the UPC, removed district commissioners who opposed the UPC and hindered opposition candidates from running. The widespread use of violence and intimidation during the election led us to categorize the 1980 election as undemocratic (Mutibwa 1992: 141, Lansford 2012c: 1480, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 104). Following a period of internecine conflict within the Uganda military forces that participated in the conflict, a transitional structure oversaw bitterly contested elections in December 1980 that were won by Milton Obote’s Uganda People’s Congress (Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 64-65). Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. During this period elections were not competitive according to LIED. No cleanliness scores affirm the absence of a regular election process (V-Dem CEI). V-Dem’s EF&FI also indicates that the elections were not really free and fair. While there is no data from FH for the year 1981, for the rest of the assessed regime period the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. For that period, LIED identifies political liberties as absent, while V-Dem's PCLI is classified by us as indicating that political liberties are not really present. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. The transition occurred in the wake of the Tanzania-Uganda war and the deposing of ldi Amin by victorious Tanzanian and Ugandan forces.

On this date a military coup led by general Tito Okello and Brigadier (after the coup promoted to lieutenant general) Bazilio Olara-Okello ousted President Obotes government (Rowe 1990). Between 07/27 and 07/29/1985, Olara-Okello was Chairman of the Military Council, and de facto head of state, then General Tito Okello replaced him as chairman of the military council. Olara-Okello became chief of the armed forces. However, in this period no group controlled all the territory of Uganda and it is borderline case to No Central Authority (Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 104, Haggard/Kaufman/Teo 2016: 9164-65).¹⁹ Per FH’s evaluation for this regime period, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem’s PCLI. For the relevant regime period, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were absent, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were limited.

Tito Okello’s ceasefire with the rebels broke down and Okello was forced to flee the country. Yoweri Museveni, the rebel commander and leader, became head of state and eventually president. The National Resistance Army, under the leadership of Museveni, seized control of Kampala. Subsequently, the National Resistance Council was formed, comprising the 38 prominent members of the NRA and NRM, tasked with governance. In April 1987, the National Resistance Council broadened its composition to include cabinet members and their deputies, many of whom were not affiliated with the NRM. Further expansion occurred in April 1989, with the inclusion of elected members into the NRC (Mudoola 1989: 2, Kasfir 1990, Rowe 1990, Lansford 2012c: 1480-81, Geddes/Wright/Frantz 2014: 104). As classified by FH for this regime period, the country scores between 9 and 10 as not free, which we interpret as rather not free. However, the period from 1990 to 1993 is an exception, as the country scored between 11 and 14, which we also interpret as not free. Political liberties were absent according to LIED and not really present according to V-Dem’s PCLI. According to LIED, no multiparty executive or legislative elections were held during the specified period. As per Polity5's classification, the executive wielded unrestricted authority without any formal limitations during this time. The regime is a non-electoral regime. During this regime period, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were moderate. It is a borderline case between a military and a personalist autocracy.

In this period general elections were held in Uganda to elect members to the National Resistance Council. These were the first elections since 1980. The transition noted on marks a shift from a Military (Personalist) Autocracy to an Electoral Autocracy, but it remains within the broader framework of Museveni's rule. On 05/09/1996 elections were held in which Museveni’s government was elected.²⁰ In elections on 02/18/2011 Museveni received 68% of the vote. After allegations of vote rigging, protests emerged that were harshly repressed with violence by security forces. In February 2016, Museveni won again despite international concerns over polling transparency. The opposition claimed widespread fraud, voting irregularities, the repeated arrest of opposition politicians and a climate of voter intimidation during the elections (Macmillan 2022d). Observers from the EU and USA also emphasized on the lack of transparency and criticized the detentions of opposition candidates while critics also claimed the misuse of state powers in favor of the incumbent.²¹ In 2018 a constitutional amendment removed the presidential age limit of 75, allowing the president to seek re-election in 2021 and possibly to retain office for life (Macmillan 2022d).²² On 01/16 Museveni secured another term in the 2021 general election with 58% of the vote. Electoral violence was high. After oppositional candidate Bobi Wine, disputed the results, he was subsequently placed under house arrest by the military (Macmillan 2022d). State violence and intimidation by security forces especially of the opposition continues. Based on our observations, multiparty executive and legislative elections were held during this period, which aligns with the observations of LIED. Since 1989, LIED classifies elections as not competitive. Until 2000, systematic irregularities in the country’s elections are reflected in V-Dem’s CEI, which classifies them as not really clean. Since 2001, the indicator suggests a complete absence of electoral cleanliness. Regarding the overall election conditions, they were somewhat free and fair between 1989 and 1995. Over the next five years, the conditions shifted to ambiguous levels. Since 2001, the elections have been classified as not really free and fair according to V-Dem’s EF&FI. Per FH’s scoring for the years 1996 to 1998, the country is classified as partly free with a score of 8, which we categorize as rather not free. According to FH, for 1999, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. As classified by FH for 2000 and 2001, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. Per FH’s evaluation for 2002-2013, the country scores from 9 to 10 as not free, which we categorize as rather not free. As classified by FH for 2014 to 2016, the country is scored from 11 to 14 as not free, which corresponds to our interpretation of not free. According to FH, for the year 2017, a score between 9 and 10 makes the country not free, which aligns with our interpretation of rather not free. According to FH’s classification for the rest of the assessed regime period, a score between 11 and 14 makes the country not free, which we also place in the not free category. According to LIED the country did not guarantee political liberties for the entire time, while according to our interpretation of V-Dem’s PCLI, political liberties were not really present from 1989 to 1990, ambiguous until 2005, somewhat present in the period 2006-2011 and again in an ambiguous state since 2012 According to Polity5, until 1992, the executive held unlimited authority with no institutionalized constraints on decision-making power. From 1993 onward, the executive's authority was subject to minor institutional constraints. From 1990 to 1994 and between 2000 and 2004, V-Dem's JCE is classified by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were limited, whereas V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. For the remaining years, V-Dem's JCE is interpreted by us as indicating that judicial constraints on the executive were moderate, while V-Dem's LCE is classified by us as indicating that legislative constraints on the executive were robust. While the country has been a borderline case between an electoral hybrid regime and an electoral autocracy between 1989 and 2001 it is a clear case of an electoral autocracy ever since.

Electoral Autocracy as of 07/01/2025 continued.

Additional sources (Decalo 1998, Eriksen 2005, Flanary/Watt 1999, Ravenhill 1974, Rwengabo 2013)